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Abstract
While intergroup peace is statistically far more common than is intergroup or
inter-religious conflict, there has been a rise in recent years in conflict framed in religious
terms. Peace and development practitioners have, in response, become increasingly
interested in engaging religion, in various ways, in peace and development work. A
theoretical field of religious peacebuilding has emerged simultaneous to this increased
practitioner engagement of religion. Despite this increase in religious peacebuilding, at
both practical and theoretical levels, we have not seen a measurable increase in social
cohesion in contexts plagued by so-called religious conflict, as I show in my comparative
examination of case studies in Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I argue that this is
because the current theoretical approach to religious peacebuilding often views religion
as solely ideological and uni-directional in how it relates to conflict and peace (as an
independent, rather than a dependent variable in a given conflict setting). This stems
from a shallow application of Scott Appleby’s ambivalence thesis, which is in and of
itself more robust than is often applied, in both theoretical and practical approaches.
I demonstrate in this dissertation that by re-anchoring religious peacebuilding
theory in a material theory of religion, both the fields of theory and practice benefit by
looking at religion as a more holistic and dynamic conflict variable- one that is shaped by
conflict as much as it affects the course or tone of a conflict itself. I argue for an
expansion of the ambivalence thesis, as I show that religion is not only ambivalent when
ii

it comes to belief or ideology, but it is also ambivalent in the ways in which it seeks to
challenge or uphold the status quo in a given situation. This added dimension of
ambivalence helps peace and conflict practitioners to engage religion in ways that deal
with root cause issues of justice and rights, rather than simply looking at religion through
the lens of violence and peace. This theoretical shift thereby makes space for more
fruitful approaches to actively engaging religion in peacebuilding practice in particular,
intentional ways. Beyond deepening the theoretical field of religious peacebuilding, this
shift will also help to refine how international actors engage religion in peacebuilding for
years to come, looking toward sustainable social cohesion rather than static peace
agreements as the goal for societies in conflict.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Surviving peace is a lot harder than surviving war. During war, you know your side- it’s
easy. After that, it’s not so easy.”1
In September of 2013, several rebel and militant groups, including both the Free
Syrian Army and al-Nusra front, worked together to invade and take control of portions
of Maaloula, a Syrian town outside of Damascus. Some from the militant groups claimed
that they were there to liberate the city- known for its ancient Christian heritage and
character, and under the control of the Asad government - from Crusaders.2 This
encounter took place 2 ½ years after the initial civilian pro-democracy uprisings in March
2011 that were met with violent government crackdowns, leading to the conflict that
remains active as of June 2017. The town of Maaloula is home to a number of ancient
churches and monasteries. I wandered the streets there myself eight years prior, in the
fall of 2005, visiting the Mar Takla Monastery and listening with fascination to the
Aramaic language still spoken in this city. At the time, it appeared quite tranquil, and
while predominantly Christian, seemed to be a site for pilgrims from multiple faiths.
In the September 2013 clashes, numerous townspeople- both Christian and
Muslim- fled, intentional damage to churches and monasteries was reported, and at least
1

Interview with respondent 4, Sarajevo, March 11, 2016.

2

Sohaib Enjrainy, “Syrian Christian Village Besieged by Jihadists,” September 5, 2013, accessed June 1,
2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/09/syria-christians-maaloula-jihadists-oppositionarmy.html
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10 Christians were murdered, with some residents reporting that Christians were shot for
refusing to convert to Islam, as documented by Robert Fisk.3 Some Christians from the
town reported that their neighbors- and former friends- turned against them in this fight.
Fisk describes one woman’s account as follows:
Hanna says that before the war reached Maaloula this month, both Christians and
Muslims agreed that the town must remain a place of peace. “There was a kind of
coexistence between us,” Georgios agrees. “We had excellent relations. It never
occurred to us that Muslim neighbours would betray us. We all said ‘please let
this town live in peace – we don’t have to kill each other’. But now there is bad
blood. They brought in the Nusra to throw out the Christians and get rid of us
forever. Some of the Muslims who lived with us are good people but I will never
trust 90 per cent of them again.” 4
The final portion of this quote demonstrates that one of the pernicious effects of
violence that is understood or labeled as religious in nature, is that it shifts the way
civilians view one another. Neighbors who did not previously look at one another in
primarily sectarian or religious terms begin to prioritize this identity marker in how they
view and relate to one another.
Other reports give additional, and sometimes alternative, narratives on the events,
with some avowing that most Christian worship sites were unharmed, and others
reporting that rebel groups went to great lengths to state that they were not intending
harm to Christians:
Some of the rebels, apparently aware of their public relations problem, said in
interviews that they meant Christians no harm. They filmed themselves talking
3

Robert Fisk, “Syria Crisis: In Sacred Maaloula, where they Speak the Language of Christ, War leads
Neighbours into Betrayal,” Independent, September 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-in-sacred-maaloula-wherethey-speak-the-language-of-christ-war-leads-neighbours-into-8839610.html
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Robert Fisk, “Syria Crisis: In Sacred Maaloula, where they Speak the Language of Christ, War leads
Neighbours into Betrayal,” Independent, September 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-in-sacred-maaloula-wherethey-speak-the-language-of-christ-war-leads-neighbours-into-8839610.html
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politely with nuns, instructing fighters not to harm civilians or
churches and touring a monastery that appeared mostly intact. They said they had
withdrawn from most of the town, posted videos of shelling there by Mr. Assad’s
forces and argued that the government had given the fight a sectarian cast by
sending Christian militiamen from Damascus to join in.5
As one analyst articulates, in describing the mixed sentiments and reactions of
Syrian Christians in this case,
Although many Christians do not trust the regime, the opposition too does not
offer much promise. The opposition’s extremist elements have killed, kidnapped,
and expelled Christians, burned churches, and destroyed early Christian
monasteries. The prelate also complains that the opposition has denied Christians
the ability to remain neutral in this conflict.6
While some of the events themselves are unclear, one this is certain: there were
numerous actors involved on both sides of the “battle lines” in Maaloula in September
2013, working with a diversity of motivations and tactics. Religious justifications and
targeting are one thread of the narrative, and yet, there is far more to the story than a
Christian vs. Muslim plotline. Most notably, Maaloula’s location along the Qalamun
mountain range bordering Lebanon, combined with it being situated on the main road
between Damascus and Homs, made it a strategic site for control in the Syrian war.7
The Syrian conflict is the most well-known example today of a conflict that has
taken on religious dimensions, in that numerous groups involved in the fighting frame
5

Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Assault on Christian Town in Syria Adds to Fears Over Rebels,” The
New York Times, September 10, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/assault-on-christian-town-complicates-crisis-insyria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

6

Flavius Mihaies, “Syrian Christian Perspectives on the War,” SyriaSource, Atlantic Council, January 7,
2016, accessed June 1, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/syrian-christianperspectives-on-the-war

7

Peter Oborne, “Syria war: Maaloula’s monastery destroyed after Assad forces drive rebels out,” The
Telegraph, April 15, 2014, accessed June 16, 2017,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10768900/Syria-war-Maaloulas-monasterydestroyed-after-Assad-forces-drive-rebels-out.html
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their own motives, dividing lines, and justifications for using violence in terms of
religious identity or religious teachings. The ripple effect has been strong, both in the
region, as new forms of sectarianism have arisen in Lebanon and other neighboring
countries, as well as in the US and Europe, where debates over refugee admissions have
taken on the language of religious difference and division, scapegoating Muslim refugees
for the violence that groups like ISIS have perpetrated using the banner of Islam.
Moments like the Maaloula attack have contributed to shaping the narrative, as
well as the course itself, of the Syrian conflict. This episode, and the way it was framed in
international media, is part of the larger narrative being constructed and produced around
the Syrian conflict more broadly,8 as complicated and shifting alliances have often been
simplified into sectarian battles and Christian-Muslim conflicts. The Syrian government
continues to frame it as a “war against terror,” 9 and ISIS militants continue to target
Christians and Yazidis in particular in highly theatrical ways (while targeting the greater
Muslim population of Syria unendingly, but typically with less theatrics). How these

8

See, for example, Jamal Halaby, “Syrian Rebels Seize Control of Christian Village,” USA Today,
September 8, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/09/08/syrian-rebels-take-christianvillage/2781763/; and “Battle for Syria Christian Town Continues,” BBC News, September 11, 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24051440; Robert Fisk, “Syria Crisis: In Sacred
Maaloula, where they Speak the Language of Christ, War leads Neighbours into Betrayal,” Independent,
September 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/syria-crisis-in-sacred-maaloula-where-they-speak-the-language-of-christ-war-leadsneighbours-into-8839610.html; Sohaib Enjrainy, “Syrian Christian Village Besieged by Jihadists,”
September 5, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/09/syriachristians-maaloula-jihadists-opposition-army.html; and Brian Dooley, “Ending Sectarianism in Syria:
How to Secure a Lasting Peace,” Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2016, accessed June 16, 2017,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-04-13/ending-sectarianism-syria.

9

Robert Fisk, “Syria Crisis: In Sacred Maaloula, where they Speak the Language of Christ, War leads
Neighbours into Betrayal,” Independent, September 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-in-sacred-maaloula-wherethey-speak-the-language-of-christ-war-leads-neighbours-into-8839610.html.
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stories get told impacts how they are understood on the ground, and sectarian faultlines
are produced and reified through both events and narratives thereof.
There is a persistent myth among journalists, civil society, and beyond, that
religious conflict is primordial and inevitable, despite evidence demonstrating that intergroup peace is far more common than is conflict involving religious or ethnic groups.10
The “ancient hatreds” framework for understanding conflict is not only coming from the
political right in the United States, although there are numerous examples of this
narrative among conservative political platforms. The political left, along with those
across the middle of the spectrum, also default to this way of framing; for example,
Barack Obama’s 2013 speech on the Syrian conflict referred to “ancient sectarian
differences” as the driving force behind the fighting.11
While scholarly analysis indicates that peace prevails more than conflict, the
primordialist thesis draws strength at a popular level, particularly in the United States and
Western Europe, from the fact that in recent decades conflicts have been increasingly
framed in religious terms, even if not technically religious in origin.12 This paradox raises
a number of theoretical issues related to our understanding of religion itself, and the
relationships between religious factors and episodes of violence or socio-political
conflict. Regardless of whether a conflict can be rightly considered a “religious” one, the
presence of religious discourse and symbolism in a conflict seems to add a distinct
10

See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,”
International Organization 54.4 (2000): 865-68.

11

B.C., “The Sects of Syria: Those Ancient Differences,” The Economist, September 1, 2013, accessed
May 30, 2017, http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2013/09/sects-syria.

12

Pew Research Center, “Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High.” January 2014, accessed May 30,
2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/01/14/religious-hostilities-reach-six-year-high/

5

element to conflict dynamics, creating conditions in which religion cannot be ignored
when attempting to rebuild social trust and cohesion.
Over the last two decades, there has been new energy in the fields of conflict
mitigation, peacebuilding and development, around the explicit engagement of religion.
By and large, foreign policy and development actors have become more interested in the
role of religion in conflict and peace. While there are certainly multiple factors
contributing to this increased attention to religion, one key dynamic at play is the fact that
both conflict actors and observers have utilized religion and religious identity,
rhetorically and symbolically, to frame a number of ongoing wars around the globe in the
last two decades. A 2014 Pew Research Center report states that, “the share of countries
with a high or very high level of social hostilities involving religion reached a six-year
peak in 2012.”13 One only needs to call to mind the ongoing social and political conflicts
in Myanmar, Syria, the Central African Republic, and Nigeria, to understand why the
need to consider and engage religion is of urgent importance today.14 In each of these
cases, as in the illustration in Syria at the beginning of this chapter, religion is invoked
regularly to describe or determine the perpetrators and victims of particular acts of
violence, or to justify actions, or to make sense of a violent event.

13

Pew Research Center, “Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High.”

14

For background on Myanmar and Nigeria, see Fletcher D. Cox, Catherine R. Orsborn, and Timothy D.
Sisk, Religion, Peacebuilding, and Social Cohesion in Conflict-Affected Countries, Sie Cheou Kang Center
for International Security at the University of Denver, 2014, accessed June 14, 2017,
http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/sisk_religion_and_social_cohesion.html; for background on
Syria, see Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto, “The Shattered Nation: The Sectarianization of the Syrian Conflict,”
Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, eds. Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 123-142; and on Central African Republic see Louisa Lombard,
State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic (London: Zed Books, 2016).
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Post World War II, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, conflicts
globally increasingly involve intra-state and non-state actors, rather than being between
nation states.15 Indeed, the scale and death tolls of these conflicts tend to be lower that
the inter-state or major international wars, as they are often waged by actors with access
to smaller arms and weaponry. However, they entail higher levels of brutality against
civilians. Civil wars, and conflicts fought by non-state actors, are the predominant forms
of conflict around the globe today.
Additionally, Jonathan Fox’s 2004 empirical study of conflicts between 19452001 points to another key development in conflict over the past half century in
particular. His study suggests that religious nationalist groups have been responsible for
more conflict than non-religious groups since around 1980.16 Additionally, Fox’s data
suggests that while religious conflict was less violence than non-religious conflict
between 1955-1964, it has become more violent than non-religious conflict since 1965.17
Monica Duffy Toft demonstrates that conflicts featuring religion have increased from
accounting for 36% of civil wars in the 1970’s to 50% of the ongoing wars in 2010.18
In this context, the UN Development Program and other UN agencies, along with
USAID, the US Department of State, and numerous other major international and
15

This is illustrated by data examined in Andrew Mack, “A More Secure World?” CATO Unbound,
February 7, 2011, accessed April 19, 2017, https://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/07/andrewmack/more-secure-world.

16

Jonathan Fox, “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary
Wars, 1945-2001,” Journal of Peace Research 41.6 (2004): 715-731.

17

Fox, “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict,” 726.

18

Monica Duffy Toft, “Religion, Terrorism, and Civil Wars,” in Rethinking Religion and World Affairs, ed.
Shah, Timothy Samuel, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012), 136.
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bilateral conflict mitigation and peacebuilding organizations have taken a strong interest
in religion as an relevant conflict and peace dynamic, deserving of explicit attention.19
Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry launched the State Department’s Office of
Faith-Based Community Initiatives, now called the office of Religion and Global Affairs,
with a speech in August 2013 stating that, given the option now as a politician focused on
foreign affairs, he would have majored in comparative religion.20 Finn Church Aid
launched the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers in 2013, supported by
multiple national and international organizations, including the Organization for Islamic
Cooperation.21 This is a shift from the modern tendency within international peace and
diplomacy to ignore or sideline religion entirely, as a “non-rational” factor. This greater
attention to religion, as a consideration to be taken seriously by actors working in
international peace and diplomacy, has been accompanied by programs and offices
committed to religious engagement, in various senses of the word.
The broader field of peacebuilding operations has thus conceded that religion
matters as a conflict dynamic and therefore as a consideration in designing sustainable
peacebuilding interventions, particularly within the strategic peacebuilding and social
cohesion frames. But how, exactly, does religion matter, and what is meant by religion,
theoretically and operationally, within the peacebuilding frame? Peacebuilding

19

Karam, Azza, and Matthew Weiner, ed., “Religion and the United Nations,” Special Issue, CrossCurrents
60.3 (2010).

20

Secretary John Kerry, Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives, 7
August 2013, accessed June 16, 2017, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/212781.htm

21

“Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers,” Finn Church Aid, accessed June 16, 2017,
https://www.kirkonulkomaanapu.fi/en/donors/international-networks/network-religious-traditionalpeacemakers/
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approaches attempt to engage religion in varying ways, including elite or communitylevel dialogues, problem solving workshops, collaborative social action initiatives,
educational programs, and the like. These forms of intervention are being increasingly
used in current conflict settings, such as in the Central African Republic and Syria, and
yet these approaches are largely understudied in any structured, theoretically-rooted way.
Indeed, religious engagement has become a new norm, and yet, religious engagement
efforts often employ a shallow understanding of religion in conflict and peace dynamics.
There are disconnects between the fields of religious studies on the one hand, and conflict
and peacebuilding studies on the other, in the way religion is treated theoretically and
operationally. Subsequently, religion is often artificially isolated and extracted from
questions about the root causes of conflict, and from other conflict dynamics more
generally.
Because religion and conflict are both context-specific categories, this project will
examine them as such by looking at two distinct cases that have been fields of practice
for various religious peacebuilding efforts: Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each of
these countries saw war come to an official resolution in the early 1990’s, but because
conflict in each context was informed by particular socio-religious identity categories and
rhetoric, peace accords left much work to be done to build (or re-build) cohesion, social
trust, and a collective sense of national identity. This project offers the opportunity to
assess not only religion and peacebuilding efforts during the period of active conflict, but
also their ongoing impact and evolving efforts 25+ years on.
It is important to acknowledge from the outset that religious engagement in
peacebuilding is in no way new; rather, religious actors have long been engaged in
9

mitigating violence and conflict and building peace and justice in their contexts. The
more novel development is that now bilateral and international organizations engaged in
“official” peacebuilding processes are now taking the role of religion seriously, as a
formal arena for official involvement, rather than seeing it as a sideshow or supplemental
(and unofficial) form of engagement as was often the case in the past. Indeed, as argued
above, religious engagement has now become a field of its own.

Methodology
This is primarily a comparative project, drawing on comparative methodologies
from both social sciences and religious studies. I use both between and within-case
comparative analysis in order to test and develop theory (in this case, “religious
peacebuilding”) in cases that have some key similarities, but are also quite different from
one another in particular ways. Additionally, I utilize Wendy Doniger’s methodological
approach to comparative religion. As Doniger outlines in The Implied Spider, comparison
does not attempt to seek out the essence of religious phenomena, but rather to examine
what religious phenomena do and how they do it, in particular spaces. 22 Because religion
is not a bounded variable in and of itself, the comparative religions approach is necessary
for nuancing the case study analysis of how religion manifests in various conflict-affected
settings.
One cannot study religion without doing comparison in some sense. Religion only
exists by defining itself in relation to and against an “other.” As J.Z. Smith points out,

22

Wendy Doniger, The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in Myth (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998), 5.
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“otherness” is an ambiguous category, which only becomes meaningful in terms of
interrelation. Thus, to study religion inherently involves comparing and contrasting. The
question is whether or not individuals are actually capable of carrying out comparison in
a manner that allows the objects under scrutiny to speak for themselves. Pierre Bourdieu
posits that there is no such thing as an objective observer. Western observers in
particular are constrained by the fact that World Religions, as a field of study, is steeped
in Protestant Western theological frameworks; this permeates the comparative endeavor,
as I will explicate more fully in the next chapter.23
Despite the limitations and pitfalls of the comparative endeavor within religious
studies, scholars such as Wendy Doniger and Peter Gottschalk, among others, have
demonstrated ways in which one can “do comparison” without employing an
ethnocentric, universalized understanding of religion. Doniger suggests that comparison
allows us to take both microscopic and telescopic views of religious worlds: “the
individual text is the microscope that lets us see the trees; the comparison is the telescope
that lets us see the forest.” In doing so, we must be careful to avoid searching for
equality between the objects of comparison, as she states, “[i]t is this perverse use of the
doctrine of sameness, applied to both texts and people, that the comparatist most
overcome in order to argue for the very different humanistic uses of the same
doctrine.” In letting go of a presupposition that one will find sameness, Doniger posits,
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scholars can discover through comparison things that are not in one’s own culture, thus
helping to test theories about one’s own culture in the process in a self-reflexive
manner.
The comparative endeavor offers much to scholars of religion. While it is
impossible to do comparison perfectly, without reifying boundaries or essentializing
phenomena, we cannot truly approach religion as such without this necessary form of
analysis. Scholars who attempt to allow subjects to speak for themselves, with multiple
voices and from specific locations, and who appreciate the fluidity of boundaries within
and between religions, and between “the religious” and “the secular” will find the
comparative endeavor ultimately rewarding, as I demonstrate in this dissertation.
The comparative enterprise within religious studies works well in tandem with a
structured-focused comparison methodology drawn from the social sciences. A
structured-focused comparison approach allows for comparison between two cases by
focusing the inquiries on several specific points of comparison, distilled from the larger
case contexts.24 For this, I developed and utilized an assessment guide (Appendix I) to
help break down the various categories of analysis for examining religion and social
cohesion in each context under consideration. Additionally, this between-case
comparison is paired with within-case comparison, as I examine a multiplicity of
approaches and initiatives to engage religion in peacebuilding in both Lebanon and
Bosnia.
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I gathered my research data using three primary techniques: semi-structured
interviews with those involved in religious peacebuilding initiatives, from project leads to
funders to participants; content analysis of programs, including project descriptions,
reports, monitoring and evaluation; and analysis of data from several surveys in both
Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I supplemented my findings through a number of
qualitative interviews in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon between March 2014 –
February 2017. Most interviews were with nationals of the respective countries, although
I also spoke with a handful of expatriates who worked on conflict mitigation and
peacebuilding projects in each context. The respondents varied in their level of religious
commitment and in their roles in each setting, including peacebuilding practitioners,
religious leaders, and political officials. In each case, I reached out initially to individuals
or organizations that I had identified as critical actors in the field of religious
peacebuilding, and used snowball sampling from there to identify new respondents when
in country.

Case Selection
I have selected two cases- Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon- that have had
distinct experiences of the role of religion in their respective conflicts, though both are
religiously plural societies. My case selection, in keeping with a strong structured focused
comparative approach, allows for both similarity and variation between and within the
two cases. Both cases have suffered civil wars that were at times defined and interpreted
as religious in some way, and both saw formal peace agreements at the beginning of the
1990’s, providing over two decades of post-conflict peacebuilding work to study. In both
13

cases, international, bilateral, and local peacebuilders have tested numerous religious
peacebuilding approaches over the last two plus decades.
Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina were historically part of the Ottoman Empire,
though their immediate post-Ottoman experiences differed vastly. Like elsewhere
throughout the Ottoman Empire, Abrahamic religions were dominant in Lebanon and
Bosnia, particularly Christian and Muslim communities. Lebanon currently has 18
recognized religious sects, and governing is divided primarily between Maronites, Sunnis
and Shi’a. The 15-year long Lebanese civil war, which involved both inter- and intrasectarian tensions, officially ended in 1990. However, deeply embedded sectarianism
continues to produce inequalities, friction, and violence, and while sectarianism and
religion are not equivalent categories in Lebanon, sectarianism employs religion in
particular ways. Bosnia-Herzegovina has three main religious populations, which are
divided upon ethnic lines- Croatian Catholics, Bosniak Muslims, and Serbian Orthodox
Christians. Religious identity played a critical role in the Bosnian War, from 1992-1995,
and the country struggles to continue re-building social trust and cohesion.
Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly differ in numerous ways, as will
become clear in this study, but their common experiences of neighbors turning against
neighbors during bloody wars often framed in religious terms, and the subsequent
engagement of religion in peacebuilding endeavors, deliver rich data for comparative
research.
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Thesis
As I will show through my case study research, religious peacebuilding has, by
and large, failed to increase social cohesion in societies that have experienced conflict
that invokes religion.25 I argue that this is, in part, because the approaches to engaging
religion in peacebuilding in the last two decades have relied on limited, belief-centric
understandings of religion and uni-directional interpretations of how religion interacts
with other socio-political realities. I propose revising the theoretical approach to religious
peacebuilding to anchor it in a material theory of religion, articulated most cohesively by
Manuel Vasquez. This revised frame of analysis helps us to more accurately describe the
co-creative relationships between religion, conflict and social cohesion, and thereby
makes space for more fruitful approaches to actively engaging inter-religious work in
peacebuilding practice.
This dissertation challenges what I see as two problematic theoretical assumptions
for understanding and operationalizing religion in the realm of religion, conflict and
peacebuilding. The first is viewing religion as primarily internalized, belief-centric, and
textual; and the second is prioritizing bounded or reified religious group identities. These
assumptions are born out in religious peacebuilding practice, as they lead to approaches
that prioritize belief and internal dispositions, extracting religion and religious identity
from the broader socio-political context.26 Additionally, the heavy focus on texts and
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internal dispositions, and on whether religion is being interpreted in peaceful or violent
results in a lack of attention to issues of justice, including structural violence and power
dynamics. This focus also leads peacebuilding actors to attempt to “extract” religion in
peacebuilding efforts, treating it as somehow separate from the socio-political context
(and actions as deriving from beliefs, rather than being part of an interactive process).
This project works to de-center these theoretical assumptions about religion and instead
to assert into the religious peacebuilding space a material theory of religion.
By looking at religion, conflict, and peacebuilding through the lens of a material
theory of religion, we see religion as a dynamic, inter-connected conflict variable, being
shaped by conflict as much as (or more than) it affects the way conflict is articulated or
enacted. Religion itself becomes through various situations of conflict- thus, when we
speak of religious groups after a 15-year war, we are not talking about the same groups or
dynamics that entered the war, so to speak. Additionally, we see that religion is not only
ambivalent when it comes to peaceful or violent interpretations of text and practice, but it
is also ambivalent in its embodiment in forms that seek to uphold or to resist the status
quo. In fact, it is more helpful to focus on how different actors draw upon religion to
challenge or uphold the status quo in different ways at different junctures (not as a
dichotomy, but a societal dynamic force), rather than simply focusing on whether textual
and verbal interpretations of religion appear violent or peaceful. I argue that this second
the theoretical field and in the areas of practice, that religion can contribute both negatively and positively
to peaceful community relations. The central operating assumption is that religion can be violent or
peaceful (or possibly, neutral). Thus, to engage religion in peacebuilding, one should enlist the peaceful
actors to help create peace and to help the violent actors see the light (eliminate/suppress/reform the violent
religious actors). This is a highly ideological approach to understanding religion, seeing text and belief as
derivative of action (peaceful or violent). While it is certainly true that religion is ambiguous, we need to
build on this and deepen our understanding of how and why, and move beyond the ideological ambiguity
of religion into how it manifests in, and is shaped by, historical and contextual material realities.
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form of ambivalence (resisting vs. upholding the status quo) is as important as the first
(peaceful vs. violent interpretations), and must be taken into account in conflict
assessments and in the design of peacebuilding initiatives.

Ethnicity & Conflict: Laying the Theoretical Groundwork
Research in religious peacebuilding relies upon several key intersecting
disciplines, including that of conflict studies. The theoretical research on religion, conflict
and peace is indebted to the broader field of ethnic studies and ethnic conflict, not in
small part because the seminal text of that field, Donald Horowitz’ Ethnic Groups in
Conflict, posits that ethnicity is a term that encompasses collective belonging based on a
number of factors, including religion.27 Along with Horowitz, Ted Gurr, James Fearon
and David Laitin, Ashutosh Varshney, Daniel Posner, and a number of others have laid
much theoretical groundwork for anyone studying the role of ethnicity- or communal
identities more broadly- in situations of conflict. This section considers some of this
groundwork, drawing out the key theoretical approach I will utilize in this project.
Varshney outlines four main theoretical approaches to studying ethnic conflict
(leaving a fifth- realism- to the side since this is only relevant, he argues, in situations of
all-out civil war). The four approaches are essentialism, instrumentalism, constructivism,
and institutionalism. While strict essentialism, arguing for the primordial nature of ethnic
hostility, and strict instrumentalism, arguing for an elite-driven quest to mobilize
ethnicity in the service of obtaining material goods or power, have largely been discarded
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by the field, theorists have continued to develop more nuanced forms of each. For
example, James Fearon and David Laitin argue for a constructivist-instrumentalist fusion,
arguing that elites construct and play up communal identities in order to justify noncommunal grievances.28
A constructivist approach focuses on the ways that group identities are
constructed, rhetorically or otherwise, to fit a particular narrative at a particular time.
Varshney argues that “[c]onstructivism is the new conventional wisdom in the field of
ethnicity and nationalism. Its central idea is that our ethnic and national identities are
constructs of the modern epoch.”29 Lest we presume constructivism to be instrumentalism
by another name, Varshney points out that the critical difference between these
theoretical models has to do with time: “Constructivism is not about the radical short-run
fluidity of identities. It is about the long-run formation, and the consequent stickiness, of
identities.”30 Thus, these narratives of group identity are not only for the given time in
which they are constructed, but rather, have life far beyond those time frames.
However, he goes on to note that the constructivist approach, while doing a good
job of accounting for the formation of identities, does not readily account for the lived
reality of ethnic conflict. The predominant form of constructivism posits that each society
has a historically constructed “master cleavage” (a group identity that emerges at some
point, then becomes “sticky”) that is then mobilized by political entrepreneurs when
useful. Given this theory, one would expect conflict to be equally spread throughout
28
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societies, since the master narratives and widespread nature of political entrepreneurs
would be the same throughout. This is not the case, however, as ethnic conflict tends to
be locally or regionally concentrated.31 Thus, Varshney argues, a constructivism paired
with institutionalism- the idea that particular institutional structures can allow or
constrain violent conflict- is the most promising theoretical development in the study of
ethnic conflict.32 I will draw upon this theoretical approach to group identity in conflict
throughout the course of this dissertation.
But does the research in ethnic conflict map squarely onto the study of conflict
that is labeled “religious,” especially given Horowitz’s assumption that religion is
something of a subset within the broader category of ethnicity? As Varshney summarizes,
Following Horowitz (1985), ethnicity as a term designates a sense of collective
belonging, which could be based on common descent, language, history, culture,
race, or religion (or some combination of these). Some would like to separate
religion from this list, letting ethnicity incorporate the other attributes. From the
viewpoint of political identities and group solidarity, this separation is a semantic
quibble. It becomes critical, however, when ethnicity and religion clash.33
While it is true that religious identity at times can indeed act nearly identical to
other forms of ethnic identity, I argue that, though often overlapping, religion and
ethnicity are also distinctive categories of identity and mobilization. For the purpose of
this dissertation, I argue for viewing religion as a unique, while interactive and
intersectional, conflict variable. This project thus builds on, but is not constrained by, the
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literature on ethnicity and ethnic conflict in putting forth an interdisciplinary approach,
centered in the discipline of religious studies, which I will unpack further in chapter two.
Additionally, Stuart Kaufman has argued that a symbolic politics theory helps to
explain ethnic violence better than a rationalist or other social-psychological theoretical
approach, as,
the critical causes of extreme ethnic violence are group myths that justify
hostility, fears of group extinction, and a symbolic politics of chauvinist
mobilization. The hostile myths, in this view, produce emotion-laden symbols
that make mass hostility easy for chauvinist elites to provoke and make extremist
policies popular.34
Given the depth of symbolic politics within ethnic (and I would argue religiouslydefined) strife, it is no surprise that post-conflict peacebuilding must engage symbol and
myth in the aftermath of a conflict if lasting social and political peace is to be achieved.

Assessing Peace: Strategic Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion
How are we to articulate the concept of peace, for the sake of this project? First, it
is critical to note that while both Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina are post-war,
neither are necessarily post-conflict, in that there is discernable unrest at societal and
governmental levels. The concept of peace for the purposes of this dissertation is not the
absence of active, ongoing battles, often referred to as “negative peace.” Ceasefires are
peace treaties are critical, of course, for the termination of protracted violence, but in and
of themselves, they do not bring peace, in the positive sense. Additionally, the absence of
overt violence can obscure the structural and cultural violence that persists just below the
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surface. This lack of sustainable, holistic peace in both contexts supports my thesis that
peace might be more likely to come with successful religious engagements.
Recent research on strategic peacebuilding articulates a concept of positive peace
(rather than simply the absence of overt violence). As Atalia Omer states, drawing on
recent work by Scott Appleby and John Paul Lederach on the subject, strategic
peacebuilding
entails a comprehensive, multidimensional, multifocal, and multidisciplinary
process, normatively guided by a pursuit of justice or justpeace. The normative
and comprehensive compass that strategic peacebuilding affords, with its focus on
the continuous striving toward this neologism of justpeace, viewing it as a
contested and continuously debated framework rather than a fixed telos, is
especially helpful in exploring how religion might relate to “peace” as the
cessation of direct violence.35
Justice, rather than the cessation of overt violence, must be part of the goal of a
sustainable approach to peacebuilding. This approach requires managing direct violence,
while simultaneously dismantling systems of injustice, socially and economically. Thus,
root causes of violence are taken seriously and addressed in this approach to
peacebuilding.
This focus on justice as part of the way we assess peace in a given context paves
the way for utilizing social cohesion as a tool for measuring the type of peace articulated
above. William Easterly, et al., define social cohesion as “the nature and extent of social
and economic divisions within society.”36 Their data analysis confirms the hypothesis
35
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that social cohesion is correlated with better institutions and, subsequently, economic
growth.37 How, then, can one foster social cohesion in a society? Easterly, et al., argue
for an emphasis on creating a common identity and utilizing the education system to
provide public knowledge about the social contracts within a given society.38
Regina Berger-Schmitt concurs with Easterly, et al., on the importance of social
cohesion for promoting political stability and economic growth. He points to a few
distinguishing characteristics of social cohesion, including the strength of social relations,
a sense of belonging to the same community, equality of opportunities, and the extent to
which there are low levels of disparities, social cleavages and social exclusion within a
society. He thus identifies two key dimensions of social cohesion: the inequality
dimension, which looks at disparities and social exclusion, and the social capital
dimension, which looks at the level of social relations and common identity.39
Jane Jenson adds a third dimension to the two that Berger-Schmitt proposed:
social cohesion’s relationship to institutions and governance.40 She defends the
intentional vagueness of the concept of social cohesion, as she argues that, while the
concept is based on data, this vagueness allows for malleability within specific contexts.
Jenson proposes three sets of indicators that can be useful in measuring social cohesion
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within societies: those that measure social disparities, those that measure cultural and
ethnic homogeneity, and those that measure participation and belonging.41
Joseph Chan, et al., argue in favor of a more narrow definition of social cohesion.
They assert that both academic and policy discourses around the term lack a clear
operational definition, and thereby limit its usefulness, particularly within the policy
realm.42 A good definition, according to these authors, is both minimal in scope, meaning
it includes only the essential constituent parts, and close to the ordinary usage of the
term.43 They argue that the current approaches to defining social cohesion conflate its
content with the conditions that facilitate it. Thus, they offer the following definition of
the content of social cohesion:
Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal
interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and
norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate
and help, as well as their behavioral manifestation.44
Thus, they offer a mechanism (Table I) for analyzing social cohesion that includes
the vertical and horizontal levels of society, as well as the objective (actual
manifestations of social cooperation, participation, and so on) and subjective (feelings of
belonging, trust, and willingness to help others) levels. These various levels of analysis
include and interact with religious values and religious communities in important ways.
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Table 1

45

This framework from Chan, et al., informs my case study assessment guide, as it
provides a concrete and holistic way of framing social cohesion in relation to sustainable
peace. Social cohesion is thus the way I will concretely assess and articulate peace
throughout this project. While I will continue to use the terminology of peacebuilding, as
it is the most common within the field of theory and practice, my analysis will use social
cohesion as a key measure of peacebuilding success and sustainability.

Situating Religious Peacebuilding: The Ambivalence Approach
The theoretical field of religious peacebuilding is still in its nascent stages, but it
has indeed become a field of study in and of itself. A hallmark of this development is the
45
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publication of an Oxford Handbook dedicated to Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding,
released in the spring of 2015.46 Two key framing texts emerged in the year 2000. Scott
Appleby, the current Dean of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs and the
former Director of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, received
his doctoral training in the history department at the University of Chicago in 1985.47 He
published important texts on the subject of religion and modernity throughout the 1990s,
including, with Martin Marty, the multi-volume Fundamentalism Project. His book The
Ambivalence of the Sacred, published in 2000, lays the groundwork for much of the
theoretical scholarship in the field of religious peacebuilding.48
Additionally, the same year Appleby published The Ambivalence of the Sacred,
Marc Gopin released Between Eden and Armageddon, also asserting that religion has the
malleable capacity to contribute to violence or to peace. Certainly studies had been
written about the role of religion’s relationship to violence and peace prior to this (in
particular, one should note David Little’s The Invention of Enmity, on the role of religion
in Sri Lanka and more broadly), but these previous texts tended to be case studies rather
than intentionally theory-building works. Religious peacebuilding as a theoretical field
draws heavily upon Appleby, and to a lesser extent Gopin, to the present day. In this
46
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section, I will summarize the key arguments that Appleby and Gopin make in advancing
an ambivalence approach to understanding
The crux of Appleby’s ambivalence argument is that religious content can be
purposed toward both peaceful and violent ends, depending on what texts or traditions are
prioritized- by religious leaders in particular- in various contexts. Appleby asserts, in line
with many key scholars of religion, that the ‘sacred’ is in and of itself ambivalent, in that
it is not wholly peaceful or violent. He argues that there are many authentic reactions to
the “experience of the radical mystery of the numinous,”49 which can be a powerful
source for religious violence and for religious peacebuilding. Appleby and Gopin both
observe that, in nearly every religious tradition, the spiritual life force has both creative
and destructive capacities. In situations of so-called religious violence, co-religionists and
commentators are often quick to emphasize that violent acts do not come from a place of
genuine religious commitment. Appleby argues, however, that it is critical to view even
certain acts of violence as genuine religious acts, as religion itself is not inherently
peaceful, if viewed through historical and theological lenses.50
Appleby puts pressure on common assumptions about religious fervency. He
argues that “militant religion,” a phrase that typically used to describe violent expressions
of religious extremism, can also be fervently committed to peacebuilding.51 Thus, he
contends that the oft-drawn dichotomy between religious violence and religious
49

Appleby, “Religious Violence: The Strong, the Weak, and the Pathological,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding, ed. Atalia Omer, R. Scott Appleby, and David Little (Oxford
University Press, 2015): 36.

50

Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 30.

51

Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 7-10.

26

peacebuilding assumes too sharp a contrast between the deeply held commitments that
lead religious people toward violence or peace. Religious ‘militants,’ he argues, can be
deeply committed to the defense of human dignity, and this may at times lead to violence
on behalf of the oppressed in efforts to create just societies.52 Religious violence, then,
can emerge from an exclusivist “dark side” of religion, but it is critical to recognize that
violence can also emerge from a deeply held sense of justice, as religious actors utilize
violence at times to promote justice where it is lacking.
According to Appleby, the primary differences between a ‘militant’ religious
peacemaker and a ‘militant’ religious extreme exclusivist are their attitudes toward
violence and the understanding of one’s role in conflict. While a religious peacemaker
ultimately aims at ending violence and reaching “reconciliation or peaceful coexistence
with the enemy,” a religious violent extremist “is committed primarily to victory over the
enemy, whether by gradual means or by the direct and frequent use of violence.”53 While
the tactics may at times look similar, the goals for these different types of religious actors
are distinct.
Additionally, the different paths that religious actors can follow are not fixed for
any individual or collective actors. Appleby states that,
…the broad patterns of [inclusion, tolerance, and nonviolence; and exclusion,
intolerance, and violence] recur as options confronting people caught in situations
of economic deprivation, social inequality, and heightened racial, ethnic or
religious tension.54
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These patterns do not necessarily exist as distinct dichotomies, but are negotiated
within specific situations with which religious individuals and communities are
confronted. Religious actors do not typically choose a single exclusivist or peace-seeking
path to follow, but rather, negotiate these within different contexts that arise.
The ambivalence of religions allows for malleability of what portions of text and
history can be made sacred or brought into focus. For example, current ISIS leaders have
popularized a portion of a Qur’anic text to justify beheadings, leaving out the second half
of the verse.55 On the flip side, Islamic Relief- a global development organization that
began in the 1980’s- prioritizes and works from Qur’anic teachings on social justice and
compassion.56 Appleby cites John Henry Cardinal Newman in asserting that religions
contain “leading ideas,” which are then interpreted within various historical and
geographical contexts, interacting with a “multitude of opinions,” which shift and are
shifted by their contact with the fabric of society.57 Appleby and others in the field have
stressed the important role of religious leaders in navigating the terrain of religious
ambivalence, as they are able to use their platforms to amplify and popularize certain
ideas or ways of thinking about religious belief and practice. Appleby and David Little
have identified four specific roles that religious leaders tend to play in conflict
55
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management, as heralds, advocates, peacekeepers and educators.58 The considerable role
that leaders have played in generating conflict and soliciting participation in violence
should give us some idea of how powerful religious elites can be in shaping what
religious content gets prioritized and in mobilizing the masses. As Appleby notes,
religious leaders play a key role in reconstructing narratives of the past.59
In ethno-religious conflicts, Appleby argues that ethno-nationalist extremism
combines with “weak religion” to produce religious violence, as weak religious
communities are more easily manipulated and their symbols, which lack robust content,
are something like vessels waiting to be filled with meaning.60 Appleby would argue,
then, that often when religion is used to motivate violence in circumstances of ethnoreligious competition, religion actually “contains” less, rather than more. Religion is
more malleable, or easily influenced, when it is not “strong.”
Appleby thus argues that, “‘religious illiteracy’—the low level or virtual absence
of second-order moral reflection and basic theological knowledge among religious actors,
is a structural condition that increases the likelihood of collective violence in crisis
situations.”61 This, of course, goes against the secularist assumption that by emptying
religion of its strength within society, religious violence can be avoided. For Appleby, the
strengthening of religion, or the building of,
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communities of faith in which the historical argument about the proper ethical
interpretation of the sacred remains vigorous and is sustained through many
formal and informal channels, moves its adherents away from narrowly conceived
ethnic, nationalist, and tribal self-definitions and toward a more tolerant and
nonviolence social presence.62
Thus, the fostering of robust internal debates within religious communities
provides the impetus for tolerant and peaceful approaches to crises.
Appleby has made an important impact on the field of religious peacebuilding by
centering the concepts of ambivalence and ambiguity, and by bringing a more robust
understanding of religion into the field of conflict and peace studies. In many ways, he is
seen as the father of the field of religious peacebuilding, and most scholarship in this
young field of study cites him as a key founder of the theoretical approaches to thinking
about the role of religion in promoting violence or peace.
Marc Gopin is currently the Director of George Mason University’s Center for
World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Revolution, and a professor at the School for
Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason. He received his Ph.D. in Ethics from
Brandeis University in 1993, and has since worked as a conflict resolution practitioner,
professor, and theorist; Between Eden and Armageddon was his first major book
project.63 Gopin argues that values such as justice and forgiveness can emerge from
religious contexts and when they are rooted in religion, people are in certain situations
more deeply committed to these values, even when they don’t fall into line with ‘rational

62

Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred, 79.

63

See https://crdc.gmu.edu/about/staff/marc-gopins-bio/ and http://www.marcgopin.com/about/,
accessed June 17, 2017.

30

choice’ ideologies.64 As Gopin asserts, “people change when a new hermeneutic is
inserted into the symbolic and ritual life of the community.”65 Whether peace-seeking
religious ideas take root depends not solely on whether religious leaders promote them,
but on their adoption by the grassroots.
In creating peaceful pluralistic religious societies, Gopin argues that pro-social
communal values (including religious ones), rather than secular universalism, must be the
starting point.66 He asserts that, “the most effective way to enlist the guards in the cause
of peacemaking is not to destroy what they need to protect but to hermeneutically engage
their traditions in a way that enhances their sense of pride in what they guard so
carefully.”67 Instead of excluding seemingly conservative religious forces, then, it is more
fruitful to engage religions in the hermeneutics of peace and co-existence, pushing
beyond the fleeting surface of pluralism into a deeper religious commitment to peaceful
co-existence.68 Religions can help mitigate conflict, but also have an important role in
capitalizing upon pro-social values to create sustainable and peaceable social cohesion
within divided or diverse religious societies.
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Gopin asserts that when peace activists try to diminish religiosity in order to build
peace, religious people are left with only “conflict-generating theology.”69 He thus
argues for secular peacebuilding practitioners to center and celebrate pro-peace religious
ideas and activism, rather than sidelining religion or diminishing its contributions. In
societies where a large portion of the population is religion, it is critical that secular
peacebuilding efforts take religion seriously.
Gopin cautions, however, against placing too much stock in the functions of
religion, while acknowledging that religious communities and leaders can play important
roles in many peacebuilding processes. Conflicts are never only about religion, and thus
peacebuilding cannot rely entirely on religious actors or the importance of many other
variables is discounted.70 Gopin points out that,
[d]espite the fact that there are liberal elites in each religion who embrace
tolerance and coexistence, if this is not embedded in the experience of the
majority, then we must understand this and work with it, rather than pretend, as
many liberal institutions do, that it is not there.71
Thus, religious values themselves, which are often influenced by elites but are
also configured in important ways at the grassroots level, can help to bolster
peacebuilding efforts.
Gopin, like Appleby, points out that religious communities have a certain level of
social capital within a society, making it possible for messages to be disseminated across
large portions and different levels of society. However, the downside to social capital is
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that it can create cohesion within fragments of society (bonding) without leading to
holistic social cohesion (bridging). Social capital is thus a double-edged sword for
religious peacebuilding efforts; it must be utilized and navigated cautiously if it is not
going to impede these efforts in the long run.
Gopin writes as a practitioner more so than Appleby, whose background is more
clearly situated within the academic realm, rather than the field of practice. Atalia Omer
credits Gopin with bringing religion more squarely into the field of conflict resolution, in
both theory and practice.72
Appleby and Gopin have thus laid critical groundwork for this emerging field of
study. Both argue that we must not write off those acting violently in the name of religion
as “not really religious,” a common impetus for observers (and particularly for religious
actors) who want to assert that “true religion” promotes peace. While from an adherent’s
point of view, this case can certainly be made, the scholar of religion must recognize the
multiplicity of religious expression and the complexity of naming authenticity in the
realm of religious ideology and practice.
In sum, according to the ambivalence approach, religious content is malleable,
ideas and the roles of religious leaders matter, and religious social capital is a critical
component for any peacebuilding efforts in any society where people identity as
religious. These factors contribute to the fact that religious actors can and do promote
peace or foster violence in different contexts. Through these anchoring texts, Appleby
and Gopin have both contributed to the underpinnings of the field of religious
peacebuilding, particularly in popularizing the assertion that religions are internally plural
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and malleable. This approach pushes back against a static view of religion and looks at
the many ways in which religion can come into play to either further peace or stimulate
violence.

The Trouble with Religious Peacebuilding
Atalia Omer, a colleague of Appleby’s at Notre Dame who received her Ph.D. in
the Study of Religion from Harvard University in 2008,73 has recently offered a robust
and thoughtful critique of the theoretical field of religious peacebuilding. One of her
primarily arguments is that the field relies too heavily on a phenomenological approach
to religious ambivalence, leaning on a narrow interpretation of Appleby. She notes that,
“It is this insight [of religious ambivalence] that sparked the industry of religious
peacebuilding and carved out space for a theological and hermeneutical focus on peacepromoting motifs and resources within religious traditions.” However, the adoption and
application of the ambivalence thesis subsequent to Appleby and Gopin has been fraught
with problems, as much work in this field has relied heavily on a shallow reading of
religious ambivalence.
While the ambivalence thesis is effective in debunking essentialist accounts of
religion, many who have drawn upon Appleby have inadvertently put forth another
version of essentialist thought, by arguing that the role of the religious peacebuilder is to
uncover and dust off “true religion,” which is a force for good (even though, as Omer
notes, this is based on a problematic- and incomplete- reading of Appleby). Additionally,
there is a related tendency to see the relationship between religion and conflict or peace
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as unidirectional.74 Here, religion is still seen as static in the causal equation, even while
acknowledging its internal plurality.
Omer argues that the primary pitfall of religious peacebuilding as a field of study
in not in too heavily centering religion, but rather in failing to see “the full spectrum of its
potential contribution.”75 She goes on to argue that,
[t]his is not merely a problem of scope; it also reflects deep theoretical blinders
born out of the misapplication of the insights and potentialities of the
“ambivalence of the sacred.” While construing the militancy of the nonviolent
religious warrior as the inverse of the religiously motivated suicide bomber frees
religion from material or ideal reductionism, it also generates conceptual and
practical blind-spots that need to be deconstructed for scholarship in the field of
religious peacebuilding to grow in a meaningful way.76
Additionally, Omer points out that the field of religious peacebuilding, both in
theory and in praxis, has accepted rather than challenged the secular frame in which
peace and conflict studies have historically operated, assuming the stark division between
the Religious and the Secular that a modern approach to religious studies entails.77 This
has many implications for the way in which peacebuilding actors go about doing
religious peacebuilding, and the way in which scholars approach the topic. Omer argues
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that, “because religious peacebuilding operates within the secularist discourse, it focuses
overwhelmingly on direct and obvious violence, overlooking how religion relates to
structural and cultural violence.”78 Additionally, the acceptance of a clean distinction
between the Secular and the Religious allows practitioners and scholars to isolate
religious factors from the rest of the elements of a conflict, which are viewed as secular
(read, rational) conflict factors. The delineation of the Secular from the Religious has its
own history, as the concept of the Secular emerged from a particular religious frame; a
reflective approach to this distinction, and to the Secular as a constructed rather than
neutral category, helps to shed much light on the critical issues that arise when
considering religious peacebuilding. Religion is not an isolated element of conflict, but
rather is intertwined with, and has a dynamic relationship with, other dimensions of
conflict.
I would add to Omer’s critique that two other key operating assumptions in the
current field of religious peacebuilding limit its depth, and therefore its efficacy. First,
religion is treated primarily within the realm of the internal (beliefs, texts, etc.). Second,
it is seen as uni-directional: as a source of violence or peace, rather than as part of a
multi-directional process within a given context, shaping and being shaped by its sociopolitical environment.
The pitfalls of the current field of religious peacebuilding can be remedied by
anchoring more fully in a strong comparative theory of religion. As noted previously,
religious peacebuilding as a field of study has largely emerged apart from the theoretical
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field of religious studies. A re-orientation toward religious studies gives more life and
more potential to religious peacebuilding as a field of study and of practice.

Chapter Structure
Chapter two begins by tracing the history of religion as a category of analysis.
Through this, I demonstrate the need to de-center the highly Western-Protestant priorities
of belief and the internal experience of religion when studying religion in comparative
context. I then explain in depth the materialist theoretical approach to religion,
demonstrating why this approach is relevant and beneficial to the study of religion,
conflict and peacebuilding.
Chapter three begins with a journey through the articulations and manifestations
of religion in Lebanon from the end of the Ottoman Empire through the present. I
demonstrate the ways religious identity groups experienced “moments of groupness”79
through particular socio-political events, and trace how these moments became
organizing myths with some “stickiness” moving forward. I examine the multiple
conflict drivers of the Lebanese civil war(s) from 1975-1990, with particular attention to
the ways in which religion and religious group identity was invoked in specific ways at
various junctures.
In Chapter four, I turn to the work that has been done since the Ta’if Agreement
to engage religion (through leaders/institutions, identities, and symbols, especially) in
social and political peacebuilding processes. I examine how peacebuilding actors at
various levels are articulating the role of religion in conflict and peace, and how
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specifically they are attempting to engage (or not) religion in peacebuilding efforts. I
find that religion is instrumental in Lebanese socio-political conflict in that it happens to
be the way that otherwise “typical” conflict drivers are framed, but religion/religious
identity is in and of itself changed through the dynamics of socio-political conflict, and
thus emerge constantly transformed by the context in which they are being formed.
In Lebanon, I argue that there are two main strains of (intertwined) religious
peacebuilding approaches: the elite-centered approaches tend to seek to uphold
communal representation/boundedness and seek a peace that prioritizes consensus
between communities; the grassroots actors tend to seek to dismantle communal identity
politics more thoroughly, prioritizing individual human rights and justice to unity
between communities as such. Thus, the ways in which different religious peacebuilding
actors articulate and operationalize both the role of religion and what peace looks like,
differs vastly, as some mimic and reproduce the sectarian system while others seek to
displace it.
In Chapter five, I begin with a tour of some of the key “moments of groupness”
for the religious communities in the area now known as Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including an analysis of how some of these moments stuck. This tour demonstrates that
the religious tensions that showed up in the conflict of the early 1990’s does not stem
from “ancient hatreds”, nor does it stem from religious ideology in and of itself, but
rather the religious ideologies that were used to creating bonding cohesion and to justify
violence during the war, were themselves shaped through a series of socio-political
events.
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Chapter six analyzes the approaches to engaging religion in peacebuilding since
the war, and argues that religion itself was shaped through the war, and in turn shaped
community approaches to social and political life. Bosnia has been a lab for engaging
religion in peacebuilding over the last 20 years. It was the first place where, immediately
post-conflict, a national inter-religious council was immediately formed to help facilitate
the reconciliation process. In a country where group identity lines during conflict were
clearly correlated with religion (as well as ethnicity), and where religious symbolism and
language played heavily into the spectre of violence, this seemed like a clear case where
involving the religious institutions, leaders, symbolism, and language in the
peacebuilding processes would be absolutely necessary. Just over 20 years after the
Dayton Accords, where are we? How, specifically, was religion engaged in the
peacebuilding processes over the last 20 years, and to what effect? I argue here that
religion is inherently political, and can serve to uphold or resist the status quo (spectrum).
We see both strains of religious engagement in Bosnia, with the elite religious institutions
serving to uphold a stagnant political system that grassroots actors (religious and
otherwise) are working to change.
Chapter seven integrates and analyzes key findings across the case studies,
including both similarities and differences between the contexts. In both Lebanon and
Bosnia, people talk about the importance of extracting religion from politics, or of
instrumentally engaging religious leaders to highlight and push out the good/peaceful
religious interpretations. In Lebanon in particular, there is a stark divide between people
in the PB space who want to preserve the status quo through the consensus model, and
those who want to resist the status quo and push for individual rights. Thus, the first
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group right now is more focused on religious peacebuilding because, for the most part, it
serves the consensus model. And we’re seeing a rise in extremisms in both contexts, as
socio-political dynamics serve to reify bonded social cohesion at the expense of bridging
cohesion, and for the purpose of consensus-based peace, rather than bonding cohesion.
Embodied separation, by neighborhoods, schools, and the like, is a influential
component of life in both Bosnia and Lebanon, with sectarian difference being more fully
inscribed into the socio-political system in Lebanon than in Bosnia. There are interreligious peacebuilding efforts that use an embodied and emplaced approach to religion
in practice, and these are promising (teams rebuilding damaged houses of worship, etc.),
but lack widespread engagement. Conceptually, there are important attempts at interreligious understanding, but they are undermined by the embodied and emplaced
separation/segregation. The praxis, therefore, does not match the ontological approach.
Overall, Religion emerges as a dynamic conflict variable. I argue that religious
identity politics often follow/emerge from other politics, but then they re-make the other
politics. Consensus, or unity-seeking religious peacebuilding tends to prioritize elite
representation of groups and reinscribe group boundedness, and it opens the space for
rogue resistance groups that don’t feel represented here to express themselves, sometimes
violently.
Chapter eight, the concluding chapter, argues that by looking at religion, conflict,
and peacebuilding through the lens of a materialist theory of religion, we see religion as a
dynamic, inter-connected conflict variable, being shaped by conflict as much as (or more
than) it affects the way conflict is articulated or enacted. Religion itself becomes through
various situations of conflict such that, when we speak of religious groups after a 15-year
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war, we are not talking about the same groups or dynamics that entered the war, so to
speak. Additionally, we see that religion is not only ambivalent when it comes to
peaceful or violent interpretations of text and practice, but it is also ambivalent in its
embodiment in forms that seek to uphold or to resist the status quo. In fact, it is more
fruitful to focus on how different actors draw upon religion to challenge or uphold the
status quo in different ways at different junctures (not as a dichotomy, but a societal
dynamic force), rather than simply focusing on whether textual and verbal interpretations
of religion appear violent or peaceful. This dynamic is impacted by the state position
toward religion, varying circumstances, etc. I argue that this second form of ambivalence
(resisting vs. upholding the status quo) is as important as the first (peaceful vs. violent
interpretations), and must be taken into account in conflict assessments and in the design
of peacebuilding initiatives. This chapter provides suggestions for how to improve the
field of religion and peacebuilding- in theory and practice- going forward.

Significance
The debates over how to think about religion in situations of conflict that invoke
religious symbols and rhetoric, or that come to be defined as fights between religiouslydescribed groups, are not likely to end anytime soon. Additionally, when analyzing
religion in conflict or violence, there is a tendency across both pop and media culture,
and in international scholarship, to identify textual or creedal root causes of violence
perpetrated in the name of religion, despite studies showing little link between belief and
committing acts of violence. This dissertation offers an alternative approach to this
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broader discussion, showing how, anchored in a materialist theory of religion, religion
acts as a dynamic, mutually interactive conflict variable.
What do we achieve by talking explicitly about religion in contexts of conflict and
peacebuilding? In certain contexts, communities make and invoke religion as a powerful
mobilizing force, particularly to define group boundaries in particular spaces and times.
However, it is not just instrumental. This project approaches religion not as an essence, or
a bounded conflict variable, but rather by observing and analyzing the processes through
which religion impacts and is impacted by- indeed, itself becomes- in situations of sociopolitical conflict. This finding helps to further develop the theory of religious
peacebuilding, bringing it beyond a shallow ambivalence approach, which in turn impacts
the way religion is engaged in peacebuilding in practice. I argue for a shift toward
prioritizing structural and systemic violence in considering religious engagement, which
if followed, will allow for deeper, more sustainable engagement of religion in building
peace in a given context. This will deepen the analysis of religious peacebuilding theory,
contributing to this burgeoning academic field. Additionally, and perhaps more
importantly, this shift will also help to refine how international actors engage religion in
peacebuilding for years to come, looking toward sustainable social cohesion rather than
static peace agreements as the goal for societies in conflict.
I now turn to the key theoretical approaches to understanding religion and offer a
new theoretical frame to guide the research at hand.
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Chapter 2: Religious Peacebuilding, in Theory
20th century peacebuilding approaches often associated religion with nonrationality, as was the case for twentieth-century international politics more generally.
While in the 21st century, the interest in, and explicit engagement of, religion in
peacebuilding has been rapidly growing, the theoretical field of study in this arena has
developed at a slower pace than the field of practice. Religious peacebuilding, as a field
of scholarly analysis and of practice, has heavily relied on textual and internalized
approaches to understanding religion in examining the interplay of religious and violence,
and in developing models for engaging religion in promoting peace. This trend shows up
in the way peacebuilding practitioners think about and engage religion. Indeed, in my
interviews for this project, many “secular” peacebuilding actors say their views have
shifted on the importance of religion in recent years and they are more likely to
consider/include religion in their approaches, but their comments reveal a tendency to
treat religion in a somewhat essentialist and instrumentalist way. Additionally, despite the
increased interest in engaging religion, my interviews with secular and religious
peacebuilding actors alike reveal a predominant sense of the need to “rescue” religion
from politics, seeing that interaction as unnatural and problematic.
Religious peacebuilding, while certainly an interdisciplinary field of study, has
predominantly situated itself in peace & conflict studies, rather than in religious studies.
This has led to a fairly limited understanding of the category of religion within the field,
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and has thus left much to be desired in religious peacebuilding theory and practice, as it
has been confined primarily to a professional, rather than academic, field of study. My
theoretical approach in this dissertation is to put this field of study into more robust
conversation with the comparative study of religion in particular. By rooting religious
peacebuilding theory in a more robust comparative theory of religion, we will be able to
further develop religious peacebuilding theory in ways that will have important impacts
on the field of practice.
In the previous chapter, I argued that the theoretical field of religious
peacebuilding is lacking in its attention to religion as such. This chapter offers a deeper
analysis of what the comparative study of religion can bring to the table, focusing on how
the emergence of a robust material theory of religion can help fill the gaps and pitfalls of
the current approaches to religious peacebuilding in theory and in practice.

A Shift Toward Religious Studies
Grounding the field of religion, conflict and peacebuilding in a materialist theory
of religion can help us address the key problems in the field of religious peacebuilding
outlined above. Certainly, some scholars within this field have already begun to forge this
more fully contextualized, embodied and dynamic approach. For example, as Omer
points out, David Little’s recent work has exemplified a more contextual and
theoretically nuanced approach to engaging religion in peacebuilding.80 Omer states that,
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in Little’s work, “It is not about religions in abstraction as systems of meanings
informing behavior but as interpreted and embodied in the complex interplay between
social practices and institutional formations.”81 Thus, there is promising work happening
in the field of religious peacebuilding, and the theoretical shift I propose here will help to
further orient future research and practice. This section will first briefly outline the
comparative study of religion, in order to then situate Manuel Vasquez’ material theory
of religion within the broader conversation about how we think and talk about religion.

Religion: What’s in a Word?
There is a widespread assumption in popular culture that we all know what we are
talking about when we use the word “religion.” However, when we interrogate the term,
we find a vexed category. I will take us only briefly into the history of the emergence of
religion as a category of analysis, in order to situate a material theory of religion in this
broader context. Walter Capps states that, “little objective understanding of religion
existed before inquirers learned how to make it intelligible.”82 And thus, this section
examines how inquirers have made the concept of religion intelligible, and indeed,
ubiquitous, thus revealing the constructed nature of religion as a category itself.
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Theorists in the past several decades have offered critical perspectives on the
history of the field of religious studies as a Euro-Christian discipline and have questioned
the universal applicability of the term ‘religion.’ Daniel Dubuisson argues that,
[a]s a field of knowledge, academic discipline, or branch of science, the history of
religions is itself a historical phenomenon. This signifies, commonsensically, that
it appeared at a precise time—the second half of the nineteenth century—and a
precise place—western Europe.83
While thinking about the various ideas and practices typically associated with
religion has a long, and largely indiscernible, history, the study of religion as an academic
field of inquiry emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Western Europe.
Thus, while there is a popular tendency to think of religion as something that has
always been a key & comparable feature of most, if not all, civilizations, the history of
the field shows that this is not the case. Indeed, Brent Nongbri argues that the modern
terminology of religion does not correlate with ancient or pre-modern language or
practice- there is no ancient language, in his analysis, that has a term that resonates with
what the modern term “religion” typically entails, though it is common to (wrongly, he
argues) translate a number of words from ancient languages as “religion.”84
Tomoko Masuzawa argues that the idea of religion emerged alongside a discourse
of secularization, and entailed a process of ‘othering’:
The modern discourse on religion and religions was from the very beginning—
that is to say, inherently, if also ironically—a discourse of secularization; at the
same time, it was clearly a discourse of othering. My suspicion, naturally, is that
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some deep symmetry and affinity obtain between these two wings of the religion
discourse; that they conjointly enable this discourse to do the vital work of
churning the stuff of Europe’s ever-expanding epistemic domain... 85
This parsing of that which is “religious” from that which is “secular” is a modern
development. This tendency to parse the religious from the secular heavily influences the
way we now categorize, study and engage with religion, reflecting the Protestant
emergence of the concept of religion itself as internal, belief-centric, and somehow
separable from that in life which is “secular.” Nongbri argues that the Protestant
Reformation in particular helped to shape this modern concept of religion as apolitical, as
Locke and others worked to settle disputes about God in the context of the Protestant
Reformation and Wars of Religion by confining religion to the personal and spiritual.86
Nongbri goes on to point out that the ancient words that are often translated as “religion”
(including the Arabic din) do not separate religion from the secular- in fact, the
separation imagined in these concepts was absent entirely.
David Chidester and Nongbri both trace the exportation of the Christian notion of
religion through colonial and missionary conquests.87 This led to what Chidester calls a
“multilayered discourse about otherness,”88 which intertwined with the fact that religion
became a category in the field of Christian imperial conquests and Enlightenment
institutionalism. Nongbri notes that “European Christians were beginning to recognize
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themselves as a fractured, diverse group, and the ‘heathen’ were beginning to be seen as
divisible into distinct groups.”89 Thus, the concept was projected on cultures across the
globe, as well as projected back on ancient cultures (i.e., Roman and Greek) in order to
validate the claim to conceptual universality.90
Masuzawa, Dubuisson, Nongbri and Chidester demonstrate the invented and
politically charged nature of the concept of religion. In light of this fraught history, how
might we imagine a working definition of religion for discourse and research? J.Z. Smith
offers a helpful lens through which to look toward defining religion. Definition is a
natural human enterprise. It is about “discovering” and creating limits around a concept,91
and these limits are necessarily contingent. As Smith poignantly articulates, map is not
territory, but maps are all we possess.92 The early mapping of religion attempted to
account for and explain the “religion” discovered in realms outside of Christian Europe,
while utilizing a distinctly Christian framework for understanding.
For some early theorists of religion, such as E.B. Tylor and James Frazer, religion
was a pre-rational reaction to the inexplicable in the natural world. 93 For others, such as
Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx, religion emerged as an illusion that served to distract
people from their own psychological issues and alienation. 94 Mircea Eliade took religion
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to be an autonomous reality that is “wholly other” and breaks into the world. The
methodological tradition of phenomenology follows Eliade’s cues; in his approach,
religion must be studied and taken seriously on its own terms.
For Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, religion was a key part of the social fabric,
helping to create and maintain societal ethics, and interacting with the other “interwoven
strands” of social life. 95 Weber and Marx agreed that religion played a critical role in
economic life, though Weber saw it as igniting a work ethic necessary for capitalism,
while Marx, on the other hand, saw religion as complicit in alienating workers in the
class struggle. Freud, Durkheim and Marx all saw religion as a product of non-religious
causes, while Weber saw ideas and beliefs as causal in and of themselves.96
Clifford Geertz argued for religion as part of the culture of symbolic meanings.
He saw culture as “webs of significance” spun by man,97and religion as one part of this
web. Geertz did not look for a large-scale theory on religion to tie everything together,
but rather prioritized local knowledge and experiences, relying heavily on the cognitive
and internalized significations of actions- essentially, reading them as texts.
While the theorists discussed above disagree sharply on how to understand the
origin and function of religion, they are in agreement that religion has an essence of some
kind; that we know what we are talking about when we utter the term “religion,” and they
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demonstrate a general consensus that religion finds its proper territory is internal, in the
realm of ideas and symbols. This assumption stems from the distinctively Christian
origins of thinking about religion as such, and the emergence of the category of religion
itself is indebted to these theoretical inquiries. As Talal Asad states, “there cannot be a
universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and
relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical
product of discursive processes.”98 This realization- that religion as a category is itself
historically constructed- has led scholars to debate whether or not the category of religion
has lost its meaning altogether.

Why Talk About Religion At All?
If there cannot be a universal definition of religion because of the cultural
baggage of the concept, can we still talk about religion? And what benefit does talking
about religion add? Daniel Dubuisson argues that we should stop using the term
“religion” altogether. He states that, while certainly the Western world is not alone in
asking metaphysical questions, organizing rituals or developing theologies, “it made from
this collection of attitudes and ideas an autonomous, singular complex, profoundly
different from everything surrounding it.”99 The Western study of religious has thus
applied its own “web of concepts” widely, affirming its own identity through this
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imposition.100 For Dubuisson, the study of religion as such is a practice in Christian selfaffirmation, and to continue to use this terminology is to continue to promote Christian
ascendancy. He calls for a shift to the phrase “cosmographic formations,” as this phrase
does not carry with it the cultural and political baggage of “religions.” Dubuisson does
not deny the widespread existence of many phenomena to which the term religion often
refers, but rather takes issue with the ethnocentric, culturally specific terminology of
religions.
Dubuisson offers the alternative notion of cosmographic formations,
demonstrating how this way of thinking about the phenomena we typically associate with
religion allows space for variation and diversity. While Dubuisson’s suggestion is
theoretically admirable in that he critiques the cultural and intellectual history of religion
while offering a possible solution to this problem, his proposed solution does not fit the
reality in which we reside. First, it would be impossible to diffuse the concept in any
universal manner. Second, and more importantly, the terminology of religion no longer
“belongs” to western academics; it is utilized and maintains meaning on the ground, and
thus, I would argue, it is not up to academics to do away with the concept.
David Chidester argues that we are stuck with the terminology of religion because
it is historically embedded.101 This embeddedness of the term religion means that EuroChristian academics, while certainly complicit in creating the term, do not fully own it. It
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is rhizomic,102 rooting itself in contexts outside of the one from which it arose, and has
grown new parts of itself. Thus, while religion is not a natural category, it has become a
meaningful category for many. We are stuck with the category of religion, and therefore
the work of the scholar of religion is to study that meaning-making: where, why and how
does the concept of religion become meaningful?
The embeddedness of religion calls for a relational and process-oriented approach
to its study, in acknowledging both particularity and universality simultaneously. Tyler
Roberts, building on the work of J.Z. Smith, calls for an embrace of incongruity and a
resistance to the inclination to locate religion in a static way. Locative approaches to the
study of religion, Roberts argues, “cast religion as a uniquely stabilizing, ideological
discourse of formation and ground the academic study of religion in a secularist
opposition to religious discourse.” Drawing on an analogy from J.Z. Smith, he goes on to
state that,
Locativists take the theologian as the paradigmatic religious figure. But thinking
philosophy’s vigilance through religion demands thinking religion and the study
of religion in terms of the pilgrim, who, as Smith has it, only obliquely and
hesitantly approaches his object of concern and in the end is able only to make
‘fleeting contact.’103
The study of religion thus involves approaching the subject with an expectation
and acceptance that one cannot “capture” religion in any meaningful way, but rather must
study the processes and events through which it is perceivable, if only for a short time.
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Roberts describes this location of religion as always a moment in a process, always
slipping away.104 Thus, the need to fully categorize, locate, or understand religion is an
impossible task, and not the task that the scholar of religion should pursue.
J.Z. Smith argues that because religion is an “inextricably human phenomenon,”
we must take an anthropological approach to its study. Religion, for Smith, is just one
way in which humans communicate worlds of meaning.105 He goes on to state that,
[w]e have not been attendant to the ordinary, recognizable features of religions as
negotiation and application but have rather perceived it to be an extraordinary,
exotic category of experience which escapes everyday modes of thought. But
human life—or, perhaps more pointedly, humane life—is not a series of burning
bushes.106
Thus, I draw from Smith the notion that religion is integrated into the everyday,
mundane life of humans, and is negotiated within this context. This is part of the basis for
Manuel Vasquez’s materialist theory of religion, which serves as a theoretical anchor for
this study.

Religion in a Material World
Manuel Vasquez’s More Than Belief synthesizes and builds on a recent turn
toward materialist approaches to religion within the field of religious studies. For
Vasquez, as for Chidester, Smith, Robert Orsi and others, the study of religion must go
beyond the examination of high doctrine, instead exploring the quotidian world in which
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religion is made and operationalized. Vasquez argues for a non-reductive materialist
framework:
A scholar working within a non-reductive materialist framework, thus, begins
with the acknowledgement that the practitioners’ appeals to the supernatural,
god(s), the sacred, or the holy have powerful material consequences for how they
build their identities, narratives, practices, and environments.107
Vasquez asserts that, in this particular interpretation of cultural realism, selves
and culture are as real as the physical world, and, “although social facts are the emergent
result of the practices of individuals, they precede and transcend specific subjectivities,
enabling, shaping, and delimiting the latter’s activities.”108 He argues that social systems
of symbol and meaning-making are inextricably embedded in physical and socio-political
material contexts. They constrain behavior and possibility, while making room for human
agency within- and sometimes pushing beyond- these boundaries.
While much of the field of religious studies has relied heavily upon Western
Protestant understandings of religion as a primarily internal matter of belief, lived
publicly through symbols primarily in reference to (and as an outgrowth from) texts and
creeds, a material approach to studying religion looks at the processes by which “the
religious” comes to be understood as such in specific contexts, as both embodied and
emplaced. Vasquez summarizes his particular materialist approach as follows:
The sort of materialism I would like to advance approaches religion as the
open-ended product of the discursive and nondiscursive practices of
embodied individuals, that is, individuals who exist in particular times and
spaces. These individuals are embedded in nature and culture, and drawing from
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and conditioned by their ecological, biological, psychological, and sociocultural
resources, they construct multiple identities and practices, some of which come to
be designated, often through contestation, as religious at particular junctures. In
other words, a materialist approach is interested in the processes behind the
naming and articulation of religion as relatively stable and patterned reality
recognized by both insiders and outsiders.109
This approach to the study of religion is thus process-oriented and dynamic, in
that a material approach to religion allows for a multi-directional, interactive relationship
between the many ideological, socio-political and material factors that together comprise
the concept we interpret as religion. He argues against a Geertzian view of religion as a
network of cultural symbols- a popular way of conceptualizing religion in current social
scientific approaches to religion- arguing that,
[i]n the end, despite the focus on locality, everyday life, and cultural complexity,
Geertz’s excessive symbolicism ultimately yields a one-dimensional view of
religion. He sees religion primarily as a set of expressive texts to be enacted and
decoded, not as shifting clusters of embodied practices emplaced in social and
ecological fields.110
Vasquez instead argues for a multi-dimensional and multi-directional
understanding of how religious symbols are developed and understood.
Vasquez traces
a widespread tendency in religious studies to treat inner subjective states as
autonomous and to see ‘external’ practices, institutions, and objects (including the
body as both creative actor and constructed artifact) as derivative manifestations
of those states.111
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This points to a key theoretical shift essential to creating a more robust and
holistic approach to the study of religion, conflict and peacebuilding: the shift from
seeing religion as primarily internal (centered around belief), with social and political
actions and realities deriving from belief, to a material approach to religion that allows
for a back-and-forth relationship between the internal and the external and understands
religious practice beyond just a physical demonstration of internal beliefs.
Additionally, a materialist approach allows for religions to manifest in ways that,
in Vasquez’s words, “impose hegemony and animate resistance, sometimes
simultaneously.”112 This dimension of religion is critical for religious peacebuilding, as
we look to nuance the ambivalence thesis by examining how religion is shaped through
context and works to uphold or resist societal status quos, in tandem with varying
interpretations of religion toward peaceful or violent action in so doing.
The material approach does not discount that texts and ideas play a key role in
understanding religion, but as Vasquez argues,
what a practice-centered approach demands, rather, is that we always place texts
in their contexts of production, circulation, and consumption...the appropriation of
texts by situated actors, ranging from institutions invested in maintaining
orthodoxy to individuals at the margins of society, contributes to the reproduction
of sedimented practices and the creation of new ones.113
Thus, while texts and ideas are relevant and important, we must study them in
context in order to understand why and how certain concepts are developed, prioritized
and mobilized.
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Vasquez agrees with the constructivist approaches to religion in part, though
criticizes strong constructivism for its lack of attention to the world beyond language and
mental structures. Like constructivist approaches within the discipline of conflict studies
laid out in the introductory chapter, a contructivist approach to religion emphasizes the
power of discourse to generate and reify boundaries and identities. Additionally, Vasquez
concurs with Russell McCutcheon’s criticism of the “private affair” approach to religious
studies that often dominates the field (and, I would add, is the primary- and sometimes
sole- mode of understanding religion in other disciplines). However, Vasquez asserts that
there is indeed data for religion- it is not, in other words, un-observable by virtue of being
a socio-political construction.
Another central feature of Vasquez’s materialist theory of religion is
emplacement, defined as “the interplay between culture and nature in the diverse ways in
which individuals and groups draw from religion to negotiate spaces and build places.”114
By studying religion through bodies, places and spaces, and socio-political dynamics, we
find a much more holistic approach to religion than a theoretical approach that limits
religion to the space of cognitive belief, internal experiences, and bounded group
identities.
Invoking Bourdieu’s conception of the habitus, Vasquez asserts that,
As embodied and historical agents, individuals act always embedded in socially
structured situations, amid already-established power relations, which condition
their needs and interests, provide them with specific resources, skills, and
propensities, open and/or close possible courses of action, and delimit the
horizons of the possible and the impossible.115
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Agency and invention exist within certain limits that are contextually inscribed.
This is where Vasquez’s theory diverges from Bourdieu. He argues, building upon
Michel de Certeau, that part of Bourdieu’s shortcoming is his assumption that doxa is
somehow fully realized in establishing the habitus wherein behavior and thought is
permitted and constrained. In reality, there is always human agency apart from the seats
of power, contesting and remaking doxa in their own unique ways.116 Citing Orsi,
Vasquez argues that one must account for the fact that “religious ideas and impulses are
of the moment, invented, taken, borrowed, and improvised at the intersections of life.”117
From this perspective, one does not have to rely on major crises to prompt religious or
social change, as change is always happening, even if at times on the peripheries.
Vasquez also critiques Bourdieu’s assumption that the body is a blank slate that responds
to cultural molding. He thus argues for a “more robust view of embodiment”, along with
a more dynamic logic of practice.118
Vasquez puts forward a theory of religion that prioritizes lived experience while
acknowledging the socially constructed and maintained structures by which the religious
is articulated as such. He reiterates that this is not meant to discredit or displace textual or
ideological approaches to understanding religion:
It is not that doctrines and personal beliefs, texts, and symbols do not matter or
carry their own material density. Rather, I have argued that we can only
appreciate their full materiality if we contextualize and historicize them, if we
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approach them as phenomena produced, performed, circulated, contested,
sacralized, and consumed by embodied and emplaced individuals. Only when we
see these discourses, beliefs, symbols, and texts as mobile yet relatively stable
artifacts operating among and interacting with other material objects within the
times and spaces constructed by the practices of situated individuals and groups
can we avoid the threat of textualism, the temptation to make semiotic systems
purely self-referential.119
Thus, “content” matters, but not as singularly derivative, and contextual/material
factors are just as critical in thinking about how religion comes to be understood and
enacted in varying contexts. If the role of the scholar of religion is to ask how particular
situations and modes of being come to be defined as religious (by insiders and outsiders),
a materialist theory of religion is necessary. The scholar must shift from thinking about
religion as something that happens inside the heads of persons, to thinking about religion
as something that is made through, and interactive with, the world beyond internal beliefs
and experiences- seen both contextually and historically. Action derives from multiple
sources, not simply from mental constructs, and is shaped by the socio-political-materialspatial realities in which we live.
Drawing on, while diverging in important ways from, Eliade’s sense of place,
Durkheim’s social networks, Marx’s social construction, Bourdieu’s habitus, and Asad’s
religious genealogies, among many others, Vasquez has offered a comprehensive
materialist theory of religion that helps move us from internally-focused, text-centric
approaches to understanding religion to a lens on religion that allows us to look
holistically, while analytically, at the lived, embodied, emplaced, process-oriented reality
of religion as it manifests in various ways in the world.
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Additionally, in thinking about religion from a process-oriented perspective,
Bruce Lincoln’s typology of religion is helpful for focusing on the how (process) rather
than what (essence) of religion throughout this study. Lincoln articulates three dynamic
strains of religion, which will prove helpful in providing a critical theoretical frame for
this study. He identifies religions of the status quo, designed to maintain the current
social situation; religions of resistance, which define themselves in opposition to the
status quo religious ideology but are focused on self-preservation; and religions of
revolution, which define themselves in active opposition to the dominant social
fraction.120
Status quo religions can be strong supporters of structural, and somewhat less
overt, forms of violence, while religions of revolution can use violent and non-violent
means to call for justice and recognition. I would add that these categories are always
shifting- again, demonstrating a process over time, rather than being static facts of
existence. The ambivalence of religion does not occur in a vacuum, and thus
understanding the connections between religion, conflict, and peace, requires attention to
questions of justice, inequalities and power in particular locales. This typology, paired
with a materialist approach to religion, provides a more robust and fruitful theoretical
basis for studying the roles (and processes) of religion in conflict and peace.
Lincoln’s categorization, while perhaps in and of itself too stagnant a
categorization, helps to deepen Appleby’s ambivalence thesis, connecting the various
possibilities for religious violence or non-violence to context-specific questions of justice
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and power. While Appleby, Gopin and Little all see religion as more than ideas, much of
their theoretical work reveals an emphasis on ideas or beliefs as the core of religion,
echoing some of the aforementioned problems with the World Religions approach to
understanding religion. Additionally, none of these authors spend much time in their
own texts situating the concept of religion in and of itself. While the authors themselves
take a much more nuanced view of religion, the lack of religion theory in their key
contributions to the field has contributed to a shallow approach to religion within the field
of religious peacebuilding more broadly. Thus, I argue that drawing on a material theory
of religion will add much-needed depth to the way in which religion is conceptualized
and analyzed within religious conflict and peacebuilding studies.
A material theory of religion pushes us to examine process, not essence. It drives
the scholar of religion away from seeing religion as internal and abstract. Additionally,
from this perspective, we do not see religion as an improper incursion into politics- as
many are apt to see it- but rather an interactive part of the socio-political environment.
Thus, there is no need to “rescue” religion from politics to harness it for the good- rather,
we can examine how it has emerged in particular contexts as part of the socio-political
interactions therein. This is particularly helpful in examining the complex web of religion
in situations of socio-political conflict, which is what this dissertation has set out to do.

Understanding Groupness: Who’s in?
How does a material religious framework help us to think about religious group
identity, particularly within conflict-affected societies? Many tend to think of religious
61

identity as natural and stable, and as all-or-nothing: you’re a Christian, a Muslim, a
Hindu, a Jew, or you’re not. But when it comes to group identity, who belongs, how, and
what that belonging means, all shift across time and space. Vasquez, Chidester, and
Rogers Brubaker, among others, argue for a networked approach to “groupness,” rather
than attempting to discursively maintain clear bounds of identity and belonging.
Chidester suggests utilizing open definitions of religious traditions as invented or
imagined communities, steering clear of talking about religions as homogenous systems
or groups. He argues that, “[r]ather than bounded cultural systems, religions are
intrareligious and interreligious networks of cultural relations.”121 Religious identity, in
this line of thinking, involves a network or web of interactions, rather than a bounded set
of ideologies, practices or persons.
Drawing on Dicken, et al., Vasquez argues that,
Networks mark relatively stable but always contested differentials of power, of
inclusion and exclusion, of cooperation and conflict, of boundary-crossing and
boundary-making. Networks are socio-politically, culturally, and ecologically
embedded relational processes that constrain and enable practices as diverse as
place-making and identity construction.122
Thus, for Vasquez, religious groups are better understood as processes rather than
bounded entities. In a similar vein, Brubaker challenges what he calls the tradition of
“groupism,” or thinking about groups of people as homogenous, clearly demarcated
entities. He suggests, instead, that we utilize “a relational, processual, and dynamic
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analytical language” when thinking and talking about groups.123 He speaks of groupness
as an event, and encourages scholars to acknowledge moments of what he calls
extraordinary cohesion at various points, without treating these levels of groupness as
always present. Thus, for Brubaker, groupness is something that happens, rather than
is.124
Brubaker’s understanding of group identity as an event dovetails with Vasquez’s
discussion, drawing on Victor Turner and others, of the “sacred’s potential to generate
communitas.”125 Group identity and values are often reified through participation in
spaces or group practices deemed sacred, such as when Serbian fighters gathered in
monasteries to receive blessings before battle. An embodied and emplaced approach to
religion makes space for understanding these “moments of groupness” in contextually
and historically specific ways, rather than simply as mental constructs.
There is much scholarly work demonstrating that religious identities (in all its
malleability) are formed through friction. Notably, Daniel Boyarin’s work Border Lines:
The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity shows the ways in which Christianity and Judaism
came to be understood as separate categories of religious identity through mutually
constitutive encounters. Neither would have emerged as a distinctive category of belief
and practice without the other. This is but one example of studies demonstrating how
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religious categories of identity emerge in interaction with another (also emerging)
category of identity and through moments of socio-political pushes and pulls.126
Additionally, religious group identity is often operating and interacting at two
(and sometimes more) levels. While religion is formed and lived in locally specific ways,
it is also often interacting with transnational networks of co-religionists and identity
tropes that span across borders. This is becoming even more apparent in our
technologically interconnected globalized world, but it was also true before the advent of
the internet and transnational media, as we will see in the Lebanon and Bosnia case
studies. Europeans, for example, felt a strong connection to the Maronites in Lebanon as
co-religionists, though they quickly realized that European and Maronite lived religion
was quite different.127 One interviewee called this transcendent tendency the “genius of
religion”128 as imagined and real connections are forged with both human & thought
networks across borders.
This approach to groupness debunks an essentialist understanding of religious
conflict. In applying it to the realm of conflict studies, however, we must also temper the
pull toward strong constructivism. Yes, religious group identity is a socio-political
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construction- it is an imagined community.129 And yet, it becomes meaningful and
accumulates a certain “stickiness” (to draw on Varshney) even though the boundaries are
often porous and the group’s Other is also not static, as the shifting opponents and
alliances during the 1975-1900 Lebanese civil war and those during the Bosnian conflict
in the early 1990’s illustrate. A material religion approach to understanding religious
group identities works in tandem with the constructivist-institutionalist hybrid approach
to understanding ethnicity laid out in chapter 1, orienting the research in the next chapters
and providing the field of religious peacebuilding more generally with a sense of religion
that is more robustly embedded in social and political life.

Conclusion
This chapter has outlined and reflected upon the current theoretical underpinnings
of religious peacebuilding, demonstrating the current gaps in theory and practice. I
argued for a material theory of religion as a more authentic and fruitful basis for the study
of religious peacebuilding. The material approach moves us past essentialist and unidirectional understandings of religion, and it also anchors our understanding of religious
groupness as malleable and developed in interaction with socio-political realities. These
theoretical shifts will ultimately allow us to refine and revise religious peacebuilding
theory. In the following chapters, I will apply these theoretical approaches to conflict and
religious peacebuilding in my examinations of efforts in Lebanon and Bosnia
specifically.
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Chapter 3: Tracing Religio-Politics in Lebanon
No one wants to talk about religion in Lebanon.
Sitting at a restaurant in Beirut’s busy Hamra district in March 2015, I tried to
explain my dissertation topic to my server, who had asked about what I was working on
in Beirut. The first two things she said in response to my jumbled explanation of my
research topic were remarks I heard over and over from Beirut residents, at coffee houses,
in taxi cabs, and in shops, whenever the conversation took a turn from the price of a rug
to religion and politics in Lebanon. First, she said that religious leaders cannot have
anything to do with creating peace because they own this country for themselves and are
the ones who create divisions to sustain their economic and political power. Second, she
told me that religious difference isn’t really a problem here, and besides, from her
perspective, all religions are the same at their core.130
The simultaneous belief that religious leaders contribute to creating conflict and
that religion isn’t really a problem is a paradox that persists across Lebanon. Some
explain it by saying that most Lebanese religious leaders have nothing to do with true
religion. These observers say that religion is split between sectarianism, which is a tribal
identity category, and spirituality, which is the heart of religion and is something that is
intensely personal and other-worldly. But is the distinction this simple? Can one neatly
130
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split religion into the categories of sectarianism and spirituality to solve the seeming
paradox of religion having either everything or nothing to do with conflict in Lebanon?
There has been a lot of religious peacebuilding- understood in varied ways- in
Lebanon, in response to what has been widely framed as an intractable religious conflict.
Many peacebuilding practitioners are engaging religion in various ways in peacebuilding
processes in Lebanon, some out of a sense of necessity, and some operating under a
belief that religious leaders and values have unique transformative power when it comes
to social reconciliation.
This case study, which is split into two chapters, explores the following questions:
what do religious leaders, institutions, identities and beliefs have to do with conflict in
Lebanon? How, specifically, have peacebuilding actors engaged religion in
peacebuilding processes. And to what effect? In order to answer these questions, we
need to shift to interpreting religion and conflict in Lebanon within the materialist theory
of religion laid out in chapter two of this project. Thus, another key question at the heart
of this chapter is, how has religion become in Lebanon? The present chapter traces some
of the key “moments of groupness” in Lebanese religious life and examines how certain
moments of group identity had staying power. Chapter Four goes on to examine how
peacebuilding attempts have interpreted, treated and drawn upon religion, and analyzes
what we can say about how these efforts contribute to- or fail to contribute to- social
cohesion in Lebanon.
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Why, and How, Should We Talk about Religion in Lebanon?
Popular narratives have imagined the war in Lebanon as a conflict between
Christians and Muslims (as broadly defined religious categories), or between different
religious sects (smaller groups that emerge from within the broader categories).
However, who was fighting whom changed over time in Lebanon, with Palestinian
militias fighting Christian militias at some points, while Christian militias fought one
another at other times, demonstrating shifts between ethnic, sectarian, and intracommunity conflicts throughout the course of the war. Conflict in Lebanon has never
been a constant series of clashes between two neatly defined, opposing groups, but rather
different confrontations between a number of sub-groups that defined their own
identities, allies, and their enemies differently at different times.131 The narrative of a
religious war, then, is far too neat for what happened (and continues to happen) on the
ground in Lebanon. And yet, religious identities, symbols, institutions, leaders, and
spaces have consistently come into play in important ways. One interview respondent, a
high-ranking commander during the civil war years, described the way in which he and
his colleagues justified their attacks in religious terms:
To be a leader of your community, you have to be the most prominent one to
defend them. So you cannot defend someone who is not afraid. You defend
someone by making him afraid of the other. Or nourishing this fear, not directly
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maybe, but so many ways- many tools….To be number one you have to be the
most extremist of the leaders of your community.132
This reflection points to the way that religious boundaries, and the content of
religious identities, were produced through the dynamics of war and conflict, as part of
the socio-political processes at work in Lebanon, as I will examine in further depth in this
chapter. Through this chapter, we will walk through how religion came to look and act
the way it does in Lebanon, but as a preface to that more in-depth analysis, it is worth a
preliminary overview of some of the key elements of what it means to be religious in
Lebanon. While religiosity and piety are part of what religion means in Lebanon for
some, more salient to everyday life are the ways that religious identity contains and
delineates one’s social and political access.
Historically, religion is deeply fused and intertwined with national identity in
Lebanon. There are 18 recognized religious sects in Lebanon. There has not been a
census since 1932, when the political system was set up to reflect proportional
representation- at all levels- for these recognized sects. This set up reveals that two key
elements of religious life in Lebanon. First, religious identity exists within boundaries
prescribed by the state- you must belong to one of the recognized sects in order to have
access to voting and other expressions of citizenship, as well as having access to social,
family and personal legal services. The census determined the amount of representation
each sect has in the Lebanese political system, revealing that individuals do not
participate in the Lebanese system as individuals, but rather as members of their sect.
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Religious affiliation is on the identity card of every Lebanese. A Lebanese individual
does not have access to the institution of marriage, for instance, as an individual, but only
through membership in a religious community, as all marriages are conducted through
the religious bodies, rather than through civic courts. Second, the fact that the census
numbers of 1932 are still the only existing metrics (though sectarian representation
allotments did shift slightly through the Ta’if agreement) reveals a reliance on past
realities and ideas of Lebanon for current modes of governance. Demographics have
certainly shifted dramatically since 1932, and this reality has led to much strife in the
present day as now larger sects do not have the political access their numbers would
prescribe, were there to be another census, as every Lebanese knows that the country is
now majority Muslim.133 Suffice it to say, using the 1932 data serves the system itself,
rather than the general populace, and there is generally political consensus on keeping the
1932 census data in order to avoid opening Pandora’s box, so to speak.
One’s ability to participate politically is also directly tied to one’s membership in
a religious community. The political system itself reserves specific roles for
representatives from particular religious communities (i.e., the President must be a
Maronite Christian, while the House Speaker must be Shi’a Muslim and so on; this
carries through military leadership and the allocations of seats in the Parliament on down
to a number of less glamorous public service positions). Voting access is based on one’s
sectarian affiliation, as well as one’s geographic affiliation (villages) and, for women in
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particular, one’s family ties. Media outlets are controlled by sects, and schools are, for the
most part, homogenous when it comes to sectarian identity.134 Thus, religion in Lebanon
is hardly limited to the internal beliefs of a person, or to the rituals and practices of a
community. It infuses many aspects of life, to the point that many no longer recognize it
as “religion”, understood from a primarily Euro-modern perspective.
The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) data show that Lebanon and
has a fairly low level of government regulation of religion (4.9/), although this number
arguably fails to take into account the ways in which government does indeed exert
control over religion through the control given to religious institutions themselves (thus,
providing the state with somewhat indirect control that is not reflected in the ARDA
number). The state also determines what can and cannot be considered an official
religion. Additionally, ARDA data shows a very high level of social regulation of
religion in Lebanon (referring to the ways in which societal forces restrict and constrain
free religious practice), at 9.3/10, demonstrating that Lebanese society strongly restricts
freedom of religion in a variety of ways.
Does it make sense to talk about Lebanon’s civil unrest as religious in any way?
Some scholars on Lebanon would say no, that it is clearly economic and socio-political,
and that the narratives of religion are primarily laid upon the context by outsiders seeking
to describe it in religious terms. According to this perspective, the religious conflict
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narrative is a false one, though one that gets reified through the narratives we tell.135
However, this view rests on a simplistic understanding of religion: religion as primarily a
matter of internal belief, removed from the rest of life. If we instead think of religion as
material, interwoven with other aspects of life and actually itself made through those
other aspects of life (the social, the political, the bodies interacting with other bodies in
the real world), then we have a different way of thinking about what constitutes the
“religious.”
A material theory of religion, as I am utilizing here, immediately asks us to take a
holistic approach to understanding what religion is and how it works in a given context.
Religion in Lebanon is complex and multidimensional. Certainly the Lebanese conflict is
not religious in the sense that it is not primarily driven by beliefs coming out to clash
with one another in ideological battles. But socio-political conflict in Lebanon has
important religious elements in the material ways in which it has played out, thereby
shaping (and re-shaping) what religion means in this context. Religion is strategically
bound up in the creation of boundaries, as the creation of social and political boundaries
is part of what religion has meant historically.
Labeling a conflict as religious in part should not be at the expense of other
factors; on the contrary, it is always layered upon some other factor. In the case of
Lebanon, it is overlapped and intertwined with one’s socioeconomic, geographic, and
political modes of being and belonging. What it means to be Maronite in Lebanon, many
would now say has very little to do with belief about the transcendent and is therefore not
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a “real religious identity.” A materialist theory of religion challenges us to rethink what
we mean by religious identity. When we shift from a purely ideological view of
religion’s role in society, we can see how something can indeed be a “religious conflict”,
in a certain sense, without the conflict having anything to do with a clash of ideological
belief.
One can scan any body of literature on Lebanon and see the terms
“communalism,” “sectarianism” and “religious community/sect/group” used, sometimes
interchangeably. While these concepts are overlapping and intertwined, it is useful to
unpack some of the differences, as this differentiation (as far as it is possible) will
become more salient throughout this chapter. Sectarianism and religion are not
equivalent, but one cannot talk about one without the other. When religious identity
becomes mobilized in socio-political ways, and particularly when that is institutionalized
in some way, we are dealing with sectarianism. In cases of strong sectarianism,
belonging is far more important than belief.
In Lebanon, we see shifts over time from self-described religious communities
mobilizing into sects with the hardening of boundaries, the politicization of religious
belonging, and the differentiation of religious leaders from sectarian/political leaders.
Additionally, my interviews revealed a tendency from Lebanese themselves, when asked
about religious dynamics, to focus on the larger religious categories (Christian, Muslim)
rather than the smaller sectarian categories (Armenian, Shi’a, and so on). This is true of
outside observers as well, to subsume sectarian groups into the broader religious
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categories when commenting on how religion plays into Lebanese socio-political
dynamics.
Thus, throughout this chapter, I will explore the interwoven and complex notions
of religion and sectarianism in Lebanon. While most of the people I spoke with, through
formal interviews as well as through informal conversations, asserted strongly that the
sectarian system is not religious, there is no escaping the fact that religious institutions
and leaders in Lebanon are inextricably tied into the sectarian system. The sectarian
system emerged from a pact between representatives of explicitly defined religious
communities. While this simplistic explanation does not capture the complexity of how
the sectarian system came to be, and how it has morphed over the years since its
inception, it is important to bear in mind when considering the present form and impact
of sectarianism in Lebanon. As one respondent noted, the challenge is “how to build a
non-sectarian state on a sectarian basis,” given the long legacy of sectarianism in the
country.136
Nader Hashemi has observed that,
[s]ectarian identities could not be politicized unless differences in beliefs, values,
and historical memory compelled religious groups to collective action around
particularistic identities. The critical question, however, that demands an answer
in explaining sectarian conflict is: why now? Why do sectarian conflicts erupt at
particular moments in time and not at other moments?137
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This is an important dimension of the study at hand, as sectarian meaning and
mobilization is a response to very specific political and social dynamics, making it a
more salient form of belonging for the general populace at certain times; it is not a
constant in the Lebanese context or, arguably, in any context.
Hashemi, drawing on Vali Nasr, points to the important role of state actors,
including the presence of a weak state, for cultivating and benefiting from sectarian
mobilization. This reveals, as Hashemi argues, the “salience of authoritarianism over
theology in understanding the dynamics of Sunni-Shi‘i relations today,” an
observation that carries into other Lebanese sectarian dynamics as well. The role of the
state in helping to curate sectarianism is a critical one, which I will explore later in this
chapter.138
Indeed, Hashemi and Postel argue elsewhere that, “A common tactic to preserve
and perpetuate political rule in a weak state is to manipulate social and political cleavages
via a divide-and-rule strategy. This gives ruling elites greater room to maneuver in the
short term, at the cost of social cohesion in the long term.”139 I will argue here that this
prioritization of elite interests carries over from political leadership to religious
leadership in Lebanon as well, precluding social cohesion in a similar fashion.
Bassell Salloukh argues that “sectarianism was institutionalized in the form of
multiple corporate consociational power-sharing arrangements,” most notably the
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National Pact and the Ta’if Accord.140 This observation reveals two important features of
sectarianism- one is that it is, indeed, institutional, meaning it is not simply a reflection of
horizontal dynamics in society, but very much a feature of vertical state-society relations.
The other is that it involves corporate politics, meaning the individual citizen is formally
subsumed into the group to which s/he belongs.
Religion doesn’t get replaced by the sect, but the sect becomes another dynamic
that takes on a socio-political life of its own, still very much connected to its origins in
religious identity, institutional infrastructure and social dynamics. Thus Lebanon both is
and isn’t a “religious conflict, ” particularly considering that what we often mean when
we say “religious conflict” rests on theoretically limited assumptions about the nature of
religion. Religion is wrapped up in socio-political conflict in complex and dynamic
ways. It follows that trying to make peace (however defined) also involves religion in
critical ways. This is not because religion is an isolatable factor, coming from the outside
to make conflict and/or peace, but because it is integrally intertwined with the nature of
society and identity in a reciprocal way.
Should one think of sectarianism as “religious” in any sense of the word?
Religious identity in Lebanon is tied up with the seats of religious authority, and at
various times, the rhetoric of religion is employed to reinforce sectarian group
boundaries. Those who would confine religion to the realm of the transcendent and
ideological would say no, sectarianism isn’t about difference in belief or religious
practice and therefore is not religious. Indeed, some describe the relationship between
140
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religion and sectarianism as a two-tiered system, with sectarianism being a layer added to
religion, which is at its core neutral (or, according to some, nonviolent).141 However,
when we expand what we mean by religion- beyond the realm of belief- it’s not such an
easy answer. A simple yes or no assumes a clean division between the religious and the
secular.142
This is not simply a theoretical question. To say that sectarianism “isn’t
religious” can lead those engaged in religious peacebuilding to try to somehow extract
religion from the ways it is intricately intertwined with sectarianism. Sectarian and
religious identities aren’t the same thing, but they are deeply interconnected in critical
ways.
While different religious communities have long existed in this space, the way
communal boundaries were defined, and the importance of religious identity in social
dynamics, have changed over time. Rather than being an “age old conflict” between
groups in the Levant, the production of sectarianism in the nineteenth-century in fact
reflects a “new historical imagination”- a new political order based on religious
differentiation, legitimated through evocations of the past.143 This challenges the notion
common in contemporary analyses of the Levant that sectarianism is an ancient, tribal
mode of operation: age-old rivalries that are preventing real modernization. Rather, it is
modern ways of thinking about religion and group identity that produced sectarianism.
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A deeper understanding of how religion and sectarianism have manifested over
time in Lebanese conflict history must precede any discussion of religion and sociopolitics in Lebanon.144 Anchoring in a material theory of religion helps us to situate
religion in Lebanon as both intermingled with all other aspects of life, and as a malleable
reality that has gone through many processes of becoming throughout Lebanese social
and political history. To understand religion in Lebanon through a materialist theoretical
lens, one must trace the various moments of groupness that occurred throughout
Lebanese history to understand how boundaries were negotiated and the ways religion
was invoked (and created in certain ways) in these events and processes. A better
understanding of how religion functions in the Lebanese context lays the groundwork for
a more fruitful conversation on how religion has been playing into efforts to build social
cohesion, and why these have and have not been effective in different ways.

The Social Cohesion Frame
As articulated in depth in chapter one of this dissertation, I find social cohesion to
be a better litmus test for evaluating the progress of a society away from violent conflict
than the more vague, and often less measureable, notion of peace. While peace can be
negative, in the sense that it can be measured by the absence of consistent armed conflict
or acts of violence, social cohesion draws on a more positive assessment framework. It
looks at the horizontal (between people and groups) and vertical (between society and the
state) dimensions of a context, and also looks at both the formal and informal ways these
144
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relationships play out. Additionally, a key component of social cohesion is how much
social inequality persists. A state can be “at peace” while maintaining deep social
inequalities, and thus while there may not be overt violence, there is indeed system
violence at work, which can lead to outbreaks of overt violence if these are not dealt with.
While social cohesion is my way of assessing the progress of peace work in
Lebanon, it is not necessarily the way in which many involved in peacebuilding- and
particularly in “religious peacebuilding” are articulating their own goals and objectives.
This will become apparent through discussions of my interview data later in the chapter.

Research Methodology
I conducted semi-structured field interviews in Lebanon between March 2014July 2015. I interviewed 24 individuals, concentrating my interviews primarily in Beirut
and its suburbs, with a few interviews in the mountains north of the city and in Saida,
though I interviewed a number of individuals who originate from and work in other
areas.145 A small handful were expatriates (from Europe or from other Arab states) who
lived in Lebanon working for international organizations. I selected respondents from
different sects in order to get a sampling of perspectives, and I spoke with persons who
reported different levels of religious commitment- some were religious leaders, while
others identified as people of faith but had varying levels of engagement with the
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institutions affiliated with their faith tradition. Still others identified themselves as
secular.146
I spoke with peacebuilding actors, religious leaders, and political officials.
Interviewees spoke from both individual and organizational perspectives on how they
have engaged religion in peacebuilding work, and how they think about the impact of this
work within the Lebanese socio-political context. This included practitioners working for
bilateral, international, and local organizations, including both governmental and nongovernmental entities. Many were born and raised in Lebanon, and my respondents
spanned several generations. Some had been working in peacebuilding or doing interreligious work for decades, while others were newer to active engagement in this work.
I selected my interview respondents through preliminary outreach to individuals
or organizations that are key players in the field of religious peacebuilding, based on my
initial desk research. Once on site, I recruited new interviewees through snowball
sampling, taking recommendations from those with whom I interacted on the ground in
Lebanon. These interviews allowed me to understand how those working in
peacebuilding spaces, and in explicitly religious peacebuilding spaces, articulate and
understand the work that they are doing.
My analysis in this chapter combines the findings from these interviews with a
study of, materials from a large sampling of peacebuilding organizations. These
materials included evaluations, internal planning documents, and public project and
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program descriptions and advertisements. These materials help to supplement my
interviews by demonstrating how practitioners involved in these approaches frame their
objectives, goals, and scope of work for both internal purposes as well as for external
audiences. Additionally, I drew upon survey data, including the World Values Survey
Wave 6 surveys, and desk studies of recent writings on the Lebanese socio-political
situation.

Scope and Structure
This case study proceeds as follows: first, I outline the social and political history
of religion and conflict in Lebanon, in three stages from the Ottoman era to the present.
One could, of course, break down each of these periods of time much further, as each
time period includes a number of different phases and events. However, my purpose in
this division is not to exhaustively cover the details of Lebanon’s modern history, but to
highlight several defining moments throughout Lebanese history that contributed to the
development of the sectarian and religious identity politics seen in Lebanon today. In the
next chapter, I examine the various approaches to engaging religion in peacebuilding in
Lebanon before analysing the success and shortcomings of these efforts, vis a vis social
cohesion in Lebanon. Through this, I will uncover for the reader key principles useful for
better analyzing the relationships between religion and social cohesion beyond the
Lebanese context, providing a refined theoretical basis for such research.
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Locating Religion in Lebanon: Nation Building and Beyond
Lebanon is a “community of communities,” meaning that it is not a country made
up of individuals, but rather a country made up of distinctive sectarian communities that
relate to the state and to one another as such. Nearly every person I spoke with agreed
upon this description. This community of communities, for some, is what Lebanon is at
its core- an interminable given. For those who take this perspective, the challenge of
peacebuilding in Lebanon involves navigating and balancing the needs and desires of
communities as such. Others, however, spoke of this as the problem that Lebanon must
overcome in order to move forward. For those in this camp, a country cannot have a
cohesive national identity if it is a nation of community identities that are stronger than,
or at least equal to, the national identity. For these actors, overcoming the sub-group
identities are the only way forward for a cohesive Lebanese nation that is inclusive,
coherent, and just, given that at present, Lebanese individuals only have rights in so far as
they are members of recognized sectarian communities, as well as through their
membership in families and villages.
In understanding inter-communal violence, we must ask how Lebanese communal
identities came to be defined as such, and how they came to assert socio-political
meaning. Religion is strategically tied up in the creation of boundaries. Indeed, the
naming of religions as such, and the identification of people with particular religious
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group identities, have always been part of a socio-political boundary-making process, as
discussed in Chapter Two of this project.147
To say national identity is inclusive of religious identities is Lebanon is a bit
misleading: as many interview subjects reiterated over and over, Communal belonging is
central to national belonging in Lebanon. One has to be part of a religious community to
have full access to citizenship and state services in many ways. Communal belonging
mediates access to and participation in politics (you must vote as a member of your
community, which is indicated on your ID card, and the MP positions are allocated by
sect), as well as access to personal and family legal services, such as marriage,
inheritance, burial, and the like.
To understand how communal and sectarian politics emerged as a key driving
force in Lebanese society, we must first understand how religion manifested, and indeed
became, in Lebanon during the socio-political conflicts marking its history. Our ability
to analyze peacebuilding efforts that invoke religion rests on the way in which we
understand how religion shows up in Lebanon’s conflict history. How was religion or sect
in Lebanon produced as a prioritized identity marker through its history? This section
traces the moments and processes that formed and, at times, crystallized communal and
sectarian group identities (and the content or meaning thereof) throughout key phases of
Lebanese history. Indeed, it shows that what it meant to be religious in Lebanon changed
over time, in response to socio-political dynamics and “moments of groupness,” and the
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meaning of religion itself was often shaped through friction and conflict, as much as it
contributed to the various historical conflict dynamics.

Ottoman Era & the Creation of a Communal System
The Ottoman Empire existed as a multi-religious state. While Sunni Islam was
the official religion of the Empire, non-Muslim communities had their own courts, as part
of the millet system, to deal with a wide range of personal matters, rather than being
subjected to Shari’a, as was the case with Muslims living under Ottoman rule.148 In
exchange for protection and autonomy, Christian and Jewish communities paid a personal
tax (jizya), in part to demonstrate their loyalty to the Empire.149 Jews and Christians were
thus integrated into the political and social life of the Ottoman Empire (including
important roles in trade and finance), while also being treated as separate groups.
The Empire conferred authority to Jewish and Christian local religious leaders to
run their courts and to collect the poll tax.150 In this way, religious leaders were treated as
the representatives of their communities and were given a large degree of control over
“their people.” This was not, however, unique to the way Christian or Jewish
communities were treated, as in general, the Ottoman Empire treated people not as
individuals, but as members of communities or units, as Albert Hourani observes:
In principle, Ottoman society was divided sharply into rulers (asker, literally
soldiers) and subjects (reaya, literally the flock).” “The ruler and his asker looked
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at the reaya not as a collection of individuals to be dealt with directly, but rather
as a number of groups.151
Under Ottoman rule, then, groups were seen as distinct units, sometimes specified
by religion and otherwise specified by other group organizing mechanisms (village,
family, and so on). However, Maria Couroucli notes that these group identities, while
legally specified under the Ottomans, also had some fluidity that began to dissipate in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The recent anthology Sharing Sacred Spaces in the Mediterranean provides
extensive research on the shifts in the way religious communities in the Mediterranean
interacted over shared religious spaces. Couroucli argues in the introduction to this
volume that, while the Ottoman Empire constituted a multi-confessional political
construct, the introduction of the nation-state model into the Middle East instigated a
quest for homogeneity, resulting in religious division and, in some cases, outright
animosity toward those of religions different from the homogenous body politic.152
The division of groups into clear-cut categories of belonging, between and within
nation-states, combined with colonial encounters within societies, spurred a quest for the
clarification of what it means to belong, to a nation or to a sub-group within that nation.
Couroucli argues that, “During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, within most
circum-Mediterranean nation-states, Christians, Jews, and Muslims strived to achieve
religious homogeneity within political territories, putting an end to a long history of
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cohabitation.”153 Couroucli describes the multi-confessional nature of the Ottoman
Empire, albeit with differing statuses for different religious communities, in comparison
to the more homogenous nations emerging in Western Europe during the same era.
Unlike in many Western European societies, religious minorities were officially
recognized under the Ottomans.154 Intermarriage and mixed families were common in
the Ottoman Empire, and interactions with the religious Other was an everyday reality for
many.
Couroucli is quick to point out that this reality of cohabitation under the Ottomans
should not be oversimplified, as communities living together does not necessarily mean
that persons or communities treat one another as equals or with respect.155 Living
together looks different in disparate spaces, and the bounds of religious identity are often
complex and, at times, fluid. Mixed families through intermarriage and the sharing of
sacred spaces by individuals and communities were realities of life in much of the
Ottoman Empire. This challenges the notion of distinct boundaries between the religious
communities of the Eastern Mediterranean, including those in Mount Lebanon, but the
point that the state interpolates its citizens through the lens of religious community
remains.
While certainly Lebanon’s history does not begin with the Ottoman era, in order
to tell the story of how sectarianism became a force to be reckoned with in Lebanon, one
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must begin in the late modern era. After all, sectarianism is arguably a modern story. The
Ottoman era saw a number of critical changes in the Levant, particularly as European
actors began to enter the geographical space. Ussama Makdisi has convincingly argued
that it was through the dynamic nineteenth century European-Ottoman encounters (both
conflicting and collaborative) with the local population of Mount Lebanon, particularly
between 1840-1860, that sectarianism was developed and took root, laying the foundation
for the ways sectarianism now operates in Lebanese social and political life.156
The Ottoman territories were divided into Vilayets, or administrative centers.
Mount Lebanon was part of the Vilayet of Beirut, while portions of the territory that later
became Greater Lebanon (the Bekaa Valley, Baalbeck, and elsewhere) were under the
Vilayet of Damascus.157 Leila Fawaz has observed that “Ottoman control was hardly felt
in Mount Lebanon, where no direct Ottoman authority existed before the nineteenth
century. The Ottomans kept an eye on it, but left it alone.”158 Prior to the 1800s, then,
the area of Mount Lebanon was not a central focus of Ottoman governing elites.
The two predominant groups residing there were Druze, who held most of the
higher ranking administrative and military positions, and Maronite Christians, who
worked in commerce and finance, as well as production roles, and were primarily
commoners.159 Certainly, there were conflicts between individuals and communities
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prior to the developments of the nineteenth-century in Mount Lebanon, and in the Levant
more generally, but the centrality of religious identity as the mode of group organization
was a modern innovation. Religion in Mount Lebanon had long been lived out in a highly
fluid way, with Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians both venerating Mary in shared
sacred spaces,160 and religion was not the primary identity category for social
organization. Even if religion was one key identity category for social and political
organization under the Ottoman Empire, that did not necessarily map directly onto the
way life was organized on the ground, often beyond the firm grasp of Ottoman powers.
Makdisi argues that social standing, primarily divided between elites and commoners,
was much more important for social organization than was religious identity, as elites
across sectarian lines had common interest in maintaining financial and social power.161
In the 1840s, as an effort to maintain control in light of the encroaching European
influence in the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire began restructuring social dynamics
through the Tanzimat reforms. These reforms used the language of revitalization of the
Islamic tradition, maintaining a distinctness from European powers, while also giving
citizenship and increased civil rights to Christians and other non-Muslim communities in
Ottoman-controlled areas. This was viewed as part of the modernization process,
attempting to strengthen the Ottoman Empire in the model of other contemporary strong
states, and also served to instill Ottoman affinity and ownership within these religious
minorities. Hourani points to the important merchant roles of Christians and Jews, prior
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to and especially following Tanzimat, aiding in Ottoman negotiations with foreign
bodies.162 Thus, certain religious minorities benefitted as elites within new Ottoman
social and economic structures, and had the added benefit of easier access to European
citizenship, which exempted them from numerous taxes and laws of the Empire.
Additionally, the reforms came with a more explicit separation of religious groups, with
Ottoman and European powers dividing Mount Lebanon into two districts, separating the
Maronites from the Druze, in 1842.
Makdisi argues that the new emancipation of Maronites through the Tanzimat
reforms is what led to ethno-religious uprisings, as British, French and Ottomans vied for
control of the Mount Lebanon region through the local inhabitants by attempting to win
their loyalty.163 Tensions built on both inter- and intra-religious rivalries and led to
Maronite peasant uprisings in 1858 and a bloody war in 1860. These skirmishes reflected
the newly constructed organizing structures, as neighbors who previously lived alongside
one another in peace turned on one another. Makdisi asserts that this violence was not
only inter-communal, but also intra-communal for both communities, as part of each
community’s own boundary-making process in the midst of social and political change.
This intra-communal social violence, he points out, was “a fundamental part of broader
religious violence across sectarian communities.”164 This tension, as part of the
boundary-making processes that accompany social conflict, is an important but often
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overlooked feature of conflict in Lebanon from the Tanzimat period to the present. The
Règlement Organique put a formal end to the strife in 1861, and in essence
institutionalized communal representation, as communal leaders came to an agreement as
representatives of their communities, building on the foundation of communal
representativity under the Ottomans.165
Leila Fawaz argues that the Lebanese civil war in 1860 was both a reflection of
changing dynamics and loss of balance between local communities, combined with the
incursions from regional and international actors, without which, she argues, “no warand, hence, no peace—is feasible.”166 In this same vein, Makdisi has argued that the
violent episodes between 1840-1860 were not
symptomatic of the failure of a nation or nationalism but as an expression of a
new form of local politics and knowledge that arose in a climate of transition and
reform in the mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire and that laid the
foundations for a (later) discourse of nationalist secularism.167
These local politics and knowledge reflect a shift in international and regional
engagement and attention on Mount Lebanon, combined with a modern Euro-Christian
approach to understanding religious identity.
The dynamic process of shifting the meaning of religious identity in Mount
Lebanon drew on a Christian-Islamic civilizational narrative that had become a popular
explanatory frame in the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth-century, Makdisi argues,
Lebanese society was opened to “Ottoman and European discourses of reform that made
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religion the site of a colonial encounter between a self-styled ‘Christian’ West and what it
saw as its perennial adversary, an ‘Islamic’ Ottoman Empire.”168 This pervasive modern
narrative shaped, and was shaped by, Ottoman and European encounters in Mount
Lebanon. Religion thus “became the site of the colonial encounter in the Ottoman
Empire in that European officials defined the parameters of reform through a
modernization discourse couched in terms of a religious civilizational clash,”169 thus
enshrining religious difference through these internal-external socio-political interactions.
Makdisi goes on to argue that, “This encounter profoundly altered the meaning of
religion in the multiconfessional society of Mount Lebanon because it emphasized
sectarian identity as the only viable marker of political reform and the only authentic
basis for political claims.”170 Thus, the result of these nineteenth-century dynamic
interactions in Mount Lebanon set a new course for religious identity as a socio-political
organizing force for the local population.
Part of the European interest in the Mount Lebanon region stemmed from the
European narrative of Mount Lebanon as a Christian enclave.171 In early encounters
between Europeans and the local residents of Mount Lebanon, Europeans viewed
Maronites as their brothers and sisters in faith, as Catholics loyal to the Roman Catholic
Church, but as “nominal” Christians. This desire to save local Catholics from themselves
and from Ottoman powers, was used to justify further European involvement in the
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region. As Makdisi argues, “European insistence on essential differences between
Christianity and Islam provided one of the key legitimating factors to their intervention in
the Middle East.”172 European powers relied on an understanding that “real religion” is a
matter of right beliefs- beliefs that were not, in the opinion of European visitors,
sufficiently reflected in the Maronites and other Christians of Mount Lebanon. Religious
identities in Mount Lebanon- as elsewhere outside of Europe- were understood in much
more material, rather than belief-centric, ways. Thus, a modern Euro-Christian
conceptualization of religion173 heavily shaped the early modern European interactions
with the Christians of Mount Lebanon. While Sunni and Shi’a Muslims were not a
strong presence in Mount Lebanon, both Maronite and Druze elites interacted with them
elsewhere, often in exploitative ways. This history plays into the ways that the
communities interacted when they did come into greater contact through the process of
creating the Lebanese state.
Throughout the nineteenth century, following the Tanzimat reforms and the
surrounding changes in Mount Lebanon’s social and political dynamics, both Maronite
and Druze populations began to prioritize religious community and identity above and
beyond other forms of kinship with their neighbors. Thus, over time, the ta’ifa, or sect,
became the prevailing loyalty and mode of social order.174 This led to popular
mobilization, sometimes in contradiction with the project of the elites. According to
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Makdisi, “The elites tried to project a stable and ordered vision of the religious nation,
while popular elements sought to appropriate religious discourse for social liberation.”175
Ruling powers created new organizational structures as part of the interplay between
European colonial encroachment and Ottoman pushback.
It would be a mistake to stop here, however, and accept that through the
skirmishes of the mid-1800’s, sectarianism became a static organizing force in Lebanon.
The nature, and the very meaning, of sectarianism is itself always changing. In this way,
we see religious identity shifting as well, as it intertwines with the emergence of the sect.
What Makdisi refers to as sectarianism in 1860 laid the groundwork for, but is not the
same as, the sectarianism in the founding of Lebanon as a nation-state, or the
sectarianism in the civil war, or immediately post-Ta’if, or in the present day. And yet,
the foundation is critical, as an “expression of a new form of local politics and
knowledge”176 upon which sectarianism was built, manifesting itself in multiple forms
from the late modern period to the present. The Ottoman period, including the increased
interaction with European powers in its later years, laid critical groundwork for the
current sectarian structures and modes of religious identity and expression we see in
Lebanon today, through the key “moments of groupness” found in the tensions,
interactions and clashes outlined above.
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Transitions to Statehood: Codifying Sectarianism
By 1864, Mount Lebanon had stabilized and was governed by an administrative
council comprised of representatives from the Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek
Catholic, Sunni Muslim and Shi’a Muslim communities. The Ottomans had established
much of Lebanon as a Mutasarrifiya, a subdivision of the Vilayet, and this Mutasarrifiya
was further broken down into districts. The Mutasarrifiya of Lebanon was ruled by a
Christian administrator, demonstrating the agreement between the French and the
Ottoman authorities.177 Under this arrangement, Lebanon experienced what many have
called the “Long Peace,”178 without much conflict to note.
By the early 1860s, Maronite Christians had become a clear majority in Mount
Lebanon, and were also becoming increasingly wealthier than the Druze population.179
The years between 1860 and 1914 were characterized by further reform and
modernization, and specifically, by growth in commerce and industry in the Middle East,
which came along with increased population movement. 180 In the case of Lebanon, there
was a large outflow of people, with an estimated 300,000 people leaving Lebanon (often
for the Americas) by 1914.181 Beirut, however, grew in industry and in population, and
Mount Lebanon became economically tied both to Beirut and to the European market.182
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The balance of social power shifted further away from cultivators, toward those who
owned or controlled land, and stratification increased between the wealthy and the poor.
European cultural influence also rose, and Christian and Jewish populations in particular
took to European styles of dress, differentiating them in a more visible way from Muslim
populations in many parts of the state.183
The decline of the Ottomans, particularly in light of the Russian defeat of the
Ottomans in the war of 1877, brought both economic depression and a renewed desire for
independence in Mount Lebanon.184 The Sykes-Picot Accords of 1916 divided up the
Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces between the British and the French, with Lebanon
falling to the French. Thus, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire brought about the birth
of Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon) in 1920; this was a result, in part, of Maronites
petitioning the French mandate authority for such an arrangement.185 The European
powers, and in particular the French, collaborated with Lebanese elites to forcibly create
the Lebanese republic, under the French Mandate, in 1926.186
Violent outbreaks followed the imposition of the French Mandate, as Greater
Lebanon’s Muslim population in particular (though joined by some Maronites, and by
other Lebanese Christian sects) rejected the legitimacy of the French Mandate and called
for an independent Arab state or for Greater Lebanon to join with Syria.187 The French
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Mandate nurtured sectarianism through both politics and culture. Under the mandate, the
French worked to control not only political institutions, but also undertook a campaign of
cultural diplomacy, which required collaboration with local political and religious elites.
Indeed, Lebanese religious councils, in collaboration with French authorities, served as
censorship bodies for cinema and other forms of entertainment and culture.188
As Jennifer Dueck has observed, the French government aimed (often
unsuccessfully) to keep their political and cultural entrees separate; thus, they “relied
almost exclusively on nongovernmental intermediaries for cultural interaction with the
local population. These intermediaries included both religious and secular associations,
which had diverse objectives and served different target populations.”189 The role of
French cultural influence under the mandate supplemented political control and gave
power to religious bodies in particular to vet and distribute various cultural artifacts.
The founding constitution, which gave Maronite elites the most power, was later
supplemented by the 1943 National Pact (al-Mithaq al-Watani), adopted as part of the
process of Lebanese independence from European powers and often referred to as the
unwritten constitution of Lebanon.190 This Pact divided power among the religious
communities, giving the Maronites the presidency, the Sunnis the prime minister
position, and to the Shi’a, the speaker of the Parliament, and these divisions of power and
188
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position reserved for members of specific sects continue through the upper military
positions to numerous other public service jobs. The activities and rights of citizens were
tied to their religious communities, from personal status laws to political participation.
Lebanese citizenship was thus defined by membership in a religious community.191
The Pact also attempted to settle, though quite vaguely, the dispute between
Muslims and Christians living in Greater Lebanon about whether Lebanon should
embrace a distinct Phoenician heritage or Christian identity, or join the pan-Arabist
movement that was emerging. The Pact indulged both, by asserting a unique Lebanese
identity and heritage with an “Arab face.”192 Salloukh, et. al, note that there is dissonance
between the text of the 1926 constitution and the spirit of the National Pact. The
constitution elevates the power of the president above the other offices, while the Pact
spread power more evenly between the government offices, and thereby between
confessional groups.193
Khalidi asserts that two factors explain the survival of the Pact in its early period.
First, Lebanon was in the pre-modernization stage. Second, the Lebanese leaders
belonged to the same “ruling elites” of other Arab nations.194 As internal pressures of
modernization and external pressures of other Arab nations escalated, however, the 1943
Pact lost its ability to contain and control the Lebanese population.
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This period of transition from the Ottoman Empire to a Lebanese state was critical
in shaping new meanings and expressions of religious identity, which was becoming
more subsumed into the sect. Increased European involvement precipitated a stronger
emphasis on religious identity and difference, as non-Muslim religious communities in
particular benefitted from capitalizing in numerous ways on religious affinity with
European powers. The Pact, by dividing power among the religious communities,
formalized the emergence of the sect as the primary form of national belonging and
participation.
This critical period of nation-building, or creating the “imagined community” of
Lebanon, solidified the religious community as a key organizing mechanism for the state
and instituted religious community representation as the means through which
individuals, as members of communities, gain access to the state. These ways of
structuring and imagining religious identity vis a vis the state played in many ways into
the civil war that broke out in the mid-1970s in Lebanon, calling the possibility of
national cohesion into question.

1975-1990: Civil War
The literature on the causes of the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war offers multiple,
contested views on the most salient contributing factors. While some argued that internal
issues, including socio-economic inequalities and rising poverty rates were most
important, others have argued that intervening external factors, including the influx of
Palestinians into Lebanon and the impact of other regional powers, including Syria, were
98

the more important contributing factors.195 Suffice it to say, a number of both internal
and external dynamics were at play in Lebanon in the 1960’s and 70’s, and dramatic and
sustained conflict broke out in 1975 that continued- on different fronts and between
different actors- until the Ta’if Accord, put into effect in 1990.
Income inequality and increased levels of poverty were a key contributing factor
to the social unrest in Lebanon in the latter part of the twentieth century. Carolyn Gates
has argued that the development of “peripheral capitalism” in Lebanon, beginning in the
nineteenth century, paved the way for multiple levels of inequality and unrest by the
middle of the twentieth century. Peripheral capitalism, in the case of Lebanon, is
characterized by an external orientation (a capital economy built to fulfill the needs of
imperial powers, rather than national interests), dependence on external entities and
forces, and underdevelopment of the economic infrastructures within the country itself.196
Gates argues that this form of economic development benefitted a small politicalbureaucratic elite while disenfranchising much of the rest of the population, and
eventually led to,
long-term unemployment or underemployment of the growing labour force,
increasing socio-economic, regional and sectarian inequalities, large-scale
emigration, dependence on volatile foreign conditions, discord and
upheaval, inter alia.197
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These combined factors contributed to communal inequalities and polarization as
well, as there was a wide-spread perception that Christians were benefitting from this
arrangement far more than the Muslim population.198
This drastic wealth inequality and poverty rates by the 1960’s led to popular
unrest and mobilization, for worker’s rights in the early 1970’s, especially in 1972 with
the Ghandour strike, and with the Protein Company in 1975.199 Additionally, popular
sectarianism revealed itself through the elite politics of 1975-1990:
Whereas compromises between the elites were meant to divide power among
different communities, they in fact divided power among the elites of various
communities at the expense of the divided and disenfranchised majority. Whereas
the elites compromised in the hope of containing sectarian conflicts, many of the
citizens used sectarianism to express their discontent with the product of elitist
compromises.200
Thus, Makdisi asserts, the sectarian politics and mobilization during the civil war
was both between sects, as well as within, with communities mobilizing against their
representative elites.
Additionally, Salloukh, et. al., point to both the failure to manage “the inherent
contradictions of Lebanon’s confessional politics,” and the fact that the state failed to
maintain a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence as important contributing
factors.201 The disruptive regional changes, including the creation of the United Arab
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Republic in 1958 and the establishment of the PLO in 1964, which brought an armed
Palestinian contingent to Lebanon, were also key contributing factors to the outbreak of
civil war.202
The role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the mass displacement of
Palestinians throughout the region and the political mobilization of Palestinian leaders, is
a critical factor in the lead-up to and ongoing dynamics of the Lebanese civil war. As
Samir Khalaf articulates,
Palestinians were likewise [like Christian communities] threatened by the fear of
being liquidated. Lebanon, by the mid-seventies, was their last abode so-tospeak. It had become at the least their most strategic stronghold. After the loss of
its Jordan base, the PLO was more entrenched in Lebanon.203
The first serious clashes in Beirut in the 1970s were between Palestinians and
Christian militias,204 demonstrating the tension that the presence and power of Palestinian
refugees and political-military elites brought to the already-strained Lebanese nation.
Meanwhile, the Ba’thists were gaining power in the 1960s in both Iraq and Syria, and
Beirut became an oasis for dissenters fleeing these countries.205
Several events are often considered flashpoints for the break-out of full-fledged
war, including rioting that broke out during a Fishermen’s strike in Saida (opposing
foreign capitalistic tampering with the local fishing industry) and killed Marouf Saad, a
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very popular leader in Sidon.206 Just a couple months later, Pierre Gemayyel (leader of
the Kata’ib party) was attending a new Maronite Church in Ain al-Rummaneh, a
Christian area in east Beirut when four men present there were killed in a drive-by
shooting. That afternoon, a bus full of Palestinian militiamen returning from a parade
drove through the same area and Christian militiamen attacked the bus, killing all the
passengers, operating under the assumption that the Palestinian commandos were
implicated the morning attack and were coming back for more.207 These incidents,
serving as triggers within the larger context of internal and regional change and unrest,
led political parties and existing militias to increase mobilization and recruitment, and to
establish paramilitaries where they did not yet exist.208
Salloukh, et. al., assert that, during the civil war, what were once confessional
distinctions turned decidedly into sectarian fault lines.209 Sectarian militias and mass
communications served to harden sectarian boundaries and narratives. Khalaf observes
that,
Precipitously many of the original nonsectarian sources of unrest receded and the
conflict began to acquire a life of its own and was deflected into directions
unrelated to the initial sources of hostility. The fighting also became bloodier and
more belligerent as it evolved into a struggle over the ‘indivisible’ and more
contentious principles of communal identity, cultural heritage, national
sovereignty, pluralism, and sectarian coexistence.210
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Khalaf refers to the war as a “’revolving-door’ of relentless cycles of violence,
quite often provoked by ‘unidentified assailants.’”211 There were at least 186 factions at
war in Lebanon by 1984,212 some more prominent and involved in more high-profile
confrontations, with others playing more peripheral roles, and sectarian in-fighting
increasing the number of players. Interviewees referred to Lebanon’s “27 wars” that took
place both between and within sects, as well as between neighborhoods, showing that a
clean analysis of the civil war as strictly (or reductively) sectarian is inaccurate.213
Indeed, as Marie-Joelle Zahar articulates, “The two warring factions are often labeled
Christian and Muslim, but it is more accurate to describe them as pro- and anti-status
quo.”214
Alliances and collaborations were always shifting. While in the early part of the
war, Shi’a in the South showed solidarity with the Palestinian guerrilla movement, this
started the shift in the late 1970’s.215 Infighting among Shi’ites broke down primarily
along the faultline between Amal and Hizbullah, formed in 1982 in response to the Israeli
invasion and backed by Iran.216 Khalaf calls the Maronite militia “turf wars” the most
ruthless, particularly between Samir Ja’ja (Geagea) and Michele Awn (Aoun).
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Additionally, new Arab parties (including Ba’athists, Socialist, Arab Nationalist,
among others) had begun recruiting in the 1950s and 60s, leading to increased affiliations
with these parties among portions of the Lebanese population.217 Additionally, the PLO
and the Lebanese National Movement formed an early alliance (in what some refer to as
the “Two Years’ War” between 1975-76) around common interests. Traboulsi observes
that, “During the ‘Two Years’ War’, the Palestinian faction had invested in the project to
impose the reforms of the LNM. In this new phase of the war, the roles were reversed,
with Lebanese factions mainly serving a Palestinian agenda.”218 Dynamics shifted with
the withdrawal of Palestinian leaders in 1983 and the subsequent decline of the Sunni
community’s prominence in political and military representation.219
The war had many casualties, beyond the estimated 71,328 killed and 97,184
injured.220 The spatial dimensions of Lebanon were drastically affected, with huge
numbers of people displaced through “sectarian cleansing” of certain areas- Traboulsi
cites 157,500 Muslims and 670,000 Christians displaced over the course of the war221and the erosion of common spaces for people from different sects to gather.222 Khalaf
remarks, “The war did not only destroy common spaces. It also encouraged the

217

Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, 213-14.

218

Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 219.

219

Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 235.

220

Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 244.

221

Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 244.

222

Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, 246.

104

formation of separate, exclusive, and self-sufficient spaces.”223 The homogenization and
decentralization of social geography has had lasting effects on Lebanese society and
politics.
The effects of the war included extreme psycho-social impacts on the Lebanese
people, for whom fear and uncertainty became a given part of life throughout and
following the war. A 1983 survey demonstrated some of these effects, with 66% of
respondents reporting that they had been compelled to take refuge in a shelter at some
point over the duration of the war thus far, and 74% reporting some form of
deprivation.224 Additionally, the war created its own infrastructure for many services that
should have been provided by the state, developing a “war system” that has been
perpetuated long after the war came to a formal end.225 The lasting effects of the war
have continued far beyond the fighting itself.
Additionally, religious and sectarian identity took on new shapes and meanings
through the course of the war. Khalaf’s 1983 survey showed that 85% of respondents did
not report a change in their religious practices, but did report increased confessional or
sectarian identities.226 While religion was not a “root cause” of the Lebanese wars
between 1975-1990, religion certainly played into the violence in a variety of ways. One
interviewee articulated that religion was heavily employed to justify violent actions
during the war. According to this former general, leaders needed to use theology to
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justify what was going on, to control one’s “troup”, and to be the most compelling (and
often extreme) voice for his people.227 He noted the way in which communal histories
played into justifications for acts of violence during the war:
I was a Maronite in my head, if you like. I was a Phoenician, which became
somehow French. My father’s history book- and I still have it- says in the
beginning, ‘our ancestors, the Gauls.’ So somehow in the beginning a part of us
was French. ...Jesus came to Tyre and Saida- do you know he walked here in the
Bible? The Bible speaks of Lebanon 70 times...I needed data to back my critical
options or opinions.228
This sentiment was echoed by many Lebanese Maronites with whom I spoke;
they grew up with a sense that Christians had a special connection to the land in Lebanon.
Communal histories and religious language were utilized across sects to justify acts of
violence and what was heralded as self-defense during the war. Through the course of
the 1975-1990 conflict(s), what it meant to be religious changed in a number of ways,
interacting with other conflict dynamics. Sectarian identities were hardened at different
junctures, through the many moments of crystallizing and mobilizing group identities as
conflictive.
Traboulsi observes that, “The war, partially the result of sectarian conflicts, was
to become the crucible in which those sects were reproduced.”229 He goes on to argue
that, “When the militias finally ‘cleansed’ their territories and came to control ‘their own
people’ and run their affairs, pressure on the individual to define himself/herself in terms
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of a unique social and cultural sectarian identity reached its climax.”230 Thus, the
geographic and demographic changes throughout the war also came with a stronger
bonding cohesion within communities, with increasingly extreme identifications with
one’s sect and only one’s sect.
It is important to note here the particular ways in which Lebanese religious
communities are structured, in order to better understand the meaning of these hierarchies
being socially and politically institutionalized in Lebanon. The Maronite Christian
community is in full communion with the Roman Catholic Church, and is led by the
Maronite patriarch. Bishops and clergy are under the leadership of the patriarch. The
highest level leader of the Sunni community in Lebanon is the grand mufti of the
Republic of Lebanon, with other clergy (including local scholars, imams and judges)
exercising spiritual and legal leadership at the local levels. Leadership of the Shi’a
community is a bit more complicated, although certainly the Maronite and Sunni
hierarchical structures are not without their own complexities. While the Higher Shi’a
Council is officially (state recognized) the leader of the Shi’a hierarchy, Hizbullah in
particular (under the clerical guidance of Shaykh Fadlallah until his death in 2010) has
asserted its leadership over the Shi’a community, particularly since 2006, even though it
was not recognized as the clerical leadership of the Shi’a community by the
government.231 The Druze have a spiritual leader, along with a political leader like the
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other communities (which often have several persons vying to be the political
representatives of the sects), the Greek Orthodox have an Archdiocese in Beirut led by a
Metropolitan bishop, and the other religious communities have their own hierarchical
structures as well, which often act in cooperation with (and are represented in) the
government in various ways.
The strong communal identities that were formed and institutionalized through the
creation of the Lebanese state played into the way that war dynamics were interpreted
and carried out. While socio-economic factors, combined with the pressures of regional
crises, were arguably the key factors leading to unsustainable societal frustration,
violence was often carried out and seen through the les of sectarian division and power.
The war itself continued to shape and harden increasingly politicized and militarized
sectarian identities, reinforcing this frame as the war went on.

Ta’if and Beyond: Reconstructing Peace in Lebanon
The Ta’if Accord, which formally ended the war, was drawn up in the fall of 1989
when Lebanese members of parliament met in Saudi Arabia, along with a number of nonparliamentarian religious and sectarian leaders, but remained in a limbo state until the fall
of 1990, when it was implemented by force.232 It was, in some sense, a new National
Pact. While it didn’t ultimately change the style of leadership, it did change some key
mechanisms of the nation state, as well as replacing certain individuals with new

232

Salloukh, et. al, The Politics of Sectarianism, 21.

108

leadership.233 Salloukh, et. al., argue that Ta’if reinforced the sectarian order,
consecrating sects “as the main pillars of political identity and mobilization in postwar
Lebanon.”234 Additionally, Zahar notes that the members of parliament who were key in
drafting and agreeing to Ta’if were not active conflict actors, but rather had been
spectators of the war, more or less.235
Specifically, Ta’if shifted balance of executive power from presidency to the
Council of Ministers. It’s restructuring of power also reflected the rising importance of
Shi’a community & the strong role of Syria as “the postwar umpire of Lebanese
affairs.”236 The Ta’if split seats in Parliament evenly between Muslims and Christians,
divided among the various sects. Additionally, the writers of the Ta’if employed sectarian
and clientelist calculations in the distribution of all major public posts.237 As was true
with the 1943 Pact, the Ta’if acknowledged the (Maronite) President, the (Sunni) Prime
Minister and the (Shi’a) Speaker of the Parliament as the primary representatives of all
major demands raised by their sectarian communities, making each the foremost
negotiator for each sect.238
Khalaf points to the Ta’if as an unfulfilled agreement, writing in 2002 that,
“Foremost, Ta’if embraced the principle of abolishing religious affiliation for filling all
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government positions, yet few practical steps have been taken thus far to accomplish
it.”239 This is still the case to this day. Khalaf goes on to assert that,
Ta’if does not constitute a paradigm shift or a radical departure from earlier
attempts at political reform or conflict resolution. Indeed, it embraces some of the
deeply ingrained traditions and defining elements that have long sustained its
political culture: its consociative attributes, and the ethos of no victor and no
vanquished.240
The Ta’if, then, returned Lebanon to a former version of itself without dealing
with the underlying causes that led to or perpetuated the war. This observation comports
with Salloukh’s assertion that the Ta’if reinforces, and indeed furthers, the sectarian logic
of Lebanon. Salloukh argues that the Ta’if was a pact between sects, rather than
between communities. This is an important shift from the National Pact, which imagined
the agreement as one between religious communities, represented by religious
leadership.241 This shows the way in which religious communal identity had shifted since
the mid-1940’s. By the end of the civil war, sectarian identity had emerged as something
that built upon, but was also distinct from, religious communities, as sects now had
political leaders, often working in concert with more explicitly religious leaders. The
meaning of religious identity in Lebanon changed through the civil war period, emerging
from it as decidedly sectarian. The Ta’if was an agreement among sects (with its quotas
for each sect, among other elements), while the Pact was an agreement among
confessions.242 This again demonstrates the close intertwinement of religious identity
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and the emergence of sectarian politics. Additionally, it is worth noting that some groups
(Maronites, Shi’a, etc.) were seen as distinctly Lebanese, even if they were competitive
for political voice, while others, such as the Armenian Christians and the Palestinians,
were viewed as foreign. These dynamics played into the battles throughout the civil war.
In leaving the dismantling of the sectarian system as a vaguely described goal for
an undefined time in the future, the Ta’if “created a structural dilemma: recognizing the
sectarian/political elite as custodians of the sectarian order while expecting them to
reform it.”243 Zahar notes that,
As was the case with the 1926 Constitution and the 1943 National Pact before it,
Ta’if emphasized confessional compromise and inter-communal cooperation as
temporary measures to facilitate transition to an integrated, non-confessional
democracy; however, no steps were taken in the direction of a non-confessional
regime. Rather, confessionalism became deeply institutionalized once again.”244
Zahar goes on to observe that, “Although the Lebanese Civil War prompted a
reformulation of the power-sharing formula, it did not question its fundamental logic,”
and also avoided casting blame on any of the war actors, allowing militias to transform
themselves into political fronts without expressing responsibility or remorse for actions
during the war. Many have noted Lebanon’s resilience in the midst of political crisis,
regionally and internally, over the years since Ta’if. This resilience, Zahar and Joy Aoun
have asserted, is a negative one, prioritizing elite consolidation of power and control over
democratic transition.245
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Thus, while the Ta’if promised transition from sectarianism eventually, the postconflict rebuilding processes did not include any major steps in that direction. Many
interview respondents commented that there was no formal or widespread reconciliation
process after Ta’if. War memories and histories set in in highly sectarian ways, and no
war actors made any public admission of fault.246 Sectarianism was reinscribed through
post-war institutions, including schools in particular. The war narratives, taught
differently in different schools based on communal affiliation, and most often taught
informally, rather than from textbooks, reinforced the idea of historical injustices for
one’s sect.
Additionally, the Ta’if established Pax Syriana, which lasted until 2005. This
arrangement gave Syria the latitude to use political and military power to help keep
Lebanon calm, and included Syrian efforts to limit the power of certain political parties,
including Michele Aoun’s faction along with the Lebanese Forces, both of which had
fought Syrian intervention in the last days of the war (though the LF did agree to the
Ta’if eventually).247 It articulated a “distinct relationship” between Beirut and
Damascus, and subsequently, Syria played an important role in Lebanese politics.248
Christian political movements in particular expressed frustration with Syrian control, and
developed political narratives in accordance with this position.
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After the Ta’if, religious and sectarian identity has continued to shift in Lebanon.
The assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, and the subsequent withdraw of
Syria from Lebanon, made way for new political alliances and mobilization. A number
of street mobilizations pushing for Syria to leave Lebanon permanently, led to
concentrated mass protests on March 8 (pro-Syria) and 14 (marking the “Cedar
Revolution,” the date of the formal expulsion of Syria from Lebanon) of 2006. These
consolidated into two primary political alliances, reflected new political divisions along
Sunni-Shi’a lines, with Christian parties represented in both political alliances.249 Some
referred to the ideological battle of the Shi’a dominated March 8 Alliance (which was
pushing for political change) and the Sunni-dominated March 14 Alliance (which was
pushing for maintenance of the status quo in Lebanon) as a façade for the new SunniShi’a dynamics in the sectarian system.250 This led to militias reorganizing along
sectarian lines, and to the “sectarian ghettoization” of urban neighborhoods and
gerrymandering for the benefit of sectarian political blocs.
Additionally, all of this played out against the backdrop of challenges to the
army’s power as a national force, as became evident in the 2006 war with Israel. The
249
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2006 war, fought primarily between Israel and Hizbullah (though most would argue on
behalf, and with the support, of Lebanon more formally), led to new dynamics, with a
large number of Shi’a leaving the South to escape the attacks. Hizbullah’s strong
performance in this war emboldened it to demand greater representation and power in
Lebanon’s Council of Ministers. Additionally, the alignment of the March 8 and 14
political blocs with external powers251 was exacerbated when the uprisings began in Syria
during the Arab Spring.252
Salloukh, et. al., argue throughout their analysis of sectarianism that it is a wellorchestrated and well-maintained system of social and political control,
an ever-expanding but holistic complex ensemble, one that operates at the
structural, institutional, and individual levels, and aims at entrenching and
reproducing sectarian modes of subjectification and mobilization, while
sabotaging challenges to the material underpinnings and ideological hegemony of
the sectarian system.253
As Hashemi and Postel have argued, it is authoritarianism, rather than theology,
that has contributed primarily to sectarianization.254 The Ta’if Agreement did not change
this, and indeed, after Ta’if, sectarian politics were reinforced and extended, even as
sectarian belonging and alliances shifted in interaction with socio-political events. As
through the war itself, sectarian identities were shaped through the peace agreement,
which paved the way for the further entrenchment of the sectarian system in Lebanese
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life, prescribing the mechanisms through which religious life would be filtered, informed
and constrained.

Conclusion
This review of Lebanese socio-political history demonstrates the ways in which
religious and communal identities were shaped by socio-political dynamics, or moments
of groupness, over time. Sectarianism was never a given or intrinsic way of thinking
about religious identity or organizing society, but rather was formed and hardened
through the socio-politics of Lebanese history, including the ways in which the state has
related to subjects (or citizens) through the filter of group identity. This, in turn, shaped
the ways in which conflict and identity were articulated and the sticking power of
communal identity politics. Religion is instrumental in Lebanon in that it happens to be
the way that otherwise “typical” conflict drivers are framed, but religious identity is in
and of itself changed through these dynamics. The group boundaries are fluid, but they
still exist and are helping define particular groups in particular ways for particular times.
These boundaries then extend beyond the course of active conflict- again, not in some
static, consistent way—and remain part of the “problem” for peacebuilders, even if we
concur that Lebanese conflict was not “about” religion. Engaging religion in trying to
build sustainable peace in Lebanon is deeply connected to the dynamics outlined thus far
in this chapter, as the religion in Lebanon that peacebuilding actors are engaging today is
a product of this particular socio-political history.
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Chapter 4: Engaging Religion in Lebanese Peacebuilding
Lebanon’s civil war came to an end with the Ta’if Agreement, and yet, Lebanese
society and politics remains in dysfunction in numerous ways. The effects of the war
have extended well beyond the end of the war itself, and many observers have attributed
the divisions and dysfunction to Lebanon’s communalism. Thus, there have been
numerous peacebuilding approaches in the last several decades in Lebanon that draw
upon religion in some way, whether explicitly or implicitly. The goal of this chapter is
not to evaluate the initiatives themselves, or even their net impact, but rather to identify
and differentiate the approaches to religious peacebuilding in Lebanon, how they imagine
the role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding in their work, and pull out trends to
analyze how these approaches imagine religion and intersect with social cohesion in
Lebanon more broadly.

Mapping Religious Peacebuilding in Lebanon
The field of peacebuilding initiatives that engage religion can be sub-divided in a
number of ways: engaging elites vs. grassroots; seeking common citizenship vs. interreligious or inter-sectarian understanding; changing social perceptions vs. changing
institutions.255 Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive of one another.
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Some are focused on harnessing the power and authority of religious elites to win hearts
and minds for peace and unity. These range from elite-level religious dialogues to NGO
engagement of grass-tops religious leaders to further local and regional peacebuilding
and development projects.
Some initiatives, which will be more explicitly outlined below, focus on creating
interactions between “regular people” (often with a focus on youth) that challenge or
provide a counterpoint to sectarian segregation- this is seen in the programmatic work of
Adyan and other similar programs. These people-to-people initiatives include programs
where individuals from different sects go together to a neutral environment for a given
period of time, to get to know one another and to break stereotypes. Some of these
programs involve ongoing efforts to create opportunities for interaction in people’s
everyday lives. Some initiatives explicitly do not overtly name or discuss sectarian
identities, but bring people from different backgrounds together to work together on
projects for the common good.
Some, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), tend to engage
religion as an instrumental good- engaged as a means to an end- while others see
religious ideologies and practices as much more integrally intertwined with social
conflict and therefore seek to engage religion on a deeper and more holistic level, as seen
in the programmatic approaches of Hayya Bina, although these cross into the
War, Peaceworks 55 (January 2006), accessed April 20, 2017,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/01/religious-contributions-peacemaking-when-religion-bringspeace-not-war; Katherine Marshall, “Interfaith Journeys: An Exploration of History, Ideas, and Future
Directions,” Georgetown University: World Faiths Development Dialogue (February 2017), accessed April
20, 2017, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/interfaith-journeys-an-exploration-of-historyideas-and-future-directions; and Omer, et. al, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and
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instrumental at times as well. Some involved see it as a “sideshow.” In fact, many of the
people deeply involved in long-term dialogue efforts see it as totally unconnected to
impacting the actual conflict dynamics. However, some argued that you have no choice
but to work with religious actors in Lebanon, stating that trying to overlook this reality is
a sort of “colorblindness.” One respondent stated that, “if someone wants really to bring
change in a society, namely here in the Lebanese society, he or she cannot overlook
sometimes the overwhelming role played by be it religious institutions or from a more
theological...by clerics...Religion is something that is too serious to be entrusted to
clerics.”256 Thus, for some, religious engagement is not a choice but a necessity.
Some actors are focused on changing individual and communal relationships (as
seen in most of the dialogue groups) and some (such as Adyan) on identifying and
building upon shared beliefs or common values, while others are more focused on
changing institutions. The numerous and varied efforts all aim to make a better Lebanon,
but articulate different visions of what “better” looks like for Lebanon, and take different
approaches to doing interfaith or religiously engaged peacebuilding work. While
respondents had different opinions on whether religion is simply instrumental or more
integral to conflict dynamics in Lebanon, the vast majority agreed that one cannot do
peacebuilding work in Lebanon without engaging with religious leaders in some way
(which is not the same as, but often overlaps with, interfaith peacebuilding efforts):
Religious people in this country are part of the social fabric so we want them
present at the table when we’re talking about some of these things. Now some
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groups don’t like that- those groups want not to involve religious leaders, let’s
keep them out of the realm of politics or whatever it is. But the truth of the matter
is that in this country, they have a very strong economic influence, they have a
very strong moral influence, and they are at the heart of the social network and the
social fabric. And as long as the laws don’t change, they have a strong legal
influence because they are in charge of the family courts.257
This reflection points to the important and intersectional ways religious leaders
assert and maintain authority in Lebanon; their influence is not limited to spiritual matters
or even to matters of personal and family status laws, but rather spans well beyond these
into other social and political spaces as well as into the economic sector. It is thus
impossible to separate out religious life in Lebanon from other aspects of life, as the
institutions and leaders themselves are so deeply entrenched throughout the social,
political and economic ecosystem.
A number of differences in methods, theories of change, and ultimate goals
emerged through my interview conversations. Some explained the key problem as the
lack of knowledge of the religious other. This interviewee stated that, “...in a country that
has a number of religious identities, not knowing the other becomes obviously a
hurdle.”258 For many, this includes knowing both the people who identify with that
religious community, as well as the content (beliefs, practices, and so on) of the religions
themselves. Others identified the problem as the sectarian system itself, and the sectarian
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identity categories maintained therein. One practitioner working in inter-religious
dialogue articulated the mission of their organization as working to “protect the religion
from politicians [and see to it] that religion is not being misused by others.”259 Many
named corruption and the lack of a strong central government as the key problems, noting
that elites utilize and play upon religious difference to distract from these root problems
that Lebanon is facing.
Within this context of diverse approaches to religion and peacebuilding in
Lebanon, two key peacebuilding tracks emerged. The elite-led (or, alternatively, elitestamped) approach, on the one hand, most often seeks to uphold communal
representation/boundedness and articulates a concept of peace that prioritizes unity and
cooperation between these distinct communities. The grassroots approach, on the other
hand, more often looks to dismantle communal identity politics, prioritizing individual
human rights and justice over unity between communities as such. This is not surprising,
as elites across the board have more to gain, while ordinarily citizens have more to lose,
through reforms of the sectarian system itself. These approaches to peacebuilding often
overlap and are intertwined with one another, but this difference in posture reveals some
of the key challenges for those who want to leverage religion for peacebuilding in the
Lebanese context.
Both approaches articulated above (elite- and grassroots-led) draw upon a similar
toolbox of methods. Many utilize dialogues between people from different groups, acting
either as individuals or as representatives of their communities. Additionally, several
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initiatives work to explicitly engage religious leaders, at regional, national, and local
levels, to help bolster projects/programs or to directly quell violence, through public
speeches or publications.260 Others focus on history and war memories, working to create
common understandings of what happened in the civil war across sectarian divides.
Among the elite inter-religious networks, one key player is the National
Committee for Christian-Muslim Dialogue. One interviewee who has been engaged as a
communal leader in the national dialogue since during the civil war described to me what
he called the first Lebanese Christian-Muslim religious summit, held in Kuwait in 1989,
at the bequest of a committee of the Arab League.261 According to my respondent, all of
the religious leaders were asked to go to Kuwait to meet with the Arab committee
appointed to help negotiate an agreement on the war. 18 of the religious leaders went, all
on the same flight and staying at the same conference center. Some wanted to leave
early, but this interviewee said that he then piped up, saying that if the religious leaders
left now, it would be easy for the outside world to describe the Lebanese war as a
religious war. Instead, this interviewee agreed to draft a statement, to which all the
leaders signed on the next day. The statement condemned the civil war, said explicitly
that it is not a religious war, and asserted that Christians and Muslims want to live
together in peace and do not give “any sort of cover to any of the militias in Lebanon”,
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urging a political settlement from the Arab league.262 This, the interviewee claimed, was
the first Christian-Muslim agreement in Lebanon, and it helped pave the way for the Ta’if
agreement. In 1993, after Ta’if, many of the same actors reconvened for the second
Lebanese Christian-Muslim Summit and decided to form a national committee. This was
the birth of the National Committee for Christian-Muslim Dialogue.
Another notable initiative is the Arab Group for Muslim-Christian Dialogue,
which is involved in regional interfaith relationship building, in order to, according to one
respondent, move “towards a better understanding of the religious other and [to
strengthen] our interfaith dialogue and interfaith work.”263 Part of the work of this group
is to equip religious communities with tools to, in the words of one of the leaders,
“protect our communities from what happens outside,”264 demonstrating a sense of
solidarity among those sects or political groups seen as Lebanese (rather than foreigners)
to resisting external dynamics that would throw off the equilibrium within Lebanon. This
respondent went on to note that the events invoking or involving religion in the world
beyond the Levant has a strong impact on internal religious self-identity and
relationships. For instance, the reactions to the Danish cartoons of the Prophet
Mohammed rippled through Lebanon and Syria,265 and thus one of the dialogues this
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group put together was between Danish and Arab people from different faith
backgrounds.
A plethora of NGOs work at the grassroots level to improve inter-religious or
inter-sectarian relationships. Some are local (created and run by Lebanese nationals),
while others are bilateral (primarily European or America), regional, or international. As
one respondent noted, “Many NGOs are being created more and more to deal with this
issue, to bring people together- Muslims and Christians, and now more to brings together
Sunni and Shi’a; [the Sunni-Shi’a division] is now really worrying for everyone,
especially the minorities in the area because if anything happens in Lebanon it will spread
all over.”266 Grassroots-focused NGOs are numerous and continue to increase, saturating
the scene with programs and initiatives.
While these initiatives have focused primarily on engaging elite religious clerics,
those involved in these efforts reported skepticism about how effective they are in
promoting widespread, sustainable cohesion within Lebanon. As one respondent said,
“They have no power, in the end. So, each one of them represents officially the religious
leadership of his own sect in this dialogue committee and they are well-known in this
field…[but] they are preaching to believers.”267 Some noted that this is indeed the goal:
“From a religious point of view, the solution is not from communities dialoguing, but

that sometimes vague references to “outside influences” in Lebanon is a cover for critiques of Saudi or
Iranian influences in particular.
266

Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015.

267

Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015.

123

from an intra-community dialogue.”268 Thus, the intra-community education and
discussions are where some see the most promise, as the “ambivalence” of any religious
tradition leaves much room for divergence of approach within each religious community,
and much of the strife emerges from internal battles for representativity or power, for
asserting the most “true” face of a given religious tradition.
Indeed, several respondents pointed to the increasing importance of work in intrareligious dialogue, within the context of religious institutions: “We’re dealing with a
system of values and norms, but [we are] also dealing with institutions [when working
with religion]..the value systems promoted by these religious systems are failing and if
we don’t engage religion in peacebuilding then it will turn against us.”269 Another noted
that intra-religious work has to come first, as Christians and Muslims in Lebanon are both
largely ignorant about their own religions. This respondent posited that Daesh/ISIS has
given the Lebanese Muslim community an opportunity to return to the text and to intrareligious learning and examination.270
The biggest division that emerged from my interviews was between the grassroots
and elite-centered approaches, with the former focusing on institutional change as a
means of achieving justice, while the latter focuses heavily on achieving and maintaining
consensus, which often means shying away from challenging the institutional status quo.
While the ambivalence of religion allows room for difference in expressing any given
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tradition in a way that promotes peace or violence, another dimension emerges here, as
religion can be mobilized toward maintaining or challenging the status quo. This divide
runs through the peacebuilding infrastructure, and thus while numerous organizations are
technically working in the same space (that of “peacebuilding”), their perspectives, goals
and methods are vastly different.

The Religious Peacebuilding Infrastructure
One key legacy of the civil war is a strong NGO infrastructure in Lebanon.
Numerous international organizations have set up camp in Beirut and beyond, with a
strong ongoing United Nations presence; this reality both supports and complicates
locally-led efforts at peacebuilding work. The NGO infrastructure in Lebanon drives
many of the peacebuilding initiatives that engage religion, explicitly or implicitly, and
thus a survey of a selection of these organizations will help to flesh out and ground the
analysis of this work.
One major NGO working at both the grassroots as well as institutional levels is
Adyan, which means religions in Arabic. Founded in 2006, and officially registered in
2008, by Christian and Muslim Lebanese leaders, the organization works through a
number of programs to tackle the persistent sectarian division in Lebanon. This
organization works through youth clubs for co-existence, citizenship curriculum
development and implementation in partnership with the Ministry of Education271, and
271
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other programs for bringing Lebanese together into a shared understanding of and
commitment to citizenship. Adyan maintains strong partnerships with international
organizations and governments, and while their work in Lebanon is primarily conducted
in Arabic, they have a strong English language web presence, suggesting an outwardfacing orientation, along with the inward-facing work.
Our Unity Is Our Salvation (Wahdatouna Khalasouna) is an NGO collective
working through a number of sectors on advancing civil peace. It has member
organizations working on environmental issues, women’s rights, and a number of other
issues, all with the aim of increasing peace in Lebanese society through a multi-sectoral
approach, according to … their website? Charter?. Together, this collective will make
calls to religious clergy to “quiet down their followers,” among the many other activities
of this group.272
Hayya Bina works on grassroots peacebuilding through a number of efforts,
integrating clerics within other programs (e.g., teaching English to lower income women
without access to formal education opportunities) when possible. They also work to
directly engage clergy through a program called “clerics without borders”, bringing
clergy together around the ideas of peace and justice. Another grassroots organization is
Fighters for Peace, which involves ex-fighters speaking in schools and universities, as
well as putting together public press conferences addressing people who are considering
joining violent factions, in order to dissuade them.

272

Author interview with Respondent 1, July 2, 2015.

126

Several NGOs focus primarily on youth. Offre Joie has been bringing youth from
different sects together through summer camps, solidarity actions, and joint service
projects since its emergence in 1985, five years prior to the Ta’if. For example, under
this NGO’s banner, youth and adults from different religious groups recently came
together to rebuild a mosque in Tripoli that had been attacked.273 The Forum for
Development, Culture, and Dialogue (FDCD), which is considered the youth arm of the
Arab Group for Muslim-Christian Dialogue, works on peacebuilding and conflict
resolution through yearly work and study camps, bringing together youth from across the
globe.274 This organization also works on citizenship projects across the Arab world,
prioritizing equality and women’s rights, among other issues, in their workshop
curriculum. Much of their work recently has focused on Syria, rather than Lebanon.
Another group, Groupement Libanais d’Amitié et de Dialogue Islamo-Chretien
(GLADIC) was founded in 2012 with the stamp of approval from the Lebanese Ministry
of interior and municipalities. Its flagship program, called Christian Islamic Living
Together, is conducted through the University of Saint Joseph to introduce 16-18 yearolds to inter-religious dialogue in coordination with public and private schools.
Many respondents working on the levels of grassroots and grasstops noted the
important roles local clerics play in quelling outbreaks of violence. On this front, the
FDCD has taken on an evaluation of the sermons, media statements, fatwas, and the like,
of clerics in Syria and Lebanon. They intend to hold workshops for clerics when the
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research portion of the project is complete, to look at the results and consider how they
might adjust their public speech to advance peace. There are several projects underway
to engage clergy to produce speech and writing that promotes peace and unity, for their
own religious constituencies and for the consumption of the broader public. This is
important in a context where clerics are free from state control of their sermon topics
(which is not the case in some other national contexts in the Arab region, like the Gulf,
where states dictate what religious leaders can and cannot speak about).
While some organizations do not explicitly focus on inter-religious dialogues or
relationship-building, many do intentionally engage religious leaders in development and
peacebuilding projects in various ways. This is true for several international
organizational efforts, including Catholic Relief Services and UNDP, among others.
Through track-two dialogues in high conflict areas in Lebanon, UNDP engages
influential religious leaders and works to build strong networks for conflict mitigation,
involved religious and community leaders. For example, they worked with the Sunni
Mufti of Baalbeck and Hermel on reconciliatory initiatives between families of killed or
abducted soldiers from different sects.275 Additionally, one respondent noted a “charter
of honor”, signed by religious officials, political actors, and members of parliament from
Baalbeck and Hermel in September 2014, denouncing violence and pledging crosssectarian solidarity. One example of the outcome of this effort was a beheaded Sunni
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man’s family travelling to pay condolences to the family of a beheaded Shi’a soldier.276
This is a critical display of solidarity in a culture that places great value on condolences,
thus demonstrating the important ways that cultural norms intertwine with expressions of
religious difference and solidarity.
Another ongoing approach of a number of NGOs and religious institutions
involves public collective displays of unity. A local NGO, Adyan, has led a symbolic
spiritual solidarity day, which moves locations around the country from year to year,
since 2007. Additionally, NGOs successfully pushed for Lebanon to adopt the
Annunciation of Mary as a national shared Christian-Muslim holiday, and a number of
groups and religious institutions work together to put on public celebrations of this
holiday. The National Committee for Christian-Muslim Dialogue was involved in
making this official ask of the government, and now, one respondent noted, “Lebanon is
now the only country in the world that brings together Muslims and Christians on that
day...everybody participates, even the Druze.”277 Several interviewees spoke of the heavy
emphasis placed on public symbolic displays of unity, including joint prayers, joint
position statements on specific issues, joint marches for peace, and joint symbolism.278
Several NGOs and universities have taken up work to create and disseminate a
shared narrative of the Lebanese war. Speaking about the importance of re-creating
shared war memories for the next generation, one respondent stated, “I am 60 and I lived
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the civil war, and nobody is going to change my mind regarding my reading of that war.
But it would be very helpful for those who are 30 and younger, a unified reading- just a
series of events- should have been available.”279 The Lebanese Renaissance Foundation
developed what it heralds as an objective research study on casualties of the war (drawing
on newspaper reports) and disseminated it at universities, but this had little traction, in
part due to the massive amount of work that was still needed to complete the research and
to make it easily accessible to others. Actors focused on this approach argue that
developing shared war narratives across sects (including a common understanding of the
level of casualties across all communities) is one of the key ways Lebanese will be able
to build social cohesion across sectarian boundaries into the future: if there is a shared
sense of history and pain.
Some groups articulate the goal of their work as trying to re-infuse sectarian
identities with religion, arguing that sectarianism is religion without the spiritual, valuedriven content. Thus, adding back in the spiritual content will save sectarianism from
being used as a divisive political tool. Particularly in locations where religious language
has been used to invoke or justify violence or enmity towards an “other”, such as
incidents and ongoing clashes framed in terms of sect over the last couple of years in
Tripoli and in the Bekaa valley,280 practitioners are finding it critical to have religious
leaders and language as part of the solution. These practitioners will argue for religious
279
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literacy (knowing one’s own religious texts, etc.) as an essential part of the approach to
peacebuilding. Those arguing for this approach talk about how religious literacy helps to
“re-infuse” the tribal model of religious identity with spiritual substance, which many
referred to as the “real” religion. Those advocating for this approach would argue that
the challenge is less about knowing about the religion of the Other, though many would
argue that this is also important, and more about having a more multidimensional- and
“full”- understanding of one’s own religious identity.
A majority of respondents agreed that “religion is not the real problem” and
asserted that faith or spirituality is something different entirely than religion as we see it
in the public square in Lebanon. While most interviewees thus saw religion as
instrumental in conflict- as a tool utilized and manipulated by politicians, rather than the
problem in and of itself - a few saw it as more intricately tied up in the conflict dynamics.
As one interviewee, a former general in a Christian militia during the civil war, put it,
It’s not faith that is the source of conflict, it’s religion-- by religion, I mean the
social and political and identity and rite things of the faith- that are the source of
the troubles...we become tribes more than sects even, we think as tribes and we
act as tribes.281
I understand this interviewee to be referring to religion in its institutionalized
form, considering faith to be something different- something more pure. The problem,
according to another interviewee, is when “religion became ideology….the faiths have no
religion- it is a question of the human being about life, about the sense of the world, and
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have have many response about this question...religion are human institutions” that
created societal chaos and disunity.282 Understanding how those who work in the field of
religious peacebuilding in Lebanon conceptualize the relationship between religion and
conflict, helps to shed light upon the theoretical underpinnings of the various approaches
to engaging religion in peacebuilding efforts.
There is no shortage of programs and initiatives to engage religion for
peacebuilding in Lebanon. Indeed, one respondent noted that the field is in a state of
saturation: “In Lebanon, we have a kind of overdose...a state of saturation. In a sense
there is so much people dialoguing and at the same time the level of tension- and I’m not
just talking about clashes in the street or theatrical clashes- the level of tension and the
increase in the identitarian, the religious identities, is so high that where we are today is
this kind of [saturation].”283 This saturation, however, has not produced social cohesion
across Lebanon, and it is notable that this is a reality shared by Bosnia, where the postconflict “peacebuilding wonderland” has also saturated the field with numerous efforts to
engage religion in peacebuilding, with limited results to show at national scale.

Assessing Lebanese Social Cohesion
Given the multiple approaches and plethora of programs and initiatives aiming to
improve religious literacy, build better relationships between people and communities,
engage clergy to promote messages of unity and peace, and reform curriculum in the
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school systems to inculcate a shared national narrative and vision, one might imagine that
social cohesion in Lebanon would be improving- if gradually- over time. However, my
interviews along with World Values Survey data and several recent studies of Lebanon
tell a different story than the one that might be expected. Both vertical and horizontal
measures of cohesion and trust are very low, as demonstrated by the data that follows.
The most recent World Values Survey was conducted in Lebanon between 20102014, and thus reflects opinions and sentiments from this time frame, which have likely
shifted over the last several years, given the increased intensity and spillover from the
Syrian war. The data shows that Lebanese are nearly evenly split on whether they trust
people of another religion,284 showing a fairly high level of horizontal distrust.
Vertical distrust was also high, with many noting that confidence in the
government is extremely low, with only 22.7% of respondents expressing “a great deal”
or “quite a lot” of confidence in the government.285 The data showed sectarian divides
when it comes to feelings of national pride or belonging. Overall, 79.6% of those
surveyed said they are proud of their nationality; however, this number was much lower
for Roman Catholics286, at 46.2%, showing a sectarian divide in feelings of national
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pride. Higher levels of pride in nationality correlated with higher levels of importance of
religion. This suggests that perhaps a stronger sense of religious identity is seen by many
as an integral component of what it means to be Lebanese- to be part of a “community of
communities.” One’s bonding cohesion with one’s own religious group correlates with a
sense of nationalism, but not necessarily with a sense of bridging (cross-sectarian)
cohesion, which is not seen as necessary to Lebanese nationalism.
Similarly, high levels of people surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with the
statement, “I see myself as part of the nation,” but Catholics were much lower on this, at
46.2%. Again, importance of religion in life correlated with higher levels of considering
oneself part of the nation, though it is worth noting that Maronites in general tend to
consider religion quite important. I would point to this as a key outcome of how
Maronite identity developed within the Arab context, with a need to hold tight to
religious identity as a way of differentiating from the surrounding culture.
The data also revealed that religion in Lebanon means different things to different
people (as is the case anywhere else), and that Lebanese do not self-identify as
particularly religious. This may come as a surprise to people who see the strong role
sectarian identities play in politics and social life, but for many, these two realities are not
in conflict, but rather see the decline in religiosity as an outgrowth of the politicization of
religious identity through sectarianization. This reveals a key feature of the sectarian
system in Lebanon: religious identity is high, while religious practice may not necessarily

sects). The Roman Catholic category in this survey likely included Maronites, Armenians, and Greek
Catholics.
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correlate, and may indeed be quite low. This is one reason many interview respondents
asserted that Lebanon needs more religion, not less.
Additionally, geographic segregation is an ongoing reality, and while many hoped
after the war to return Christians to the “Muslim areas” and Muslims to the “Christian
areas”, this did not happen fully. As one respondent noted, “Although the Christians in
the Chouf could get back their lands and what was left of their houses, they never came
back seriously. The go for weekends, in summer mainly. They don’t feel yet
comfortable enough because nothing serious was done.”287 And since 2005-2008, “we
see a sectarian cleansing not done by force, but by the environment.”288 Further
geographic segregation has taken place since 2008. This contributes to a lack of social
cohesion, as there are few organic opportunities for cross-sectarian interaction and
relationship-building. Most of these opportunities must be constructed, and are thereby
often “opt-in,” limiting their impact to a very small segment of society.
Generational dynamics also suggest that social cohesion is actually worsening
with time, rather than improving among younger generations. Many interviewees noted
that the older generations are actually more willing to engage in dialogue, because they
have memories of Lebanon before the civil war, which they describe as a Lebanon that
didn’t prioritize people’s religious identities. This observation challenges the idea that
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sectarian boundaries were hardened prior to the war and led to the violence; rather, it was
through both the actual experience of the war, and the subsequent creation of war
narratives and histories that the sectarian divides were truly generated and solidified.
While, as discussed above, the battles during the 1975-1990 often did not reflect clean
sectarian boundaries, the war narratives that are prevalent in post-war life do. One
respondent asserted, “maybe we could focus on tomorrow’s Lebanon, not the past,”
questioning the effectiveness of the focus on re-making war memories.289
On this note, many respondents noted that youth consciousness of sectarianism is
worse than the older generation, according to many, “because we did not tackle the issue
of the memory. We did not work on improving reconciliation. We did not bring youths
together. They might sit next to one another in pubs or universities, but it’s not social
living together. It’s coexistence- and I hate that word. It’s either living together or
nothing.”290 For example, many Christian students at American University of Beirut, for
instance, which is in an area (Hamra) seen as predominately Sunni Muslim, had never
before been to a predominately Muslim area of Lebanon, and the fact that most students
commute rather than residing on campus limits the ability of university life to provide
deeper and more sustained opportunities for cross-sectarian relationship-building.
Additionally, several university-affiliated respondents attested to the fact that campus
politics mimic the sectarian system.291 Rather than running for campus posts as
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individuals, there are electoral lists, which mimic the existing political blocs, if not
publicly then implicitly.
It is important to note that survey data in 2006 showed that Hassan Nasrallah,
Secretary General of Hizbullah, was the most popular figure in the Arab region,
demonstrating widespread Sunni support of him as an anti-establishment figure (which, at
that time, overrode sectarian loyalties).292 Additionally, several respondents reported a
high sense of unified nationalism during 2008, in the wake of mass mobilizations after
the expulsion of Syria from Lebanon, but said it only lasted a week, after which the
groups divided starkly into pro- and anti-Syria (March 8 and 14 blocs). One respondent
commented that the only reason this divide did not produce another civil war was because
Christians were on both sides, although this opinion dramatically oversimplifies the
shifting alliances and actors on the ground in and after 2008.
Beyond reporting social division and geographic segregation, a number of
respondents spoke of the dismal state of inter-religious relations. One reflected that
“interfaith relations were excellent before the war.” He noted the way Muslims and
Christians alike in south Lebanon honored the Virgin Mary at Christmas, and found a
kind of solidarity and camaraderie in this. This respondent felt that interfaith
relationships have deteriorated rapidly over the last several years. He noted that Muslims
are no longer visiting shrines to Mary in the south, lamenting this as a sign of the decline
in positive interfaith relationships. Additionally, he noted that in neighboring Syria,
Christians there were no longer seeing their Muslim neighbors protecting them like they
292
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had experienced in the past. While in the past, he noted that Syrian Muslims had been
strong in their support for their Christian neighbors, prioritizing their safety over the
safety of one’s own family, there are only a few Syrian cities where he reported this
being the case over the last few years. While there was a case he cited in Qalamoun
where “Muslims stood in front of a church when the Islamic brigades came,” he noted
that this is the rare exception.293
A recent report by Joy Aoun and Marie-Joelle Zahar reinforces the claim that
Lebanese social cohesion leaves much to be desired, pointing to the ways in which the
Lebanese economy, consociational politics, and international donor intervention have
together perpetuated sectarianization of Lebanese society and reinforced bonding, over
bridging, cohesion.294 On the vertical axis, we see a society that is deeply untrusting of
its government, and on the horizontal axis, we see continued geographic and other forms
of demographic segregation along with low levels of social trust, bolstered and
perpetuated by a deeply embedded sectarian system that works to maintain these
boundaries and divisions.

Barriers to Impact of Religious Peacebuilding Work
Part of the reason the numerous initiatives have not been able to break through in
creating greater social cohesion in Lebanon is that there are multiple strong barriers to
current peacebuilding initiatives, including and beyond those that explicitly engage
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religion. Four barriers in particular surfaced through my research and interviews:
External factors, including regional politics in particular; religious extremism, and the
subsequent focus of peacebuilding actors on extremism; over-reliance on the role of
religious leaders (or communities); and finally, and I would argue most importantly, the
entrenchment of the sectarian system.

1. External factors
Commentators on the Lebanese conflict have often pointed to the strong impact
that regional and geo-political events have on internal Lebanese dynamics. This remains
a key intervening factor today, in the wake of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011.
As one interviewee noted, “we have found that a lot of what is going on in Syria is
affecting the interfaith relations, not only in Syria but what is going on in other places as
well.”295 The way in which sectarianism has been exploited in the Syrian conflict is
rippling out, impacting sectarian identity in other parts of the region.
One can observe the effects of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon on a number of
fronts, given both the physical proximity of Syria to Lebanon as well as the history of
Syrian political engagement in Lebanon (and the existing divisions among the Lebanese
regarding that involvement). Specifically, three major contributing factors stand out: the
influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon (estimated to be over a million, or 1/5-1/4 of the
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Lebanese population)296, the fact that fighters (including Hizbullah) are moving back and
forth across the border between Lebanon and Syria, and the geopolitical involvement and
subsequent narratives thereof. This last factor includes both the “proxy war” between
Saudi and Iran that many argue is being waged through the Syrian conflict (which is
often articulated and interpreted through a Sunni-Shia sectarian lens), and the on-theground sectarianization of the conflict in Syria.297
The influx of refugees in particular has put an extreme strain on the already weak
Lebanese economy and infrastructure, including Lebanon’s already strained electric and
water systems, for example. This, combined with the sectarianization of the Syrian
conflict, has led to a deepening of existing sectarian tensions in Lebanon, along with the
emergence of some relatively new forms of sectarian tension. For example, the influx of
primarily Sunni Syrian refugees into some cities has caused tension with poorer Shi’a
communities, as government and international resources are diverted to aid newly arrived
Syrians rather than the existing Lebanese poor. Joy Aoun and Marie-Joelle Zahar note
that,
most Lebanese political and religious leaders are more concerned with internal
stability and security than providing services and support to Syrian refugees but,
paradoxically, the longer the refugees’ needs remain unmet, the more pressure
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their presence will exert on ill-equipped host municipalities and the communities
therein.298
Thus, both the Lebanese government and international aid groups have no choice
but to work to address the needs of incoming Syrian refugees. International aid has
indeed shifted primarily toward the Syrian refugees and away from the Lebanese poor,
and international peacebuilding organizations have also shifted much of their attention to
ISIS and the more overt forms of violence and discord threatening Lebanon, which has
shifted attention away from addressing pre-existing sectarian tensions and root causes.
This can add to the resentment that non-elite Lebanese might already feel toward Syrians
[ should be some literature on this, how interventions should aid everyone to not make
targets of the refugee population]
Additionally, ISIS’ explicit targeting of Syrian Christians has bolstered a narrative
among Lebanese Christians about an existential threat against them, and has resulted in
stronger in-group cohesion as well as a number of Lebanese Christian groups taking up
arms, sometimes in collaboration with Hizbullah.299 Finally, there are intra-communal
divisions emerging in response to the ongoing Syrian conflict. Sunnis in particular are
pulled between loyalty to the more traditional Sunni political parties in Lebanon and
divergent extremist Sunni groups like ISIS. Those involved in organizations like Jamaa
Islamiyya, which has denounced ISIS, have been caught in between, and thus we see
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multiple levels of fracture and competing loyalties within Lebanese Sunni
communities.300
Another respondent pointed to the Syrian conflict as the main reason for recent
disintegration of inter-religious relationships in Lebanon:
The infrastructure of the Christian Muslim relations has been destroyed
unfortunately due to the conflict. We have to do a lot of work to rebuild that
again..I will say this conflict has made interfaith relations very fragile and easy to
break at any minute.301
A religious leader suggested that the Syrian conflict’s heavy impact on internal
Lebanese relationships demonstrates the way in which Lebanon’s fate is inextricably
intertwines with the rest of the region: “Maybe the situation of Lebanon is proving for all
of us that this country until now is not ruled by its own people.”302 This response suggest
that, on top of being vulnerable to regional shifts, Lebanon is subject to the whims of
foreign powers, rather than having the autonomy to control its own destiny.
One interviewee notes that the “religious lobbying” prevalent throughout the
Lebanese war continues today, noting in particular the tactics both Sunni and Shi’a
leaders in Lebanon used to get Lebanese to fight in Syria: “how to convince someone
who is Lebanese that he should be part of this conflict? The Shi’ite community said we
have the Shi’ite in Damascus that is in danger, and we should defend it, and we should
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defend our religious identity through this religious fight.” And on the other side, “the
[Syrian] regime is not fighting the opposition, the regime is fighting Sunnis.”303 Thus,
articulating the Syrian conflict as a religious or sectarian one has continued to provide
fighters on every side, and has had important ripple effects in Lebanon.
One respondent commented that, “the confessional rift in Lebanon is not enough
to create a conflict except if this is exacerbated by events outside of Lebanon.”304
Another said, “Of course the confession element plays out and is very important, but not
so much because of existing internal Lebanese dynamics but because of what this means
in terms of repercussions of events that are happening outside.”305 According to the
majority of respondents, the role of regional factors, and particularly the current Syrian
conflict, continues to serve as a barrier for the success of religious peacebuilding work in
Lebanon.

2. A Heavy Focus on Religious Extremism
According to a number of respondents, another key barrier to the ability for
peacebuilding programs to have strong and lasting impact is the uptick in religious
extremism. One respondent remarked that, while the Syrian crisis has really negatively
impacted sectarian relations, ”the most dangerous thing in this whole thing is religious
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extremism.”306 Clearly, this barrier is directly intertwined with the issue of external
factors.
The rise in religious extremism has had a particularly strong impact on the Sunni
community, where there is “this very sensitive issue of the risk of losing the base,
especially in areas where people might be the most attracted to Daesh. Their main
objective is to portray themselves as the real leader of the Sunni community.”307 A
parallel trend is happening in Lebanese Christian communities as well, as one respondent
noted that Christian militias and vigilantes in Baalbeck, trying to prevent the intrusion of
ISIS, have ramped up rhetoric against the Syrian refugees, accusing them of hiding
terrorists in their camps. This respondent noted that, “this situation right now, somehow
you can see a trend in the Lebanese society of people going back to their confessional
roots in a sense.”308 The rise in religious extremism on any “side” is being met with
similar trends in other communities, thus perpetuating extreme bonding cohesion.
One person commented that, “right now, if there’s one thing that all NGOs are
working on, it’s the rejection of the threat of ISIS.”309 Much of the funding for Lebanese
peacebuilding has been funneled into the fight against Muslim extremism, and thus even
NGOs that would not have previously prioritized efforts to counter extremist ideology
and action have reallocated funds and energies toward these programs, as this emphasis is
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currently the most appealing to funders.310 This demonstrates the ways in which funder
interests can drive NGO activities, shifting the priorities of local groups. This has been a
perpetual challenge in both Bosnia and Lebanon, as funder interests have often driven
post-conflict peacebuilding and development efforts in both cases. This can mean that the
donors’ reading of a conflict often overrides local needs and values.

3. Over-reliance on religious leaders
Another important barrier to religious peacebuilding effectiveness, according to
respondents, is that too much stock is placed in the religious leaders. One pointed to the
fact that the Maronite Patriarch had not (at the time of my interviews) been able to broker
a deal between Aoun and Geagea, for the presidency: “The church has had very little
leverage over the candidates...So to say the religious leaders have that much influence, it
goes up and down and depends on the candidate. Ultimately, their role is hostage to that
division.”311
Elite dialogues have been important for creating a common space, but several
respondents commented on the importance of recognizing the limits of these efforts: “If
you don’t put these things in law and you don’t protect them institutionally, these efforts
are very vulnerable. Not that I don’t see hope coming from these initiatives, no, on the
contrary, but hope without political change and institutional structures, can fall back into
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things that are not very healthy and fall back to war.”312 Thus, while most respondents
believe that these initiatives play an important role, there are clear limits to what they can
be expected to accomplish.
Another respondent noted that, “during more than three generations, the religious
institutions were accomplices and silent.”313 While now, this person noted, religious
institutions and leaders are more outspoken against violence, the media does not cover it.
One interviewee commented on the disconnect between talk and action by religious:
You know, there is a French word that says ‘pompier de’ [literally, firefighter]you light the fire and you extinguish it. I have a feeling that religious authorities
in Lebanon have been playing this game for 40 years and people are very happy
when they see them all aligned saying outlined stances of unity and even though a
week before each one of them was behaving in a different way. So it is true that
now they are playing a pacification role, but you won’t get a solution until their
role gets confined to religious matters.314
One respondent asserted that the effectiveness of religious leaders is entirely
dependent upon political elites’ need for certain figures and messages at any given time:
“Now we have a lot of religious figures who are wise enough, who are charismatic
enough, I believe I am one of them, but it is not our time now.” As for the ones who are
currently lifted up, “Maybe they are not [great] but they are needed now just to gather the
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body, to make the body come to each other and stick to each other.”315 This respondent
gave the example of the fighting in Tripoli during the civil war. Battles- about nineteen
in total- raged between two neighborhoods, and “no one could stop it, and then suddenly
it just stopped. We say like this, those who used to send the message that we should start
the fighting, now they send the message that we should stop the fighting.”316
Another respondent commented, “Can we expect that...interfaith dialogue will
lead really on a conceptual level to anything? Personally I think not. But will using the
clerics as icons help sometimes in calming down a situation? I would say yes.”317 This
respondent, among others, argued for the importance of getting into the specifics when it
comes to strategically engaging religious leaders. For instance, the respondent asserted
that a Muslim cleric in Lebanon often has more leverage in people’s personal lives that a
Christian cleric does. While this is a reflection of this particular respondent’s perception
of relative clerical power, the reality of some imbalance of clerical authority between and
within different religious communities can lead to an disparity in many dialogues looking
to engage different religious leaders, as the weight and scope of leaders’ influence differ.
One respondent also noted the new ways in which religious leaders are exerting
influence: “It’s a new situation- clerics who are al-fresco, clerics who are on the public
stage, are not necessarily the most influential.”318 This respondent went on to say that,
“Lebanon, ok, clerical institutions are recognized as kind of national institutions: Muslim
315

Author interview with Respondent 6, July 5, 2015.

316

Author interview with Respondent 6, July 5, 2015.

317

Author interview with Respondent 10, July 9, 2015.

318

Author interview with Respondent 10, July 9, 2015.

147

and Christian clerics speaking on television, appearing in public functions, but are they
the ones that exert the higher level of influence? Is the dialogue between these guys...will
the results of a dialogue between these guys go downstream and have...the expected
influence? Unfortunately, it’s not the case.”319 These are political dialogues, serving a
political agenda, and “their religious load is depleted.”320
Calibrating the potential impact of religious leaders is thus an important part of
the religious peacebuilding assessment process. Some asserted that religious leaders, at
this point, really only have an influence on their followers. One articulated this reality as
follows: “For the time being I think that the religious leadership will have an effect
mostly on their own adherents who are not directly involved in conflict. But those who
are involved are already involved and they wouldn’t listen to them.”321 Another noted
that social media has dramatically changed the types of religious leaders exerting
influence, and their mechanisms for doing so, citing the quality of internet in Syrian
refugee camps in Lebanon as one place where religious speech is getting a lot of traction
online.322
However, there are also limits to the reach and impact of religious leaders’ ability
to exacerbate violence or inspire peace, as another respondent noted, warning against
placing too much stock in these efforts:
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Interfaith, inter-religious, inter-sectarian dialogue in a situation of conflict are
band-aids. Sustainable peace cannot be brought to any society if we don’t reach a
point where citizenship prevails. So obviously in emergency cases, you need to
apply these band-aids. But in the long run, I don’t think that they really offer a
solution...we are going back to the same logic of the system where to exist you
need to belong to a sect. Yes, these are band-aids to be applied from time to time,
in extreme situations we need them, but they should be considered as a tool in a
larger toolbox.323
Another reflected their observation of this issue as follows:
What is the percentage of religious influence? Let’s take the case of the Sunni.
Ok, the Sunni, the Hariri establishment presents itself as the moderate
establishment. But when this establishment has no more funds, its religious
message goes down, and this is what you are seeing now.324 How do we explain
nowadays the marginalization of the moderate trends within the Sunni community
and the emergence of all the radical trends? Because finally the religious message
itself needs to be encapsulated with a set of services-- it’s not enough to tell
people you should not kill your Shi’a neighbor, but you should also...provide him
with a job, with a political perspective. Otherwise we find that people are sinking
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in this deep despair. Or finally and so they will join, or easily be attracted by
radicals, or radicals will be the ones offering both money and a key for heaven.325
Thus, the efficacy of religious leaders lies not only in what they say, when, but
also how it is amplified and received, which is contingent upon a number of factors that
are not controlled by the religious leaders or by peacebuilding organizations themselves.

4. Entrenchment of the sectarian system
The biggest barrier to peacebuilding efficacy that emerged through my interviews
was the sectarian system itself. One respondent commented that, “[the diffusion of
power among sects] further radicalizes this dimension of society, which in turn becomes
an inhibiting factor for the formal political system to conduct the needed reforms.”326
Thus, while deeply embedded sectarian tensions are not in and of themselves the root
causes of Lebanese social and political strife, they act as barriers to the very institutional
reforms needed to disembed these divides.
The majority of respondents agreed that sectarianism has gotten worse in the last
several years. One stated that,
We’re trying to get out of religion and sectarianism in Lebanon, but recent events
have brought us back into this magma. We’re trying to act on our own political
beliefs, but there is a way to fight this. You could fight it by military or physical
means, which is suicidal, or you can fight it by trying to promote values by people
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and organizations and even by politicians. So yes, we cope [with sectarianism],
but we don’t condone.327
Another interviewee stated that sectarian identities are preserved so that leaders
can utilize them to leverage power: “So, at any point in time if you’re a leader who wants
to either rally support around you or differentiate yourself from another group, you may
use that identity- that sectarian identity- as a tool...and also as a way of creating...a
network of mutual support.”328 Political elites, according to this analysis, utilize and
maintain sectarian identities to further bonding cohesion, often at the expense of bridging
cohesion in Lebanese society. As one respondent articulated, “the system feeds on these
divisions”329
Despite there being agreement among respondents that sectarianism is a barrier to
peacebuilding efficacy in Lebanon, I found disagreement on how, exactly. Here, two
divergent goals for Lebanese religious peacebuilding emerged. While some actors and
initiatives see dismantling sectarianism itself as the only route to social cohesion and
sustainable peace, others prioritize the preservation of unity and consensus through the
sectarian system. Thus, for the latter group, while the current sectarian system is indeed
problematic, it is because there is corruption that needs to be deal with. Sectarianism in
theory is not the problem. This is a key finding from the Lebanese case study, as there
are strong forces in society- within and outside of the religious peacebuilding
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community- working in these competing directions. Religion in Lebanon is inextricably
intertwined with this reality. One cannot engage organized religion in Lebanon without
dealing with institutions, and those institutions (the Maronite Church, for example) are
inherently related in some way to the sectarian system, monitoring and controlling issues
of legal status and rights, among other factors.
Several pointed to the problem with the fact that there were paragraphs of the
Ta’if agreement that were left unfinished- including the eventual move away from
sectarianism as a political system. One person noted that this was not due to actual
problems preventing the full implementation of Ta’if, but rather, it was empty talk to
begin with: “it was almost an unspoken agreement that some things will never be
applied.”330 Another commented that, “[there’s a] possibility of evolution into
deconfessionalization but it will take a long time...The generation of the civil war is still
the generation that is occupying the cabinet in Lebanon...And I don’t know if it will ever
be complete. Lebanon has been created in such a way that some level of this
arrangement will have to persist.”331
While for some, the emptiness of the promise of Ta’if (to shift from the sectarian
system) was seen as highly problematic, others noted that the empty promise was, and
still is, necessary for maintaining Lebanon’s fragile peace: “It is better to have inefficient
agreement than war.”332
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One respondent pointed to “an equilibrium of fear, [which] is somehow protecting
us from further unfolding of events.” This person went on to describe this situation as
follows: “Yesterday there were clashes between Sunni and Shi’a just south of Beirut.
Twenty years ago this may have spread to other areas, but I have a feeling the leaders
didn’t want it to spread because they cannot control the consequences.”333 Thus, at least
for the short term, there is a benefit in carefully balancing the power of sectarian leaders,
to assuage further devolvement into violence:
I know this doesn’t serve a long-term purpose, but it’s good to have groups that
are roughly equal in weight in power because they neutralize each other. One
knows that he would not gain power by resorting to weapons and arms. Right
now I think we are in a safe zone, but we are still really far from what we want the
state to be.334
The weakness of the Lebanese government plays into the entrenchment of the
sectarian, as one respondent noted, “the problem is that the government is weak, and
when governments are weak, tribes are strong.”335 This respondent talked about how
clientelism has increased in recent years, forcing people to go to their religious or
sectarian leaders- rather than directly to the appropriate government office- if they need
something, “from a phone line to building outside of your legal percentage on your own
block. Anything you need from your government, you don’t go to the government
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officials, you go to your leaders who are in the end from a certain religious group.”336
This reflects the ways in which Lebanese lean heavily on members of their own sect
within various government offices, rather than approaching the government as individual
citizens. Another respondent commented on how most Lebanese subsist on electricity
from private generators, rather than relying on the public utilities system. Even if the
cost of state-provided electricity were half the price of the generator, this respondent
remarked, everyone would still go with the generator, as the trust in the state’s ability to
provide this service is completely absent.
One respondent noted that,
Individuals can do a lot of work, NGOs can do a lot of work. Organizations
having one color-being related to one specific group- or having multi-colors like
Adyan, can do a lot of work. But at the end of the day, if you don’t have a strong
government, a just government, a trusted government, a government which can
give you the feeling that it can provide you with your basic needs and it will treat
you equally with the others, if you don’t have this government no one will support
it because if you have a weak government, an unjust government, it’s a threat for
the community. And then to be able to face any bad luck or any bad chance is to
be more sticking to my own people, and then maybe the umbrella of the religious
sect is the best tool to make this kind of lobbying.337
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The continued failure to elect a President the time of my interviews338 shows how
little power the president had, but according to one respondent, “it shows how little
power everybody has...The system is going down. We’re drowning. And of course the
Lebanese are unable as usual to define their own way to get out of it, so everyone is
expecting a hand down to help- Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, the US...We should be able to
do something from within.”339 Another respondent commented, “No one wants to go
back to civil war. There is a government of national unity that has decided that unity is
more important than electing a president, or having national elections.”340 This was a
prevailing sentiment, that unity is prioritized by the system above all else, including
justice, democracy, and individual rights.
Indeed, one respondent pointed out that Lebanon has never shifted from the
economics of war: “The government is paralyzed, and everything continues. It’s not a
country that depends on institutions so much, you don’t have electricity- you have
generators. It’s still the economics of war. You know, during the war the economy of
generators was created, and it’s still there. That’s why there is no reform of the
electricity- it’s the generator mafia. There’s also a mafia of the water tanks and the
private providers, they are making some people in the government very rich...But they
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use this [confessional language] as an excuse- oh, we cannot upset the Christians.”341
According to this perspective, political and religious elites point to confessional and
sectarian divisions as the problem- the barrier to peace- when in fact it is in their interest
to maintain these very divisions. This respondent’s comments reflects the way the
government is able to shift blame for its own lack of provision of public goods and
services, faulting sectarian dynamics rather than owning up to the governments failures to
provide for its people.
One respondent noted that this is the self-preserving goal of sectarian elites,
including those who are publicly committed to building social cohesion at the national
level: “It seems that a lot of times the issue of peace is used as a pretext to maintain elite
interests, in the name of consensus and peace and not to upset anyone, you have a model
that has become very inefficient, is a model that has the faction of disunity and favors and
making sure that everybody has a piece of the pie. No one has interest in building an
efficient functioning public institution.”342 Thus, several suggested that elite-stamped
peacebuilding programs are distractions, or empty verbiage. Indeed, several of the key
issues on which religious leaders have acted (not just spoken) in unity are in opposing
civil marriage343, and in opposing the desegregation of schools by sect. These examples
demonstrate the ways in which some religious and sectarian leaders have, over time,
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unified in efforts to maintain bonding cohesion, often against the will of grassroots multireligious activists.
Another respondent argued that everyone but the Sunnis is directly benefitting
from the rhetoric of sectarianism, including in particular Christians who are currently
focused on decentralization as a solution to Lebanon’s socio-political strife.344 One of the
key benefits, to the political and economic elite, is financial, as one respondent
commented, “Historically, Lebanon has always been the little place to keep an open
financial system because everyone needs it. Everyone needs a place to go and put their
money, relax, and so on...it serves the interests of everyone.”345 This again demonstrates
the importance of external forces on Lebanon’s internal affairs, including the regional
designation of Lebanon as a vacation spot.
Several expressed deep frustration with the way in which the logic of sectarianism
seems to prevail over any attempts at sustainable peacebuilding, commenting on the
preservation of sectarianism as similar to dictatorship in its prioritization of stability over
peace: “because dictators can bring stability and the dictators are much better stability
providers than democratic regimes.”346 Thus, some expressly articulated their goal to be
ending the sectarian system, in the interest of peace. One respondent stated, “I think a
civil government, a civil system, civil society is the only way to protect our communities
and to have a just and peaceful outcome that we may reach.”347
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On the other hand, some respondents were much more positive about sectarian
politics as the right way for Lebanon’s communities, long-term: “All of the Lebanese
who are talking about the sectarian system as something bad, they are talking about the
system itself or how the system is being used? I believe it is not the system itself, but
what they have witnessed in the system...it’s the corruption in the system, not the system
itself.”348 This respondent expressed fears about Druze, Maronites, and others losing
their identity and communal rights if the system were dismantled.349
Some of the successes noted by those working in the field of religious
peacebuilding clearly play a preserving role when it comes to sectarianism. Commenting
on the way in which religious leaders have good relationships and indeed, are working
together across sectarian lines, one actor working directly in interfaith relations told me
that, “We have seen how Muslims and Christians have come together on so many issues
related to humanitarian aid...and neither Muslims or Christians accepted the issue of civil
marriage. They agreed- the religious leaders agreed on it [in opposition to it]. While the
people were in support of it, the religious leadership did not want it.”350 This
interviewee’s comment seems to raise another paradox: religious leadership (rather than
“Christians and Muslims” as this respondent inaccurately states initially, since it is the
leadership rather than the people who have taken these positions) has worked together to
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bring positive change through humanitarian projects, and yet the other place they find
consensus is around standing together in opposition to potential advances in individual
civil rights (civil marriage). This demonstrates the emphasis on consensus among
religious leadership, as well as the drive to maintain the status quo.
From my interviews, it became clear that the humanitarian projects religious
leaders choose to work on together are important and positive, but largely “safe”- they
would not work on controversial humanitarian issues that cross into structural injustices.
Additionally, the work to oppose civil marriage demonstrates the stake that religious
leaders have in maintaining much of the structural status quo. Thus, the seeming paradox
of religious leaders working together to further humanitarian causes, while also working
against the desires of the Lebanese people, simply demonstrates the careful balance that
religious leadership in Lebanon walks- doing good for society (and opposing overt
violence) without shaking up the structures from which they benefit (along with the
political and economic elites). The entrenchment of the sectarian system, combined with
the other key barriers mentioned above, makes it exceedingly difficult for any
peacebuilding efforts to break through.

Our Aim is to Slow Down the Fall into Abyss
Beyond identifying these barriers to success, how do those engaged in religious
peacebuilding, in its various forms, see their own impact? The vast majority of those I
interviewed agreed that religious leaders can play a very strong role in exacerbating
violence or inspiring peace through interpretations of scripture, but in a limited way, as
159

noted above. As one respondent reflected, “Religion is extremely important in
Lebanon...I absolutely believe that the spiritual leaders in Lebanon play a fundamental
role in preventing the exacerbation of conflict.”351 This respondent gave an example of
Sunni leadership helping to defuse a radical Sunni leader in confrontation with the army
in Saida, noting, “I think that the spiritual leaders in Lebanon have played a very
important role and will continue to play a very important role in maintaining stability, as
long as they are not using inflammatory language.”352 These reflections demonstrate the
extremely negative way of framing goals of religious peacebuilding work in Lebanon at
present, aimed at disaster prevention, rather than focused on building something positive.
One interviewee, while somewhat skeptical about the broader impact of initiatives
to engage religious leaders for peacebuilding, yielded that “ultimately, these initiatives
are essential because they have an impact on the discourse.”353 Thus, many highlighted
the effect the current work with religious leaders has on public rhetoric in particular as an
indicator of success.
When considering the impact of person-to-person or other grassroots programs,
some focused on individual change as the key indicator of success, while others talked
about a slow, ripple effect of shifts in understanding and education about the Other:
I think that not everything is always a success but a lot of it provided to be a
successful by the fact that many people do start accepting the religious other and
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having a better understanding...when you have this kind of ignorance of the
religious other [like in Syria today] you get distortion. So ignorance leads to the
distortion of the image of the other and this in consequence leads to him going to
his own ghettos….So I think what you know we can say about the interfaith
dialogue and peacebuilding- that we are fighting this kind of ignorance and trying
to have people get together and understand each other.354
While none of these initiatives can impact everything at once, one respondent
noted that, “If you have these institutions and these actors engaged proactively to
promoting peace and tolerance then you have somehow a multiplying effect within
society.”355 Another reflected on three key factors that indicate broader impact of
peacebuilding initiatives, generally:
I think the trickling up has to do with a few factors. One, it has to do with the
efficiency and effectiveness of civil society. Two, it has to do with the space that
civil society has and how it uses that space. And third, it seems to me that it
would be important for the trickle up effect to work to start peeling off particular
individuals from the political hierarchy to buy into this new way of doing things.
They would at least temper their own coalition’s statements.356
While many stated that it is impossible to see or measure the results of these
programs, respondents noted that evaluations can show the impact on individual attitude
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shifts357 and that they are laying the groundwork for the future: “A lot of these initiatives
have been incubators of new ways of looking at things...but they are still hostage to
bigger and stronger dynamics that continue to dominate society. They might be the seeds
of things to come.”358
Others were less ambitious when it came to thinking about impact, with one
pointing to the counterfactual of what Lebanese society would be like without so many
NGOs and programs,359 and another stating that, “we are throwing onto the political
market each year 17-20 members of political groups. Now we cannot measure their
improvement unless they get into power….Our aim is to slow down the fall into
abyss.”360
While many talked about the aforementioned barriers to peace and felt that,
without these intervening factors, their initiatives and programs could have more impact
toward peace, a few saw their inter-religious work as disconnected entirely from sociopolitical peacebuilding. As one said, “There are different hats, but one head- there is one
goal, it is Christian-Muslim understanding. Christian-Muslim dialogue.”361 Thus, while
most respondents saw their work- whether directly or indirectly engaged with religious
leaders, values, and communities- as directly contributing to peacebuilding in some way,
a few of those more explicitly involved in inter-religious dialogue did not articulate that
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same goal, but rather indicated that inter-religious relationships are themselves the goal,
not a means to achieving or maintaining peace in a pluralist society.
A respondent directly involved in inter-religious dialogue work noted that, while
there is indeed a saturation of dialogue, people are striving to keep their identities in the
face of increasing globalization. This respondent noted that the global narratives are
stronger than any local or regional initiatives, so while these dialogues might temper their
effect, they are fighting a huge uphill battle to counter narratives of religious or sectarian
division.362
Another respondent argued for the preservation of unity, rather than focusing
energies on advancing democracy as such:
We are not after a perfect democracy, but we are after a perfect conviviality.
How can I use democracy to protect my national unity? National unity is my
target, which I care for. How can I protect and survive this national unity? That’s
my aim. I use democracy in this way in order to protect my national unity.
Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East where the rights of communities
are preserved, not only the rights of individuals...So yes, our political system,
sectarianism is not good, but so far, it is the only way to find, to preserve the
rights of communities, and to give them the chance when others are eliminating
the rights of communities, to give them the chance to feel free when expressing
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themselves and living in their own beliefs. This is the good thing about
sectarianism in Lebanon.363
This emphasis on unity and consensus was strong in other interviews with those
actors who were themselves religious elites, or prioritized work with religious elites as
part of their peacebuilding and inter-religious relationship building efforts. The focus for
many involved directly in inter-religious work was essentially damage control and
building of individual and institutional relationships, rather than seeing these efforts as
working to change institutions or socio-political structures in any way. This is critical,
because there is an assumption that explicitly interreligious work in a context like
Lebanon would naturally have peace, or increased social cohesion, as one of its goals,
and yet, a different sentiment entirely emerged through many of my interviews: those
working in these spaces often do not see their work having a ripple effect into society, but
rather see the work as important for those on the inside of this “bubble,” protecting them
and their relationships while social and political strife continues unabated. This leads to
some of the key findings that emerged from my observations and analysis of the religious
peacebuilding efforts in Lebanon.

Key Findings: What can we say about religious peacebuilding in Lebanon?
1. Religion is shaped through, and in turn shapes, conflict in Lebanon. The World
Values survey data shows that many Lebanese identify with spiritual beliefs and with
sectarian identities, but do not identify as explicitly religious. The meaning of religion
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itself has been changed through conflict, and the fact that one cannot engage with religious
institutions in Lebanon without the sectarian system coming in tow is an important factor
shaping this reality.
Religion cannot be confined to the realm of the personal/internal and the
apolitical, because religion itself is made through politics. Lebanese and Lebanon
observers often separate out religion from sectarianism because there is a common
assumption that religion cannot be this politicized. This belief is reified in the realm of
inter-religious work, as practitioners and Respondent s attempt to parse the truly religious
from the political and sectarian. However, religion is made through, and exists in, a
dynamic relationship with the socio-political, as demonstrated in this chapter’s journey
through Lebanese history.
Adam Gaiser argues for a narrative identity approach to understanding Islamic
sectarianism in particular, which “treats intra-religious divisions as participatory
discourses in which individuals ultimately choose to locate themselves in a plot (‘emplot’
themselves)—or not to do so—and which can thereby imply certain kinds of
practice/behavior.”364 He goes on to argue that this is a “dynamic and conscious process
of adoption, maintenance, and manipulation of certain types of narrative identities in
particular places and at particular times by particular persons or groups of persons,”365 a
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finding that comports with what a material approach to studying religion in Lebanon
reveals.
The persistence of global & regional narratives is important to the Lebanese story.
While on the localized and quotidian level, religious tension is rarely present, the regional
and global discourse on religious division (i.e., the clash of civilizations narrative) is
often stronger than the local realities of coexistence and cooperation.

Religion is always

local. And yet, local manifestations of religion are often highly informed by external
global or regional narratives that connect oppression and conflict to religion in explicit
and implicit ways.

2. Institutional change is necessary for religious peacebuilding efforts to be truly
effective in improving social cohesion. Otherwise, the changes that are made are too
fragile and undermined by the dominance of sectarian logic. Cross-sectarian ties (often
initiated through peacebuilding programs) can be part of pushing for this institutional
change. However, their work is extremely uphill, since elites work against sectarian
cooperation that is anti-status quo. Institutions, not just initiatives, are necessary for
sustainable social cohesion. As one respondent noted, peacebuilding programs and
initiatives are building the infrastructures of a new kind of Lebanon, but they need
institutional engineering to make a lasting difference. Successful programs judged on
their own merits cannot make sustainable change if they do not shift the institutions and
structures constantly maintaining and reproducing sectarianism.
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The overview of Lebanese history in the first part of this chapter demonstrates
how the institutionalization of the sect, and its subsequent self-perpetuation, constrains
social cohesion as it continues to sow both horizontal and vertical distrust in many ways.
Additionally, the biggest barrier to social cohesion that emerges from my study is the
sectarian system itself – this is distinct from the existence of different sects, which I argue
is in and of itself is not the barrier, but rather the ways the sectarian mode of functioning
has been entrenched and hardens boundaries and inequalities, while creating more and
more distance between the state and individuals.
It is clear that Lebanese elites do indeed understand and know one another. The
issue is not interpersonal division, but indeed, the elite cooperation to maintain
sectarianism and thereby elite control of communities. When programs are primarily
focused on changing beliefs (about one’s own religious tradition, and about the Other),
structural barriers to social cohesion are often left to the side, thus precluding sustainable
change. Improved relationships between people of different sects are important in and of
themselves, but do not have the power to “trickle out” to improve social cohesion without
structural shifts.

3. Many overt religious peacebuilding initiatives (particularly those that are elitecentric) are playing by, and either advertently or inadvertently reinforcing, the logic
of sectarianism. As one respondent argued, everyone in Lebanon has to play the
sectarian game to get ahead, NGOs included, and thus their efforts are often wrapped up
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in sectarian agendas.366 Religious leaders cannot extract themselves from the sectarian
system in doing inter-religious work.
Religious leaders in Lebanon are often upholding the status quo of communal
representation, mimicking the sectarian system itself and re-inscribing the status quo.
Two key examples of how this manifests are the religious institutions’ collaboration in
opposing civil marriage and in preventing schools from being desegregated by sect.
Rather than promoting a genuine societal transformation that deals with the injustices of
the past and present, religious elites play by the sectarian logic, speaking of unity and,
indeed, united themselves in opposition to shifting the status quo of sectarian
representation and control. It is clear that the language of sectarian elites and statesanctioned religious elites is highly controlled and carefully calibrated to maintain a
minimal amount of national unity without sacrificing sectarian loyalty, thereby losing
their sense of control.
In a recent Carnegie paper, Alexander Henley asserts that,
Because high-level religious leaders in Lebanon are generally drawn from elites
and emerge from institutional apparatuses, and in a number of cases are
dependent on the state, there is no cultural expectation that they be followed
blindly—or at all. They are not ‘of the people,’ nor are they necessarily regarded
as being ‘for the people.’367
This comports with the findings of my research, as religious leaders are deeply
embedded in and benefit in many ways from the status quo of sectarian politics in
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Lebanon, thus creating distance between their efforts and the desires of the Lebanese
people.
Henley goes on to argue that,
the reality is that religious leaders often have to walk a fine line in terms of
rhetoric and behavior among their own community, the political elite, and other
communities. In order to avoid being ostracized and isolated, they usually take
pains to remain in favor with the elite, in that way maximizing their own
influence through their ability to engage in gentle persuasion or soft negotiation.
At the same time, they avoid straying too far from the dominant political values of
their own community, let alone the values of coexistence that are a part of
Lebanese political life.368
Religious leaders do not have to overtly create sectarian strife in order to help
curate sectarian divisions; indeed, they must show their commitment to unity in order to
preserve their place in the Lebanese order, but it is the implicit ways that they benefit
from status quo maintenance that have a stronger impact on Lebanese society and
politics, holding back much of the justice-seeking social cohesion work that is of interest
to the people at large.

4. Points 2 & 3 create a paradox for religious peacebuilding efforts. If an effort or
initiative is aligned with the sectarian system, or has a vested interest in upholding it, then
their work serves to uphold the status quo and the interest of the state. If they are not so
aligned, they have a very hard time making an impact that trickles up in any way. One
respondent noted that as long as civil society level programs are not connected vertically
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to impacting political institutions or engineering, they are allowed to do their work,
because they are not seen as a threat.369
As Salloukh, et. al., have argued,
By binding Lebanese to their sectarian/political patrons and clientelist networks,
and by making them materially dependent on the latter’s patronage benefits, the
political economy of sectarianism operates in such a way as to sabotage
experiments in non-sectarian forms of political mobilization and organization,
forcing most Lebanese to privilege their sectarian identities over alternative and
more appropriate class, professional, or local affiliations.370
Thus, the dilemma at hand is that political elites will only allow programs and
initiatives to gain traction that do not challenge their authority and control. Anything that
truly challenges the sectarian system gets squashed, and yet challenging the sectarian
system is the only way that these programs could actually achieve their desired effects.
While most Lebanese politicians and sectarian leaders are verbally promoting
social cohesion from their platforms, certain actors have at times diverged from this
common message, as Aoun’s call for Christians to rally in the streets in the summer of
2015 shows.371 Christian and Shi’a politicians often reference the risks of leaving any
community behind in Lebanon, focusing on their own community’s rights being
curtailed. Thus, the current political rhetoric is about maintaining an amenable balance
of power and participation, rather than regularly spouting overtly negative rhetoric about
other groups. That said, the electoral system promotes bonding, rather than bridging,
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strategies for political parties to gain seats.372 This points to the way in which bonding
cohesion, or reifying the sectarian boundaries, actually serves the status quo version of
cohesion in Lebanon. The current model of unity, enshrined in Ta’if and more deeply
entrenched thereafter, is dependent upon sectarian boundaries with powerful elite
representatives and guardians. The sectarian system requires elites to take part in this
careful dance, promoting enough unity to stay in play in Lebanon (and to avoid war),
while simultaneously maintaining enough bonding cohesion (i.e., sectarian loyalty) to
remain as the representative of a given sect.
Additionally, it is useful to consider Bruce Lincoln’s categories of religions of the
status quo, religions of revolution, and religions of resistance, when considering how
religion manifests at present in Lebanon. While religious and sectarian elites
predominantly reflect manifestations of religion aimed at maintaining the status quo, this
is not immediately clear from the surface. For example, Nasrallah and Aoun both use
resistance or even revolutionary language at times, but nearly always act in the service of
maintaining the status quo of political and religious elite social and political control.
Generally, only those who benefit from the status quo in Lebanon are invested in keeping
it, and thus Lebanon is ripe for religious narratives that resist and revolt. Thus, there are
resistant and revolutionary forms of religion always present and rising to the surface
when opportunities present themselves (such as, at present, on the Syrian border, as well
as on the southern border at moments of particular tension with Israel).
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5. Those interested in advancing social cohesion in Lebanon need to calibrate and
specify the roles and effects of religious actors in peacebuilding. As one respondent
pointed out, a focus on local religious leaders will yield more results, as local leaders may
be more invested in and willing to work for real, sustainable peace than national religious
leaders.373 Additionally, one must distinguish between preventing or extinguishing overt
violence, and the longer term goal of sustainable social cohesion. As one respondent
said, “when you need to negotiate a ceasefire, ok you make concessions. But you should
not mix up ceasefire building and peacebuilding.”374 The same strategies of engaging
religion in times of immediate/urgent crisis are not the strategies that will help build
social cohesion over the long term. Thus, there is a need to differentiate the roles and
impacts of religious leaders, and to note that their impact will ultimately be calibrated by
how useful their message or work is to the political elites, and on the urgency and
overtness of particular episodes of violence. As one respondent noted, “sometimes, you
just need a fatwa.”375
There is some promise in embodied approaches to religious peacebuilding,
including the adoption of Annunciation Day into the national calendar as a multireligious holy day, and the cooperative public rebuilding of houses of worship that have
been damaged or destroyed. However, the effort for mainstreaming Annunciation Day as
a cross-sectarian national holiday is stymied by the fact that very few are aware of its
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existence, and it is widely still seen as a (somewhat obscure) Christian holiday. If and
when efforts to integrate cross- or trans-sectarian modes of being and belonging into the
Lebanese nation-state are successful, we are likely to see increased social cohesion in the
country, and yet efforts to do so are often confined to small peacebuilding or activist
circles.

Conclusion
My analysis of current religious peacebuilding efforts in Lebanon reveals a
notable divide between efforts working to tame, control, and preserve a status quo, under
the banners of unity, consensus, and communal rights; versus efforts challenging the
status quo and seeking to remake social norms, under the banners of justice and
individual rights. Efforts in inter-religious engagement are bound by the logic of the
sectarian system itself. They often go one of two ways- they either work (explicitly or
implicitly) to reinforce and uphold the sectarian system, or they work to resist it. It is
highly challenging to straddle the middle, and ultimately, work that tries to take a middle
path is rendered ineffective or is constantly undermined by the deeply-embedded
sectarian logic. There is a fragile but carefully calibrated effort among sectarian elites to
prioritize bonding cohesion without losing the minimal amount of bridging cohesion to
maintain Lebanon’s precarious national unity.
The religious peacebuilding space is varied, as are the ways religion shows up in
socio-political conflict, and all of this is dynamic, as religion becomes something new
and takes on new meanings and modes of operation over time. In both analyzing religion
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in conflict and in peacebuilding, we are better served by looking at the ways religion
serves to preserve or challenge status quos in various contexts, rather than asking if
religion is promoting violence or peace. It gives us a more nuanced approach to
peacebuilding, if we can see how religion is being employed to challenge or uphold a
norm- it helps us look beyond the immediate and overt instances of violence.
Salloukh, et. al., argue that, “although wrapped in velvet clientelist and
ideological gloves, the violence of the sectarian system is profound though not always
discernable or physical.”376 The current religious peacebuilding approaches are good for
dealing with overt, urgent violence, but are less effective at addressing deeper systemic or
institutional violence. Without dealing with the systemic, less obvious forms of violence,
the overt violence will continue to emerge. The distraction of extremism often sidelines
efforts to address systemic violence, and much of the energy and capacity of religious
peacebuilding gets rerouted to manage the most obvious violence, at the expense of
creating long-term change.
The Lebanese socio-political conflict are not “about” religion, and yet, it takes
place through the lenses of religion and sect. Religious identities become salient through
very particular political processes, and this process in turn changes the religious
identities, as it is a dynamic relationship. In other words, it is not just religion being
“used” by politicians as if religion itself is somehow static, but it becomes itself through
the socio-political conflict processes. What it means to be religious is shaped by sociopolitical dynamics, in both conflict and peace, and many root-cause issues (such as
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economic disenfranchisement and inequalities) take on a sectarian or religious lens in the
Lebanese context. In this way, religion is inherently political. Efforts to engage religion
in peacebuilding are thus essential, not optional, as there is no clean divide between the
religious and the socio-political. However, current approaches to engaging religion in
peacebuilding in Lebanon have been limited in their ability to increase social cohesion.
While these efforts have proven to work in quelling direct and immediate forms of
violence, from the civil war until the present day, they have not been able to effectively
move Lebanese society further than this, and have in some cases served to further
entrench the sectarian system.
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Chapter 5: How Did We Get Here? Tracing Bosnia’s Religio-Political History
As you walk through the center of Sarajevo, you quickly comes across a number
of religious structures, including the Gazi Husrev Beg Mosque, founded in 1531; the old
Orthodox church, built in the 1530s; a synagogue, built by the Ottoman governor of the
time in 1580-81; and a Roman Catholic cathedral, built in 1889. Along with a number of
other religious structures, these four houses of worship are located within a half square
kilometer of one another, nestled amongst the shops and restaurants that comprise the
bustling center of the city.377 This heritage is a source of pride for many residents of
Sarajevo to this day. The geography of sacred space in any given city can show the
nation’s commitment to religious expression and pluralism, and yet, it does not always
mean that this pluralism is without tension.
Bosnia has been a lab for engaging religion in peacebuilding over the last 20
years. The high levels of international intervention immediately post-war were
unprecedented, and many focused, at least in part, on healing religious divides.378 Indeed,
Bosnia and religion-focused conflict resolution efforts have become closely linked in
research, with more focus here than in Lebanon on intentionally engaging religion in the
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post-conflict climate. Immediately post-conflict, a national Interreligious Council was
formed to help facilitate the reconciliation process. In a country where group identity
lines during conflict were clearly correlated with religion (as well as ethnicity), even if
these lines were constructed, and where religious symbolism and language played heavily
into the specter of violence, Bosnia seemed like a clear case where involving the religious
institutions, leaders, symbolism, and language in the peacebuilding processes would be
absolutely necessary.
Bosnia is often seen as one of the paradigmatic religious conflicts of the 20th
century, and yet, in 1990 right before the conflict, emerging from years of socialism, very
few within Bosnian society would identify as particularly religious. As one of my
respondents stated, “in Bosnia, you are a believer from 1992.” 379 How, then, can we
explain what happened here? Do we simply say that religious symbolism and identity
were mapped onto ethnic identity, as a cloak of sorts? This may be part of the answer,
and yet, there is much more to the story. This answer does not satisfy how and why
religion came to factor so prominently into the articulation and dynamics of the war at the
particular time that it did. Additionally, religious identity was itself shaped through the
lead up to the conflict in the 1990s, through the war itself, and beyond. How religion
functions in Bosnian society now, and what this means for peacebuilding initiatives that
engage religion, is shaped largely by these processes of meaning-making.
To start to unravel these questions, we must understand the history of religionmaking in Bosnia, as it intertwines with (and is in many ways inseparable from) cultural
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and ethnic identities. Through this chapter, we will look at this through socio-political
moments of groupness in Bosnia’s history, then analyze how some of these moments
became “sticky,” to invoke Ashutosh Varshney’s terminology.

Talking about Religion in Bosnia
Bosnia, like Lebanon, was part of the Ottoman Empire, which affects the ways in
which religion developed in this context. Additionally, the 20th century context of
Yugoslav socialism shaped religion in Bosnia in unique ways. Under the Yugoslav
socialist project, religion was highly privatized. While the free exercise of religion was
permitted, public displays of religion were discouraged and religion was not integrated
into political life.
For many, the combined factors of the near equivalence of religious and ethnic
identity, and the privatization of religion under the socialist government, created a
context in which numerous people confined religion to their homes and with their
families, precipitating increased bonding cohesion. Many of my respondents referred to
their pre-war selves as “Eid and Baklava Muslims,” or as “Christmas and Easter
Christians.”380 Many noted that religion was primarily seen as private and cultural; it later
became much more public and politicized, transforming the way religion functioned in
Bosnian society, as I will expound upon later in this chapter.
In modern day Bosnia, religion has been mapped onto by ethnic identity nearly
completely. Serbs are Serbian Orthodox, Croats are Catholic, while Bosniaks are
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Muslim. “Muslim” legally became an ethnic category in Bosnia in the 1970’s, in
response to the increased politicization (and institutionalization) of Serb and Croat ethnic
identities, a point that I will examine further in this chapter. Regardless of what one
believes (or does not believe), or how one practices (or not), religio-ethnic identity is a
key organizing structure for Bosnian socio-political life, from electoral and governance
structures to employment quotas to geographic distribution and schooling, demonstrating
many similarities to Lebanon’s socio-political organizing structures.
Bosnia is divided into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Republika Srpska. Bosniak and Croat citizens make up the bulk of the population in
the former, and Serbs make up the primary population in the latter, though both entities
are multi-ethnic. Within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are 10 cantons,
eight of which are either Croat or Muslim, while two are mixed.381
The highly complex electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina institutionalizes
ethno-religious divisions. The Presidency is shared between the three primary ethnic
groups (Serb, Croat, and Bosniak), with one candidate from each group being elected
through a plurality vote, and then rotating between occupying the Presidency and two
Vice Presidency slots. This closely mirrors the Lebanese consociational structure of
government, giving explicit preference to the predominant ethnic groups in an effort to
balance the power between them. No one who is not from one of the three primary ethnic
groups can run for this office, and thus the Jewish and Roma minorities, for instance, are
rendered ineligible.
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Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are not compelled to vote for their ethnic
candidate, but can only vote for one candidate (so a Croat could not, for instance, vote for
both a Croat and a Bosniak candidate from the electoral lists). The seats in the House of
Representatives, one of the bodies of the Parliamentary Assembly, are proportionally
representative of the main ethnic groups in the country.382 It is worth noting here that the
numbers from the 1991 census are still being used to determine quotas and electoral laws;
there was a census in 2013, but the ethnic data from that census have still not been
released, as it would likely cause political turmoil.383 This is similar to the situation in
Lebanon; although the census data being used in Lebanon is much older, the same
operating principle applies: that the political structures rely on a very specific snapshot of
ethnic/sectarian belonging, rather than being malleable over time to changing
demographics. Florian Bieber has observed that, from 1990 until the present day, voters
in Bosnia have opted for ethnonationalist parties, even when other cross-cutting platforms
are available and viable in elections.384 In showing that ethno-religious political parties
were not the only options, Bieber’s research demonstrates that ethno-religious political
identities became embedded and embodied in Bosnian political life over time.
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Bosnia has institutionalized religious freedom (including the freedom to change
one’s religion) for both individuals and communities in society, with such guarantees
enshrined in the constitution, although there are numerous cases in which these
guarantees are challenged or transgressed. 385 Personal status laws (including marriage,
divorce, inheritance, and the like) are treated by civil, rather than religious courts, and
thus unlike Lebanon, Bosnians do not rely upon clerics for personal status concerns.
Ahmet Alibasic and Nedim Begovic argue, however, that this
model of separation combined with equality, however, does not preclude the
state’s control and cooperation with religious groups. The main terms of the
state’s control over religious life are elaborated on under the procedures for
awarding the status of legal personality and for registering religious communities
at the Ministry of Justice.386
Thus, the state indeed exerts authority over religious life by determining what
counts as an accepted religious community in Bosnia.
Data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) shows that Bosnia
has fairly low levels of government regulation of religion (3.7/10). The state does exert
control over what counts as religion by determining what can and cannot be considered
an official religion in Bosnia. The social regulation of religion is higher, at 5.6/10,
showing that social forces act to restrict religious practice in more ways than do official
government interventions or regulations.
While the Muslim and Jewish communities in Bosnia are autonomous, for the
most part, the Catholic and Orthodox communities answer to outside authorities
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(Catholics to the Holy See in Rome, and Orthodox to the Serbian Orthodox Synod in
Belgrade). Religious leaders and institutions played varied and ambivalent roles in the
lead up to and during the Bosnian war. One respondent observed that, “before the war,
there was a lot of media hype of religious leaders recruiting people to join their side in
the fight. After the war, these same leaders were telling people to make peace.”387 Thus,
while the employment of religion in war tactics is indisputable, the specific roles of
religious institutions and leaders were wide-ranging.
For Bosnia, religion is in no way a “root cause” of conflict, and yet, it played into
and was shaped by conflict in the region over time in critical ways. We see here the ways
in which the Bosnia case resides at the intersection of instrumentalist and constructivist
approaches to understanding the role of religion in socio-political conflict. As a
historically non-religious society, which has become more religious over time in terms of
personal practice and belief, Bosnia is a key example of how religion functions as a
dynamic conflict variable, religion in Bosnia took shape through socio-political processes
and became an important factor in defining conflict, as well as in defining the current
state of Bosnian society.

The Social Cohesion Frame
As I argued in Chapter One of this dissertation, utilizing a social cohesion
framework better measures societal progress toward peace than utilizing the more vague
concept of peace. Social cohesion looks at the vertical and horizontal, as well as the
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informal and formal, ways in which social groups relate to one another, and society to the
state. Additionally social cohesion considers injustice and inequalities, while one can
conceivably measure peace in a more negative sense, as the absence of overt conflict.
While social cohesion is my way of assessing the progress of peace work in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not necessarily the way in which many involved in
peacebuilding- and particularly in “religious peacebuilding”- are articulating their own
goals and objectives, as will become apparent through discussions of my interview data
later in the chapter. I will continue to use the term “peacebuilding” to refer to the efforts
in the field, as this is consistent with how actors themselves talk about their work, but
social cohesion is my measure of efficacy of these efforts, taken as a whole.

Research Methodology
I conducted field interviews in Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2016, then
followed up with phone interviews, between April 2016-February 2017. I interviewed 17
individuals, concentrating the bulk of my interviews in Sarajevo, with a few interviews in
Banja Luka and some in Maglaj, along with some interviews with people previously
involved in Bosnian peace processes who are now residing in the United States. Several
respondents that I interviewed in Sarajevo worked and lived outside of the city. I
selected respondents from different ethno-religious groups in order to get a sampling of
perspectives, and I spoke with persons who reported different levels of religious
commitment- some were religious leaders, while others identified as religious but had
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varying levels of engagement with the institutions affiliated with their faith tradition, and
others identifying as secular.
I spoke with peacebuilding actors, religious leaders, and political officials.
Interviewees spoke from both individual and organizational perspectives on how they
have engaged religion in peacebuilding work, and how they think about the impact of this
work within the Bosnian socio-political context. Many were born and raised in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and my respondents spanned several generations. Some had been
working in peacebuilding or doing inter-religious work since the war began, while others
were newer to active engagement in this work.
I selected my interview respondents through preliminary outreach to individuals
or organizations that emerged as key players in the field of religious peacebuilding, based
on my initial desk research. I reached out to these individuals and organizations prior to
arrival to make contact and set up interviews. Once on site, I recruited new interviewees
through snowball sampling, taking recommendations from those with whom I interacted
on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those I interviewed were very willing to
recommend other players in the peacebuilding field, and thus, my cohort of interviewees
grew naturally from these initial points of contact. This methodology is similar to the
approach I took in Lebanon, although it was slightly modified to fit the Bosnian context,
and I was able to interview more people outside of Sarajevo that I was able to outside of
Beirut.
My analysis in this chapter combines the findings from these interviews with a
study of materials from a large sampling of peacebuilding organizations. These materials
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included evaluations, internal planning documents, and public project and program
descriptions and advertisements. These materials help to supplement my interviews by
demonstrating how practitioners involved in these approaches frame their objectives,
goals, and scope of work for both internal purposes as well as for external audiences.
Additionally, I draw upon survey data from three surveys, including two from the
University of Edinburgh along with the UNDP National Human Development Report
2009 on Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Scope and Structure
This case study is divided into two chapters, and proceeds as follows: in the
present chapter, I outline the social and political history of religion and ethnicity in
Bosnia from the Ottoman era to the present, focusing on several key historical periods.
This is not meant to be a complete overview of Bosnia’s history, but rather reveals
several key socio-political moments that helped to shape ethno-religious identities and
make them politically meaningful at different points in time. I then shift in Chapter Six to
an overview and analysis of a sampling of recent and current approaches to engage
religion in peacebuilding in Bosnia, analyzing the challenges and impact of these efforts
in terms of social cohesion in the country. Through this, I will provide the reader with
several key insights relevant to understanding the complex relationship between religion
and peacebuilding in and beyond Bosnia.
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Tracing Religion in Bosnia’s Socio-Political History
The first part of this chapter is a tour of some of the key “moments of
groupness”388 for the religious communities in the area now known as Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including an analysis of how some of these moments stuck and, in many
ways, fused with ethno-political identities. This examination demonstrates that the
religious tensions that showed up in the conflict of the early 1990’s do not stem from
“ancient hatreds,” nor do they derive from religious ideologies as such. Rather, religious
ideologies were used to create exclusive bonding cohesion and to justify violence during
the war were themselves shaped through a series of socio-political events throughout
Balkan history.

Bosnia on the Edge of Empires
Bosnia has been a multi-religious context for centuries, and over the years,
different religious communities have been dominant, leaving other religious communities
with varying degrees of freedom and autonomy.389 This reality undercuts any one
group’s ability to claim exclusive native dominance.390 While the ethnic and religious
histories of the Balkan people is disputed, historians assert that south Slav peoples arrived
in the Balkans between the 6th and 7th centuries, with large conversions to Christianity in
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the 9th century. The Christian population was split into western and eastern Christianity,
mirroring the schism of the church. The split population began using different scripts for
writing, thus materially reifying the sense of difference between the two primary
Christian communities.391
The area now known as Bosnia was a trade crossroads in the Balkans. Seen as a
meeting ground (or, from the perspective of some, a ‘no man’s land’) between Catholic
Dalmatia and Orthodox Serbia during the Middle Ages,392 Bosnia was overtaken by the
Ottomans in 1483, and large numbers of Bosnians converted to Islam over time.393 The
Serb Patriarchate, which had been set up in the Kosovo region in 1346, was abolished by
the Ottomans in the 15th century but re-established- still under the Ottomans- in 1557. It
remained until 1766, when the Ottomans again abolished it for fear of it being used to
cultivate anti-Ottoman revolutionary sentiments and action.394 The Serbian church was
then re-subsumed under the jurisdiction of Constantinople until the Serbian Patriarchate
was re-established in 1920.
The pre-Ottoman borderland identity of Bosnia also came with a lack of strong
religious institutional oversight. Thus, Bosnian Catholics among other groups developed
their own local religious traditions that were seen by the outside Catholic religious
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authorities (including in particular the Hungarian Catholics, as Austria-Hungary gained
control of the region for a period) as heretical. Subsequently, outside authorities
established greater institutional oversight as an effort to bring them back in line. The
local Catholics rebelled against this oversight, breaking ties with Rome and forming their
own Bosnian Church in the 1250s. While the Bosnian Church leaders did return to the
fold of the official Catholic Church about a century later, the boundaries and beliefs of
the local Catholics (including their leadership) remained porous and open to regular
interaction with other religious communities.395
In this period, the three major groups (Serb, Croat and Bosniak) all spoke dialects
(with their own unique scripts) of the same language, which was until recently referred to
as Serbo-Croatian.396 Additionally, in medieval Bosnia, no one known as Serbs or Croats
lived in Bosnia proper, as the local population of varying religious traditions considered
themselves to be Bosnian. Thus, any wars at this point were international, not internal
ethnic wars.397
During the final five years of the pre-Ottoman Bosnian state, as the Ottoman
Empire advanced toward the Balkans, the king sought to eliminate the Bosnian Church
entirely in an effort to attract European aid to the Bosnian cause. Thus, when the
Ottomans conquered most of Bosnia in the 1460s, the Bosnian Church had mostly
disappeared.398 During the early Ottoman period, more Orthodox Christians were
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entering Bosnia from Serbia (fleeing an earlier Ottoman takeover there), and Catholics
fled to Dalmatia and Croatia (which were still not conquered by Ottoman forces), thus
creating major demographic shifts in the Christian populations. Additionally, converts to
Islam came from all of these religious communities, but this was a very slow process of
conversion, as it was not until the 17th century that a majority of Bosnians had become
Muslim.399
While there are different perspectives on the notions of religious tolerance and
coexistence under the Ottoman millet system, Michael Sells notes that,
The truth is that while for many centuries religious coexistence was undoubtedly
more accepted under the Ottomans than almost anywhere in Christendom, the was
certainly no sense of religious equality. If there was no ethnic conflict, it was not
because of ‘tolerance’ but because there was no concept of nationality among the
Sultan’s subjects, and because Christianity stressed the ‘community of believers’
rather than ethnic solidarity.400
Thus, we can acknowledge the unique nature of religious coexistence under the
Ottomans without romanticizing it, while also recognizing that it looked different in
different geographic and cultural contexts and changed over time. Christians and Jews
had special status as “people of the book,” as the millet arrangement allowed for a certain
level of autonomy for religious communities and particularly for the religious elites. At
the same time, non-Muslim religious communities (and the individuals that comprised
them) also experienced discrimination and sometimes harsh treatment and higher
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taxes.401 This includes in particular the practice of devşirme (often translated as the ‘levy
of boys’), in which select Christian boys were enlisted into military or administrative
service for the Ottoman state and compelled to convert to Islam.402 This practice indeed
entailed forced conversion, while also, some argue, providing advancement opportunities
for men from Christian families. Scholars of the period disagree on whether or not this
was met with acceptance and praise or resistance from Christian communities, as records
show that reactions from Christian populations were mixed.403
Demographic changes by the 15th century led Muslims to Balkan cities, while the
countryside remained mainly Christian. While tax registers between 1520-1539 reveal
that more than 80% of the residents of the Balkans were Christian, Muslims were more
numerous than Christians in most Balkan cities.404 The Ottomans did not seek out mass
conversion to Islam, though there were certainly waves of conversion, in part because it
was beneficial to have non-Muslims living in the territories to pay higher taxes and
provide other benefits, 405 although there is mixed evidence of how this played out in
reality. The Orthodox Church in particular received many benefits from this arrangement,
as they were given more control over their own people, collecting taxes from them and
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dispensing justice through religious courts.406 The Bosnian Franciscans also had their
own millet, though a number of Catholics in the region converted to Islam, as their ties to
Rome led to a less desirable arrangement for local Catholics than that of local Orthodox
Christians.407 According to Mark Mazower, “Ottoman rule was bringing Balkan
Christians not only religious autonomy but increasing prosperity as well.”408 It is
important to note that the reference to “Balkan Christians” here means the leadership, not
the masses.
While institutional religious separation and autonomy was a reality in the Balkans
under the Ottomans, lived religion saw much more cross-pollination among religions.
Christians commonly visited Muslim sacred sites and vice versa, and particularly in areas
outside of the reach of the institutions, there was more institutional “slippage” as well,
with non-Muslims frequently opting to utilize Islamic courts. John Fine notes that,
The interaction between religious communities on the village level during the
Ottoman period, supported by the local priests, most of whom were
locals….allowed the development of what truly is a Bosnian culture, shared by
Bosnians of all faiths and distinct from that of the neighbouring regions (now
states).409
Shared religious life was thus a reality, working within the simultaneous
experience of religious division at the institutional levels.410
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The 18th century entailed both chronic fighting on numerous fronts, and increased
decentralization in Bosnia, leading to a very weak central state or sense of national
identity. Ethnic distinctions within Bosnia became much more pronounced in the 19th
century. Religion and ethnicity were becoming more fused, and religio-nationalism
began to develop. Fine asserts that,
The concept of ethnicity itself had raised its dubious if not evil head in Bosnia
only in the nineteenth century, when Christian Bosnians began to take up ethnic
and national ideas that penetrated Bosnia from Serbia and Croatia. With this
development, new dimensions were added to one’s religious identity. If you were
a Catholic, you were also a Croat; if an Orthodox, then also a Serb. Now, for the
first time, the names ‘Serb’ and ‘Croat’ were applied to people in Bosnia.411
A particular form of nationalism was thus beginning to emerge, developing and
reifying ethno-religious identities in a way that had no been seen before in this context.
Peasant uprisings began in the mid-1800s, with a particularly notable revolt in 1875 in
Herzegovina, proceeded by major declines in Ottoman power in the region. These
revolts were not explicitly nationalistic, as they focused on the rights of the peasants, but
the calls for independence coincided with nationalist sentiments that were on the rise in
the region, precipitated by the Balkan enlightenment.412
Austria-Hungary began to occupy Bosnia in 1878, precipitating a crisis in
Catholic and Muslim communities on the local level, as the Catholic Austrian authorities
brought with them a secular, European approach to education. Muslims feared mass
conversions to Catholicism, and the Muslim elites became more interested in asserting
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authority over the religious lives of village Muslims.413 This trend was echoed by
Catholic authorities as well (both from Rome and from local Franciscan elites), as fear of
major changes spurred a much stronger interest in asserting more religious control over
their own flock.414 Under Austrian authorities, Bosnian Muslims became more organized
in a centralized local hierarchy, as Austrians hoped to create distance between Bosnian
Muslims and Ottoman authorities. Thus, the Austrian emperor appointed the first Rais
al-‘Ulama (Grand Mufti) of Bosnia in 1882.415
Fine argues that, “the tensions that came to the fore with the Austrian
occupation...are within religious (becoming ethnic) communities, not between them.”416
This is important to note, as it is often the case that tensions within religious
communities, and assertions of control from institutional elites, often precede tensions
between religious communities, as seen in the increased control different religious
authorities attempted to assert over their own communities in this time period. Multidirection conversion took place during the 15th and 16th centuries in particular, with
conversions between Islam and the Christian sects, but also from one Christian sect to
another as well (i.e., from the Bosnian Church to the Orthodox or Catholic).417
Additionally, there were clashes, toward the end of Ottoman rule in particular, between
external institutional religious authorities and local religious communities. One such case
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was between the Catholic leadership in Rome and the local Franciscans in Bosnia, as the
latter were seen as too loose in their tolerance for diverse and heterodox practice among
lay Catholics.418 In order to exert greater control, the Pope (with the support of the
Austrian emperor) appointed an archbishop to Sarajevo- something that had not been
done previously. 419 In the other communities, this intra-religious tension was also seen
through competing authorities vying for control and community representation, both
leading up to and during the war in the 1990’s.
The Ottoman Empire officially fell in the Balkans in 1923, as the modern political
map of the Balkans emerged, leading into the multiple Yugoslav eras.420 The AutroHungarian occupation of Bosnia, paired for a length of time with formal Ottoman rule, in
many ways nationalized the millet system of governance, as it reified the religious
communities as socio-political entities, subscribing these religious distinctions into sociopolitical life in a very material way.

Ethno-political Identities in the Yugoslav Eras
The Yugoslav state existed in various forms from approximately 1918-1991, first
as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, following the fall of the Ottoman
Empire, then as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, then, after World War II, as the Socialist
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.421 While at the emergence of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia, enthusiasm for South Slav unification was mostly limited to intellectual and
societal elites, the growth in higher education in the Balkans prior to World War I helped
cultivate the spread of this enthusiasm for unified South Slav identity.422 World War I
created tensions for this vision, as ethnic nationalism grew in the Balkans, but the
Kingdom was created nevertheless, known in 1918 as “the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes.”423 The multi-confessional, multi-national Kingdom included the regions
of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia and Dalmatia, Vojvodina and CroatiaSlavonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they adopted a constitution for the new entity in
1921, asserting that this people spoke a single language (“Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian”).424
Lenard Cohen notes that,
Some momentum toward the formation of a Yugoslav identity did take place
during the 1920s simply owing to the cohabitation and routine interaction of
different South Slav elites and citizens in a unified state, but on balance the
countervailing force of disappointment and bitterness regarding overcentralization
and ethnic inequalities proved to be far more influential.425
Thus, while political elites were successful in creating the official political body,
they faced numerous challenges trying to spread a sense of common identity among all of
the peoples that made up the Kingdom.
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In 1929, King Alexander renamed the entity the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia,” and
abolished the existing constitution, further centralizing authority and banning political
organizations with religious, regional or ethnic goals. While he did experience initial
success in this effort, ethnic movements continued to gain momentum, and the King was
assassinated in 1934 by Croatian Ustashe and Macedonian fighters working in
collaboration with one another.426
The second half of the 1930s saw greater stability for the Kingdom, and a 1939
agreement with Croatian forces essentially federalized the country, giving Croatians their
own “national unit”. This created some temporary balance between the two largest ethnic
groups- the Serbs and Croats- and this era saw an increased sense of common Yugoslav
identity, in the midst of decentralization.427 Under the Kingdom, religion was not
prohibited, but it was not particularly welcomed, nor was it a key part of how different
ethnic groups identified themselves in public, political ways. While a Bosnian identity
still existed, the Kingdom did not formally recognize a Bosnian entity or “nation.”
In the early 1940’s, the fascist Ustashe military ruled in the Croatian state,
promoting a dedication to “greater Croatia,” a vision that included expelling the Serbs. A
“Chetnik” guerilla army of Serbs fought back against this destruction, and while some of
them nursed an idea of “Greater Serbia,” the army, under the leadership of Josip Broz
Tito, was of mixed ethnicity and was eventually able to ward off the Ustashe fighters.
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World War II sparked bloody interethnic violence and civil war across the
region.428 In 1941, following the partition of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was joined to Croatia;
at the time, it was 20% Croat, 35% Muslim, and 42% Serb. The Croatian leadership
began wooing Muslims while cleansing the Serbs, and the local Franciscan priests had by
and large supported the violent Croatian Ustase rulers.429 Thus, religious rhetoric
supporting ethnic violence emerged more strongly within the context of World World II
and the disintegration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
In 1945, Tito reestablished the Yugoslav federation, which had been destroyed by
Nazi Germany in 1941.430 Tito’s motto of “brotherhood and unity,” under which
Yugoslavia was liberated and its constituent regions re-joined to one another as 6
republics, was meant to cast a regional sentiment of unity among the republics.
However, as Yugoslavia became increasingly decentralized, ethnic identity increased and
became more central to political activism.
In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there was freedom of expression
of religion but no public display of beliefs or ritual. Devoutness was seen as
incompatible with holding membership in the Yugoslav Communist Party. In the 1950s
and 1960s, Muslim Communist Party members were discouraged from giving children
traditional Muslim names and there were no workplace accommodations for religious
observances.
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Tone Bringa observes that,
The Yugoslav’ authorities’ curb on the expression of religious beliefs in public
was a combination of the basically atheist outlook of their communist ideology
and their fear of any expression of separatist nationalism. The authorities were
well aware that for many ‘Yugoslavs’ adherence to one particular religion was
intimately linked to their identification with one national community (or
‘nation’).431
Because of this, before 1990, religious beliefs and rituals were expressed
privately, often in people’s homes, largely dominated by women. Under Tito’s
Yugoslavia, religion was private & individual, while the religious institutions
(specifically, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Croatian Catholic Church, and the
Islamic Community in Bosnia) served as the keepers of culture in many ways, and
indeed, paved the way for ethno-religious mobilization later. A number of respondents
talked about their own experience of religion under socialist Yugoslavia. A Muslim
activist described their own family as “Eid and Baklava Muslims”, while a Serb activist
talked about being “Christmas and Easter Christians.” In other words, religious identity
before the war was for many part of the landscape of life, worn lightly, but not at the
forefront of one’s identity. Religious identity was thus re-shaped through the war.
Some argue that because religion existed on Balkan life’s periphery before the
war, and was for many an “empty” cultural container, it was easy to manipulate (or “fill”)
by religio-political entrepreneurs looking to mobilize otherwise similar people against
one another. Serbian Orthodox leadership early on bought into the politicization of
religious identity as part of an ethno-national project, led by Serbian politicians, and the
431
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church hierarchy quickly became supportive of these efforts. The images of priests
blessing soldiers and weapons and of monasteries harboring fighters remain visceral in
the minds of many I spoke with. Additionally, the emergence of a Muslim ethnic identity
as such was a key development in the 20th century that contributes in important ways to
the utilization of religion in subsequent conflict and strife.

Emergence of a Muslim Ethnic Identity
Muslims in the region did not have their own ethnic identity until the latter part of
the 20th Century, seeing themselves as members of their political-national entities, and as
“Bosnian” more generally, but not as a separate nation based on religious identity until
the late 1960’s, when this shifted. The increase in the importance of ethnic identity
regionally led Muslims to seek an identity label of their own, akin to the Serb and
Croatian labels that were gaining prominence. Thus, in 1968, they were officially
recognized under the label “Muslim,” which was meant to signify a religious community
and now, an ethnic identity.432
Ashutosh Varshney notes that,
In the post-1945 Yugoslavia, Croats, Macedonians, Serbs, Slovenes, and
Montenegrins were called nations; Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians were
nationalities; and Austrians, Greeks, Jews, Germans, and Poles were ‘other
nationalities and ethnic groups.’ In the 1971 constitution, Muslims of Yugoslavia
were promoted from a nationality to a nation.433
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The Yugoslav government recognized this new national category of “Muslims” in
order to give Muslims an equivalent alternative to Serb and Croat classifications (which
were the other options; “Muslim” became the only option now for non-Serb, non-Croat
Bosnians).434 Thus, the emergence of a Muslim political identity a in Bosnia-Herzegovina
results from the changing socio-political climate between 1945 and 1971, during and
following World War II.
While this, according to Sells, “finally gave Bosnian Muslims a political voice
alongside Catholics and Orthodox Serbs…it did so at the cost of further reinforcing the
identity between religion and nationality.”435 Bosnian Muslims had held onto their
secular identity prior to this, attempting to make a stand against the erosion of a secular
Bosnian state. However, the political climate essentially forced a politicized religious
identity category for Bosnian Muslims as the only way to hold weight against the
increasingly nationalist Serb and Croatian powers, in order to secure institutional space
for their community in political and social life.436 This demonstrates one way in which a
certain form and function of religious identity became materially manifest in Bosnian
life, a legacy for years to come.
This push for a strong public religious identity did not reflect the ways in which
many Bosnian Muslims viewed themselves, which was primarily as Bosniaks, rather than
prioritizing their religious identity.
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As Bringa observes,
Among Bosnian Muslims, there were devout believers who held deep religious
convictions, there were people who practiced certain key rituals and honoured
major religious holy days out of respect for tradition, there were those who
believed in God but had never learned how to practice Islam, and there were those
Muslims by ‘ethnicity’ who declared themselves atheists. In other words, among
Bosnia’s Muslims there was a continuum of degrees of conviction and practice
similar to what is found in Christian-defined societies in Western Europe.437
The decision to take on “Muslim” as an ethnic identity, then, did not naturally
follow religious developments within the community, but rather reflected political
developments (both inside and outside the community). An increased religiosity
followed, to some degree, as the shift in the way Bosnian Muslims became politically
identified as Muslims led to shifts in how Islam was lived out within Bosnian society.
There was an uptick in religious expression (attending sermons and religious rituals or
services, and so on) toward the end of the 1980’s. This was also true for other religious
communities, as communist structures were losing control of society.438 Bringa notes
that while many welcomed this increased openness for public religious expression, which
had been tamped down in socialist Yugoslavia for fear it would breed ethno-nationalism,
it also served to highlight the distinctions between the three primary ethno-religious
communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.439
This brief tour of Bosnian history demonstrates that the Balkan conflict does not
in any way reflect “age old” religious animosities brewing, but rather, religion was
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employed in a specific way to support a nationalist project and others were driven to
follow suit in taking on the badge of religious identity as a primary form of social and
political expression. Simultaneous to Muslim development as ethnic identity, Serbian
Orthodox narratives were also shifting and hardening. Ethno-religious identities
sharpened in response to one another, paving the way for war to take on religious tones
when it broke out. These processes and events changed what it meant to be Muslim in
Bosnia, in interaction with the flexing of other ethno-religious identities in the region.
Additionally, the emergence of a Muslim ethnic identity in Bosnia helped to prioritize
religion as one of the key differences between groups. This material reality of religiopolitical identity becomes critical in understanding how the Bosnian war played out.

Preparing for War
The Yugoslav state continued to weaken, as demands for decentralization and
autonomy increased, and the 1974 revised constitution reinforced this trend by shifting
federal power to more localized institutions. In the midst of these regional and
geopolitical shifts, political movements within Yugoslavia took on an increasingly
nationalist tone. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), for example, readopted the
Croatian symbols used during WWII, displacing the Yugoslav symbols they had been
utilizing. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Bosnian Muslim Party of
Democratic Action (SDA) both took on nationalist rhetoric and membership as well.440
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Following Tito’s death in 1980, the Yugoslav presidency became rotational
between the different Yugoslav republics. Strife between the republics became more
pronounced, including a struggle between Albanian and Serbian powers in the late 1980s.
This fueled Serbian nationalist rhetoric, and Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian communist
party official, utilized this to claim control over Yugoslavia in 1987. In response, both
Slovenes and Croats declared independence in 1991. Confrontations subsequently
increased between Serbian and Croatian forces, particularly in areas where Croatian
nationalism had been prominent during the time of the Ustashe and where Croat leaders
had not acknowledged Ustashe atrocities during World War II.441 These confrontations
often left Bosnians, and particularly Muslim residents of the region, caught in the middle,
though sometimes being targeted more explicitly by actors such as Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic.
Dino Abazović argues that during the early post-socialist period, there were two
simultaneous and interactive processes occurring: the “nationalization of the sacral” and
“sacralization of the national.” He states, “In other words, ethno-national political
ideologies have demanded (and have been granted) the support of organized religious
doctrines in order to legitimize new establishments.”442 Both national political entities
and religious institutions took refuge, of sorts, in these processes, as religion re-entered
the public square with force.
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Prior to the war, then, the groundwork had been laid for religiopolitical
entrepreneurs to draw on religious narratives in their framing of the struggle for power
and territory, as religion was produced materially in ways that served key socio-political
purposes. As mentioned previously, expressions of nationalism had become increasingly
religious in tone. Sells points out that, “at the heart of the agitation by Serb radicals
against the Muslims of Yugoslavia there has been a mythology which presents Slavic
Muslims as Christ killers.”443 The mythology that Sells refers to here references the
death of the Serb Prince Lazar in a 1389 battle with Ottoman Sultan Murat (who also died
in the same battle). Prince Lazar’s death became an anchor of Serb national mythology,
though this national myth was not continuous from 1389, but rather was revived and
repackaged in the 19th century by Serb nationalist writers and artists, including Vuk
Karadzic.444
Milosevic often appeared with pictures of Prince Lazar, portraying himself as the
savior of the Serbian Christians from Muslim and other “occupiers.” As Stuart Kaufman
points out, this is a key example of symbolic politics being used to inspire and embolden
narratives that would come to life to justify violence in particular ways.445 Thus,
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs (including writers, artists, politicians and religious elites)
built the scaffolding for a Serb nationalist identity that would clearly draw on religious
tropes. In the demographic shifts of the 1980’s, a number of Serbs moved out of Albania
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and Kosovo, while the Muslim population in each context grew. This fed a Serb
narrative that Muslims were planning genocide against the Serbs, and the story of Prince
Lazar became more and more popular. This narrative was not limited to Muslims in
Albania and Kosovo, but rather was projected onto all Slavic Muslims.446
A Serb festival in 1989 demonstrated what Sells refers to as several “streams of
rage” that were routed into violence against Bosnian civilians in the following years.
Sells argues that,
Three streams of rage-- disinterment of remains of Serb victims of genocide in
World War II, procession of Lazar’s relics through Bosnia and around Kosovo,
and pilgrimage of Serbs to visit the relics in Kosovo-- were channeled into a
single raging torrent. Within three years, those who directed the festivities in
1989 were organizing the unspeakable depravities against Bosnian civilians.447
The building of a national Serbian mythology that drew upon religious symbolism
and narratives was thus lived out materially through these events before the nationalist
rage took a large step further into the violence in the early 1990’s.
Serb nationalists continued to spread the view that Ottoman rule was oppressive,
depraved, and backwards, and this “became the foundation for a new religious ideology,
Christoslavism, the belief that Slavs are Christian by nature and that any conversion from
Christianity is a betrayal of the Slavic race.”448 These nationalists posited that those who
converted to Islam under the Ottomans were either forced or decided to do so out of
cowardly or selfish opportunism.449 These narratives, and the material ways in which
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they were enacted in public spaces, served to increase ethno-nationalist cohesion,
bolstered by religious stories and symbols, while pushing the sense of a multi-ethnic,
multi-religious Bosnia further and further away.
All of this led to major shifts in the way religion was understood and lived out in
Bosnia. One respondent, reflecting on the lead up to the war, commented that, “as
Yugoslavia fell apart, it felt like there was a need to put back on your religious or national
identity in some ways. This made it hard for mixed marriages. It didn’t used to matter,
then it became the only thing that mattered.”450 This demonstrates the starkness of the
shift that took place in the immediate lead-up to the war for many Bosnians. For Bosnian
Muslims, Perica observes, while religious fundamentalism was not a driving force of
Muslim nationalism in Bosnia in the early 1990’s, ethnic nationalism (mapped onto
religious identity) was:
Religion boomed, but so did a ‘new’ history, without which a nation cannot exist.
School textbooks glorified the Ottoman era. The Bosniaks have become a martyrnation, victim of a genocide perpetrated against Muslims by the two neighboring
Christian nations.451
The re-entry of religion into the public square was closely intertwined with ethnic
nationalism, and thus what it meant to be “religious” in Bosnia took on an entirely
different tone over this time period.
In the spring of 1992, Bosnia voted for independence in a referendum and Bosnia
and Herzegovina was recognized internationally as a sovereign state, while Bosnian Serb
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nationalists declared their own independent “Republika Srpska” with a separate
headquarters, backed by Serbia, and with Karadzic as its president.452 After the vote, Serb
nationalists opened fire on those celebrating in the street outside the Parliament building
in Sarajevo, and the Yugoslav National Army, which was Serb controlled, began a fullfledged assault on Sarajevo, which involved ethnic cleansing and the destruction of
cultural and religious artifacts and buildings.453 The burning of the Vijecnica, the
National and University Library, was a particularly striking blow to the rich and varied
cultural heritage of Sarajevo.
As Andras Riedlmayer argues,
This systematic assault on culture can be explained as an attempt to eliminate the
material evidence-- books, documents, and works of art-- that could remind future
generations that people of different ethnic and religious traditions once shared a
common heritage and common space in Bosnia.454
The erasure of common spaces and culture furthered the sense of division, with
repercussions far beyond the course of the war itself.
By the fall of 1992, the Serbian military occupied 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and mass killings of non-Serbs were committed across the country. Sells notes that,
When through historical circumstance such rage was diverted from the Albanians
in Kosovo to Slavic Muslims in Bosnia, there was nothing the Bosnian Muslims
could possibly do to convince their attackers of their peaceful intent; even their
peaceful smile could be read as the smile of a Judas.455
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These mass killings were bolstered by a growing sense among Serbs that they
were fulfilling a religious duty, protecting their own and exacting revenge.
In 1993, Croat nationalists began to follow the path of Serb nationalists in
targeting Muslims, as the observed Serbs gaining territorial concessions rather than being
punished for their horrific treatment of the local Muslim population.456 They revived the
Ustashe, the Croatian militia that, supported by the Nazi regime, was quite brutal during
the Second World War.457
During the Bosnian war itself, religion was drawn upon to identify victims, as
well as to justify violent actions. Sells remarks that,
In the world of Omarska [a town in Bosnia], if an inhabitant of Bosnia had a
name identifiable as Muslim or parents with names identifiable as Muslim, that
was considered guilt enough, whatever the beliefs or practices of that individual
and whether or not that person was categorized as ‘Muslim’ in the nationalities
census. Those organizing the persecution, on the other hand, identified
themselves and their cause through explicit religious symbols. The symbols
appeared in the three-fingered hand gestures representing the Christian trinity, in
the images of sacred figures of Serbian religious mythology on their uniform
insignia, in the songs they memorized and forced their victims to sign, on the
priest’s ring they kissed before and after their acts of persecution, and in the
formal religious ceremonies that marked the purification of a town of its Muslim
population.458
This reality in Bosnia, which is similar to the Lebanese case, demonstrates the
deep and widespread ways religious symbolism and identity came into play in the war,
transforming conflicts over territory and political control into “religious conflicts,”
between increasingly polarized ethno-religious groups. While certainly there were many
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Serbians opposing the ethnic- and religio-nationalists, Serbian nationalists cracked down
on dissent. Sells remarks that one of the features of religion-based violence in BiH was
the “elimination of all dissent within a particular religious group and destruction of the
people outside of it.”459 Intra-religious tension was certainly high and those with power
worked hard to stamp out divergence and dissent.
Additionally, numerous religious and cultural artifacts were specifically targeted
for destruction through the course of war,460 and a number of my respondents noted the
ways in which mosques were targeted for destruction, even when the areas in a city or
town surrounding the mosque were left intact.461 One respondent noted that in his town,
all of the houses of worship were intentionally targeted during the war.462 These
anecdotes are confirmed by Gregory Most’s research on the destruction of houses of
worship during the Bosnian war, which shows that this happened at very high levels
country-wide.463
Alliances between the religio-ethnic groups shifted throughout the war, with
Serbs and Croats collaborating in certain cities, Croats and Muslims in others, and all
three groups fighting one another in other contexts, as politics shifted over time- a trend
seen in the Lebanon case as well. One Croat respondent, who comes from a smaller city
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a few hours outside of Sarajevo, reflected that the Croats and Muslims were working
together to defend his town against the Serbs in the first year of the war. However, once
word came from the Herzegovina region that Croats and Muslims were fighting there,
things shifted in his town and the larger Muslim population began to take Croats into war
camps. This respondent was in a war camp for nine months, and noted that he could see
his own home from where he worked, and he personally knew the vast majority of his
captors.464
The international response to the Bosnian conflict favored the demands of ethnic
nationalists, rather than prioritizing the calls of the Bosnian government calling for a
multi-ethnic state. Both internally and externally, a narrative of an “Islamic component”
was also prioritized, even though any Islamic nationalism arose late in the conflict and,
some argue, was primarily imported from outside actors.465 Bringa notes that there was a
widespread perception in Europe that Islam was foreign and/or a product of a past era.466
This played heavily into the international perception and discussion of the Bosnian war,
which was bolstered also by an obsession with Islamic fundamentalism, as Bringa states,
“It is important to note that in Tito’s Yugoslavia, Islamic fundamentalism (or just
‘fundamentalist’) was considered synonymous with Muslim nationalism and a parallel to
Serb and Croat nationalism.”467 Internal and external observers, who saw any political or
public expression of Islam as somehow “fundamentalist” in nature, thus shared this
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obsession with seeing Islamic fundamentalism as a key component of the Bosnian
conflict.
The Muslim identity of Bosnians was thus prioritized more by those outside
looking in than by the Muslim population itself, at least in the first couple years of the
conflict. Muslims across the globe saw Bosnian Muslims as being victimized because of
their religious identity and began sending humanitarian and military aid to the
population,468 while Western observers fixated on their Muslim identity as partially to
blame for the conflict (some as victims, some as perpetrators). As Maya Shatzmiller
observes, “no matter how the secular Bosnian Muslims viewed themselves, their
neighbours and other Europeans regarded them, in the first place, as Muslims.”469 This
prioritization of Muslim identity by outsiders led to local reification of this narrative in
certain ways, as leaders like Mustafa Ceric, head of the Islamic community, pushed for
more public Islamic identity and education, and Qur’anic quotes and Islamic symbols
began to show up in the armed forces, particularly in 1994-1995.470
In 1993, Alija Isakovic, the head of the congress of Muslim leaders, is quoted as
having said, “Now that multiethnic Bosnia has been destroyed, the Muslim state must
create its own political and constitutional framework in the same way as the Bosnian
Serbs and Croats have done.”471 Thus, again, Bosnian Muslim identity as a
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nationalist/ethnic identity continued to develop in interaction with and response to Serb
and Croat nationalist trends.
Middle Eastern religious actors, primarily from the Gulf, also fed into the
“Islamicization” of the Bosnian Muslim cause as well, patronizing Bosnian Muslims and
seeing them “as ignorant of the true faith and therefore in need of instruction and
proselytizing.”472 This led to a reorientation of Bosnian Muslims toward the worldwide
community of Muslims in a way that was not previously seen in Bosnia. Additionally,
Karadzic played into Western fears of Muslims and orientalist tropes, referring to
Bosnian Muslims as Turks and fundamentalists, and playing up acts of terrorism and a
general “Muslim threat” to Christian civilization. These factors demonstrate not only the
important ways in which Bosnian Muslim identity was shaped in reaction to other
emerging ethno-religious identities, but also the important role that outsiders (and
particularly religious outsiders) on all sides played in feeding the religious narratives of
the conflict.
Bringa notes that, there was not a rejection
of a specific Muslim identity anchored in Bosnian society, but it does mean a
stronger stress on the Islamic heritage of that collective identity...In Bosnia,
however, the more public use of Islamic symbols has to be seen in relation to the
increase in public use of religious symbolism among the Catholic Croats and the
Orthodox Serbs.473
Thus, the war certainly was not religious in the sense of being waged “between”
Christianity and Islam writ large, as shared interests of the primary actors involved were
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far more territorial than religious.474 However, the rhetoric and framing of the war, both
from the inside and from the outside, became increasingly religious as ethnic identities
hardened and took on religious symbols and identity markers in processes of
differentiation and conflict with the other, demonstrating the ways in which religious
identity is produced and refined in situations of friction.
The war raged on until the NATO strikes of September 1995 broke the siege of
Sarajevo. All in all, estimates indicate that approximately 236,500 people died between
1992-1995 in Bosnia. 164,000 of these were Bosnian Muslims, 31,000 were Croats, and
27,500 were Serbs.475 Thousands of places of worship were intentionally destroyed,
including 1024 mosques and Muslim religious sites, 182 Catholic churches, and 28 Serb
Orthodox churches and monasteries.476
By 1995, as Bosnians themselves were exhausted and brutalized by war,
international actors had begun working together to try to find a way to end the bloody
conflict. Elizabeth Cousens articulates the two main goals of the international actors
engaged in Bosnia in 1995 as follows: “first, that a war would not resume, and second,
that Bosnia would rebuild for itself a just peace, which international observers by and
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large considered a multiethnic one.”477 The years following the peace agreement did not
see these goals come to fruition. While elections were being held, displaced people were
returning to their homes, and the cease-fire continued, there were numerous elements of
the peace agreement that remained (and many argue still remain) stagnant.478
Cousens notes that the Bosnian war ended with a “coerced compromise,” as a
local and regional response to international force, rather than what is referred to as a
“mutually hurting stalemate,” which meant that the international parties heavily involved
in bringing about the agreement itself would be required to work equally hard to see
through its implementation.479 There were numerous reasons that this did not happen,
with the problematic nature of the peace agreement itself being one. 480
While there was some return of refugees and internally displaced persons
following the Dayton Agreement, many returns that were planned as part of the
agreement (which would have reset the demographic shifts caused by the war) were not
seen through, in part because there were numerous politicians pushing against remixing
areas that had become ethnically homogenous. 481 Additionally, other efforts from ethnoreligious nationalists served to reify boundaries of exclusion. For example, Sells points
to an incident in 1997 when the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church endorsed the
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Declaration of the Association of Writers of Serbia, which included the following
statement in the accompanying press release:
The account by SRNA [the Serbian News Agency] states that His Holiness,
Patriarch of the Servs, Pavle, gave his blessing for the Declaration, which was
signed by sixty intellectuals, including fourteen members of the Serb Academy of
Science and Art...The Declaration states that the Hague Tribunal has ‘acted solely
as an instrument for persecution of Serbs.’482
Despite the Dayton Agreement ending the conflict formally, this demonstrates the
hardening of positions of nationalist groups in the days and years following the end of the
war. Overall, the Dayton Agreement was partially implemented, with international help,
but was not carried out to the full extent needed in order to accomplish the goals of
rebuilding a just society.
While there is no longer active fighting, the logic of religio-ethnic conflict and
division lives on in Bosnian society, providing a challenge for those seeking to build
social cohesion in the country. Many expressed a fear of opening a Pandora’s Box if they
pushed for too much change too fast. Thus, Bosnians were left with a ceasefire, but what
many of my respondents referred to as a “frozen conflict.”

Conclusion
The lead-up to the war, and the course of the war itself, reshaped religious identity
in Bosnia. Through the disintegration of Yugoslavia, religious expression re-emerged
strongly in the public square- a sharp shift from the private way in which religion was
conceptualized and practices under Tito- and simultaneously emerged as a political force.
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Religion became public and politicized simultaneously, and as the fusion of
religion and ethno-nationalism grew for Serbs, so did it grow for Croats and Bosnian
Muslims, in a symbiotic relationship that led to deeper bonding group cohesion, at the
expense of bridging cohesion or a sense of common national identities. Religious leaders
allowed themselves to be used (and some arguably led the charge), perpetuating the idea
of “what is good for my community is good for me” (and, one might add, what threatens
a co-religionist is a personal threat).483 Thus, these moments of groupness that took place
before and during the Bosnian war influenced the way religion would be perceived and
lived out in Bosnian life for years to come, as the next chapter will demonstrate.
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Chapter 6: Religious Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for Better or for Worse?
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bosnia is inundated with peacebuilding
work. Within the first week of my research there, I was invited to four separate
peacebuilding gatherings or events in or a short drive from Sarajevo. The grassroots
peacebuilding work is ongoing and appears tireless, in Sarajevo and beyond. After the
war, numerous relief organizations and groups, both foreign and domestic, undertook
humanitarian and peacebuilding work in Bosnia. While many of the international
organizations have become less directly involved in peacebuilding, they still support
numerous projects and a number of the locally-led projects and organizations stemmed
from this international intervention. Many of these were religious actors, with ties to
religious institutions and authorities. Perica asserts that, “the religious peace-building
operation in the Balkans expanded into the most massive such operation in the history of
humanitarian work and peacemaking.”484 Bosnia is, indeed, a peacebuilding wonderland
of sorts, and has been a particularly interesting case for those interested in religious
engagement in peacebuilding.

Mapping Religion and Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina
The peacebuilding work in Bosnia, like in Lebanon, can be categorized in
multiple ways. There is work happening that is either led or endorsed by the government,
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and there is work that is driven fully by civil society and grassroots actors. Some of the
initiatives that explicitly engage religion are focused on clergy and religious institutions,
while others emphasize the importance of person-to-person interaction across lines of
religious difference. Some focus in the realm of belief, while others primarily consider
opportunities for engagement and joint action, without talking about religious belief or
practice.
Those engaged in peacebuilding work in Bosnia have differing opinions on if and
how religion should be engaged in this work. Several respondents asserted that religious
leaders play an important role in people’s lives in Bosnia. For example, one respondent
noted that religious leaders often work into their sermons who people should vote for.485
Thus, according to this perspective, engaging religious leaders is non-negotiable if one
wants to make progress toward peace, in part to stop them from acting as spoilers to the
process. Other respondents argued that it is best to avoid religion entirely, or to only
carefully and sparingly call attention to religious identity or engage religious leaders or
institutions in this work.486 One respondent, who has been working in peacebuilding
since the war, said that he used to have extremely negative feelings about religion, but
has come to believe that religion might be the one thing that brings reconciliation. From
his perspective, right now, it is still bringing division, but it has the potential to bring
reconciliation.487
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The most notable effort in terms of explicitly religious engagement in
peacebuilding is the Interreligious Council. The leaders of the four primary religious
communities in Bosnia (Serbian Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish) were,
according to many respondents, among the first to enter the peacebuilding process in
Bosnia, and played a key role in facilitating the political peacebuilding process.488
Religions for Peace International helped to formally establish the Council, though
respondents told me that it began through self-organized coffee meetings between the
Sarajevo-based leaders of the four primary religious communities during the war;
international actors helped to formalize what had already begun. When the Interreligious
Council was formally established, the leader of the Jewish community, a very small
community had been in Bosnia for approximately 450 years, became a key partner in the
Interreligious Council, taking on the role of the first president. The Jewish community
was seen as the most neutral in relation to the war. The Jewish leader served a three-year
term, which was extended from the original assignment of a one-year term, and then the
presidency started rotating among the rest of the communities.489
During the war, Sarajevo religious leaders started to work together through joint
prayers and on humanitarian issues. After the war, they drew inspiration from South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission to start working on reconciliation through
religious leaders and communities.490 While one respondent noted that it was successful
488
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early on, the leaders later felt that it was too complicated to do from a religious point of
view because the sense of forgiveness and reconciliation was too different in different
religious traditions. This led them to give the planned Truth and Reconciliation
Commission over to civil society, though it never came to fruition.491
One respondent, an international peacebuilding practitioner, spoke about the
specific challenges of forming and maintaining the Interreligious Council just after the
war. He noted that, “the fact that you had nearly 100% coincidence of national and
religious identity…there was no way for the religious leaders to speak to a distinct faith
community without also speaking to a national community.”492 This made it very
difficult to work with the religious communities within some sort of separate realm, away
from the politics of ethno-nationalism.
While the ethnic-religious conflation made working with religious communities
as such a huge challenge, this respondent observed that it,
was further complicated by the socialist history. So you did not have the kind of
depth of social infrastructure in the society that you find in other places. You
didn’t have faith communities that were providing a lot of health and social
service work- that had all be stripped away and was being done by the state.
Leaders were doing things in spite of (not because of) the society. A lot of people
had been returning to their religious institutions as a national statement.493
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Thus, from this perspective, a weakened central state made room for bonding
cohesion and mobilization along religious lines.
One of the first legal projects of the Interreligious Council was the freedom of
religion law, which was adopted in 2004. According to one respondent, the Council
drafted approximately 95% of the text of the law.494 Another respondent involved in the
process noted that this effort came about specifically because the leaders of the religious
communities all agreed that it was important to restore freedoms to practice religion
openly.
The law itself prohibits discrimination against any religious community, granting
each “equal rights and obligations,”495 While much of the content of the law focuses on
religious community rights rather than the rights of individuals, it does allow for freedom
of conscience or belief. Additionally,
According to the law, (a) the state may not accord the status of state religion to
any church or religious community; (b) the state may not interfere in the affairs
and internal organization of churches and religious communities; (c) no church
may obtain any special privileges from the state; and (d) the state may provide
material assistance but without discrimination on any grounds.496
Thus, the law both prohibits discrimination and clearly outlines a separation
between religious communities and the state, although the law also gives the government
the right to decide which religious communities are to be recognized as such in Bosnia.
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The respondent involved in the drafting of the law stated that,
That was an important and really effective way of countering the political national
trap and finding an area where each of these communities had a similar
experience under socialism and communism where their rights to practice were
circumscribed…and all facing being in the religious minority and majority in
different parts of the country.497
Finding a common space for joint political action, then, was a key part of keeping
the Interreligious Council together and engaged. While the work on the religious
freedom law was a careful foray into the political space, one respondent noted that now,
religious leaders have mostly stayed away from the political processes (with the coaching
of the Interreligious Council). They send messages of peace, but are less overtly getting
involved in politics. This is something that many local religious groups support, as they
fear what could happen if religious leaders are heavily tied into politics.498 One
respondent involved in the Interreligious Council noted, in reference to political
involvement, that “We try to stay away…We do not interfere in any political movements.
But they influence the public and their influence reflects on us…they created a negative
atmosphere and fear of others, and we have to fight that fear. It is a secondary influence,
we are not directly addressing [politics] but we have to deal with it later.”499 Thus, even
though they work to stay out of politics, the realities of Bosnian socio-political life
inevitably pulls the Interreligious Council into certain political debates.
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One of the key principles of the Interreligious Council, according to one
respondent, is consensus. They do not take on a project unless it has consensus from all
of the religious communities. 500 This respondent asserted that if they did take on projects
that did not have full consensus, they would not be successful and the Council itself could
be at risk.
Several respondents described the early days of the Interreligious Council as a
period of trying out different methods and strategies to get religious communities to work
together and to have a ripple-out effect. One noted it became easier as time went on to
find things that the religious institutions and leaders could and would do, and the courage
of the religious leaders themselves to speak out publicly increased over time as well.501
One respondent commented on the positive aspects of religious overlap with
ethno-national groups in Bosnia, stating that, “we are focusing on peacebuilding and
trustbuilding process among three nations who were involved in war conflict. But most
of the time those three nations are also different religions. So we use this religious
background to connect people.”502 The religious dimension of ethno-national identities in
Bosnia thus, from this perspective, provides a unique entry-point for peacebuilding
efforts.
Another respondent recalled an interaction he had with a Serb priest who came to
a workshop with instructions from his Bishop to “report back,” but became invested in
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the conflict resolution approach. When the priest tried to engage his Bishop in the work,
he was rebuked, so was unable to participate formally in the activities.503 This story
demonstrates the layers of religious, cultural, and ethno-nationalist norms at play when
trying to do peacebuilding work that engages religious actors in a meaningful way. This
respondent notes that, “one thing I learned through this whole process was that there was
absolutely no way you could categorize [an] entire religious community.”504
While some noted that at the beginning, the Council remained a Sarajevo-based
group, facing major challenges and resistance when trying to expand into other areas,505
the Council now has 12 branch offices outside of Sarajevo, with three more under
construction at the time of my interviews.506 While the Interreligious Council has
undertaken a few legal projects, as noted above, most of the work attempts to be
politically neutral, and focuses on modeling religious engagement (through religious
leaders meeting and demonstrating camaraderie and solidarity publicly), developing
programs that allow for religious leaders and laypersons to interact with one another and
to explore commonalities, and responding to local incidents of violence directed at
religious communities. They have seen a decrease in the number of attacks in cities
where they are active, and attribute this to local religious leaders showing up when
incidents occur and trying to help deescalate hot spots.507 They have also been working
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with local police to prioritize responding with justice in cases of these attacks, taking
away the need for revenge.
Additionally, the Council has projects focused on the rights of women within
religious communities and society more generally, working with UN Women and other
groups to lead reading groups focused on understanding religion texts and traditions
within the context of global human rights norms.508

The Religious Peacebuilding Infrastructure
While the Interreligious Council is the most high-profile effort in explicitly
religious peacebuilding, there have been, and continue to be, numerous other efforts to
engage religious actors, institutions, and ideas in peacebuilding efforts. Some
peacebuilding actors ran conflict resolution workshops at the end and just following the
war; one respondent was conducting these primarily with religious actors, holding several
workshops that brought together people from every religious group in Sarajevo. This
respondent noted that, “it was quite a feat to bring together that kind of representation
during the siege itself.”509 Simply getting people from different backgrounds into the
same room was considered an accomplishment in and of itself during and just following
the war.510
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The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched an initiative in 2014
called Dialogue for the Future: The promotion of coexistence and diversity in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The program was requested by all three presidents, and was launched by
the presidents with a declaration at a conference in April 2014. The stated strategic focus
of this project is,
to address the deterioration of relations amongst communities and substantially
decrease the threat of renewed conflict and violence by promoting peaceful
coexistence, which is characterized by increased trust, respect for diversity,
strengthened civic and inter-cultural dialogue amongst citizens, in particular
youth.511
One of the UNDP programs involves bringing together university students from
different ethnic backgrounds to work together on key development problems. One
respondent involved in the work noted that, “when they see common problems and work
together, they’ll figure out that they are all the same, they’re all human.”512 For example,
when there was extensive flooding in Bosnia in 2014, UNDP took a number of young
people from across ethno-religious groups to peace camps in some of the most-affected
sites, where they worked together on reconstruction. This respondent noted that, while
there was no explicit engagement with religion in the program design itself, the Serb
students were very curious when the Muslim students slipped away for prayers, and
organic inter-religious engagement resulted.513

511

“Dialogue for the Future: Promoting Coexistence and Diversity in BiH,” accessed February 10, 2017,
http://ba.one.un.org/content/unct/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/what-we-do/jointprojects/dialogue-for-the-future.html.

512

Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016.

513

Interview with Respondent 1, March 8, 2016.

226

Another specific “Dialogue for the Future” project is to hold youth forums, which
include training on non-violent communications. Through this, youth have been given
opportunities to engage with local decision-makers and politicians, and they are working
to increase these interaction points ahead.
Several NGOs recently formed a collective effort called Pro-Future. Those
leading this effort have mapped the needs and challenges for peacebuilding in Bosnia,
then assigned different participating NGOs different roles (sometimes working together,
sometimes in their own “lanes”, so to speak) to exert collective impact. They work in 36
municipalities, and have paired off the municipalities (with each in a pair having a
different ethnic majority). Each municipality is required to have three people represented
in a working group, with one of those people being an employee of the municipality and
the other two being affiliated with different NGOs. They do their work in a number of
sectors, including particular foci on youth, schools, and war victims. I attended one
program where they brought three war survivors (of different ethnic groups) from one
municipality to another, to share their stories with a group of school children. They do
these programs on a regular basis, in multiple cities and villages, working with the war
victims on their own personal narratives, while simultaneously working with the schools
to make time and space for the youth to hear these stories and to reflect on them
afterwards.
In its third year of implementation, funded primarily by USAID, Pro-Future has
become the largest peacebuilding project in Bosnia, and is aiming to work with 60
municipalities by the end of the project. A large number of organizations are involved,
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including Caritas, Catholic Relief Services, Mozaik, Parliament of Citizens in Banja
Luka, the Inter-religious Council, and an independent group in Tusla. Evaluative
research on previous CRS and Caritas peacebuilding projects went into the design of this
effort, drawing on lessons learned and best practices from previous program efforts.514
Additionally, the Pro-Future project has begun working with the Interreligious
Council on public forums for religious leaders to talk about peace from the perspectives
of the different religious traditions, and to hold ongoing “open doors” days at houses of
worship, inviting people from different religious communities to visit and learn about
each tradition more deeply.515
Several smaller initiatives pull together people of different backgrounds on a
regular basis for dialogue and engagement. These involve numerous small, informal
gatherings in order to slowly build deep, sustainable relationships across lines of
difference. One respondent spoke about using faith and religiosity as a tool, as Bosnian
tradition is a great resource on the role of faith in peacebuilding. This respondent
described their work as digging religion out from the fear and trauma.516
One program, “Believers for Peace,” has conducted trainings over the past 7 years
with over 1500 Islamic studies teachers, to help them use Islam and Peacebuilding
manuals in Islamic schools. Additionally, Believers for Peace has held conferences to
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help strengthen the capacity of religious leaders to use religious sources to effectively
promote peace.
Another respondent discussed the importance of seminary programs designed for
inter-religious exchange, at the institutional and clerical levels.517 While there is much
work between the institutional leadership of the Muslim and Catholic seminaries,
according to this respondent, the Orthodox do much more of their inter-religious work
through the Inter-religious Council, rather than at the seminary level. This respondent
noted that there are good everyday relationships between the Muslim leadership and the
Orthodox priests, and they can discuss theological matters, but they avoid discussing noneternal matters.518
There are a number of more localized programs as well. One respondent
described a survey they did in 2006-2007 in Sankimost, a city in northwestern Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and found that religious leaders had the highest level of trust from the
community. Thus, they began a slow process of building trust between the religious
leaders, then had them go public after 5 years of internal conversations, then have built
programs from there to engage young people. They have their own independent
Interreligious Council, but when the national Interreligious Council came to work with
the religious leaders in this area, they did not get to know the local Interreligious Council,
and thus were unsuccessful in recruiting religious leaders for their initiative.519
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In every program, this locally-focused initiative asks participants to reveal their
religious identity, to help them feel comfortable in their own skin and to build trust and
security among the group.520 It has also been important, according to this respondent, for
the religious leaders to publicly speak together on a regular basis, to normalize their
cooperation and camaraderie.521 However, the conversations between religious leaders
have rarely discussed the past, which this respondent sees as a continued barrier to the
healing process necessary for building social cohesion.522 According to this respondent,
they are having these conversations (about the past) privately, when it is just the religious
leaders meeting with one another, and eventually will be able to help lead the
conversations publicly, but it takes time.523 The key, according to this individual, is that
their peace work is not about programs, but is really “24/7.”524
As this overview makes clear, there are many different strains of peacebuilding
work actively engaging religion in the Bosnian context. Some are government-endorsed,
while others draw primarily from the grassroots civil society actors, aiming to keep their
distance from the government. Still others operate in something of a hybrid space
between government and grassroots. Additionally, a number of the initiativesparticularly those framed as explicitly religious peacebuilding initiatives- prioritize
religious identity and difference as the key “problems to solve,” while a smaller handful
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of initiatives engage religion while seeing it as one intersectional factor within a wider
milieu. An examination of the ways that these varied organizations and initiatives
conceptualize goals and success helps to reveal the significance of these differences in
approach.
Asking those involved with these efforts about their goals and expectations
reveals a lot about how religion is being imagined in the Bosnian peacebuilding space, as
well as how this work is impacting and interacting with broader socio-political
dimensions.
One respondent who worked closely with the Interreligious Council at its
inception stated that, “for a lot of that time, the most fundamental measure of success was
that the council held together. Even if they felt like they couldn’t meet each other or have
public meetings for a while, none of them felt compelled to pull out.”525 Thus, early on,
success was measured by the Council members simply staying engaged.
Another respondent observed that, when peacebuilding work is explicitly faithbased or faith-rooted (rather than simply engaging religious actors), determining the
benchmarks of success looks different than it does for “secular” peacebuilding work:
There’s a couple different aspects that influence this. One is motivations. Faithbased people can be motivated even in light of not seeing results…also, that sense
that what takes place depends upon the involvement of the supernatural. That has
some influence also on the outcome. There’s a much more personal
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understanding of that- a real force and investment, on the part of something
greater. So, success and failure continue to get looked at differently.526
From this perspective, religious engagement and faith-rootedness of those
involved in peacebuilding efforts fosters a deep commitment to the effort that might
otherwise be hard to sustain. One respondent involved early on in the Interreligious
Council described the tensions of balancing work with religious institutions and
hierarchical structures with a desire to engage with the grassroots efforts that were
happening. This respondent noted that there was indeed tension, particularly in the years
just following the war, and that “if work wasn’t sanctioned by or if the leaders didn’t see
[the grassroots efforts] as trustworthy and loyal” then the Interreligious Council could not
engage with it.527
We see through this survey of efforts to engage religion in peacebuilding in
Bosnia a plethora of programs and approaches. How, then, should we think about the
ways in which these efforts interact with social cohesion more broadly in the Bosnian
context? A look at the current state of social cohesion in Bosnia helps to situate this
analysis.

The State of Social Cohesion in Bosnia-Herzegovina
While there have been numerous sustained efforts, coming from both institutional
and grassroots levels, to rebuild social relations in Bosnia, social cohesion in the country
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has not significantly improved since the end of the war. One respondent pointed to the
persistence of transgenerational trauma, noting that, “people who are Croat, who have
never lived in Croatia, consider Croatia their country.”528 He noted that, for most living
in Bosnia, there is a shared sense that they are still living in the war period, in a way.
This reality persists despite extensive societal support for efforts to build social
peace. One survey, conducted in 2011 in four key cities in Bosnia by a team from the
University of Edinburgh, found widespread support for building understanding, peace,
trust, and reconciliation, as trust-building initiatives. These all polled higher than support
for “identification of liability/guilt”, historical accuracy, or apology, although support for
all of these objectives were deemed important or very important by a majority of people
surveyed.529
Survey participants differed in their feelings about explicit religious involvement
in peacebuilding initiatives. 56% of respondents indicated that they are personally very
religious, and “respondents who self-reported being personally religious tended to favour
reconciliation and peacebuilding initiatives more than respondents who said they were
not religious.”530 Additionally, those who reported higher levels of participation in
religious services were more likely to affirm the importance of a reconciliation process,
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while those who reported not being religiously active were more likely to indicate that a
reconciliation process would not make a difference.531 Respondents in Mostar and Banja
Luka affirmed their believe that religious leaders and lay leaders have a special role to
play in reconciliation; these numbers dropped in Bugojno and Sarajevo.532
The data does not show stark divisions between Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks as
such in their responses, but rather the more determinate indicator of their attitudes
(toward supporting or not supporting peacebuilding efforts) was whether the individual
was part of the ethnic majority or minority in their city. Those who were in the majority
were more likely to see value in the role of religion in reconciliation processes than did
those who were minorities in their respective cities.533
A follow up study in 2013 confirmed the widespread support for trust-building
and reconciliation efforts, particularly among those who self-identified as more
religious.534 However, most respondents (60.8%) named the economy as the highest
priority facing the country, and while just 39.9% felt that political change was most
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important, only 29% said that improving social relations was a key priority for the
country. 535
In interpreting this survey data, it is important to understand the way in which the
term “reconciliation” is employed. According to the survey authors,
Reconciliation is used here as a term which implies activities, practices and
processes involving the building of relationships, both ‘horizontal’ relationships
across the wider population and ‘vertical’ relationships, begging questions about
the perception of a need for accountability between representatives and the
populations they seek to represent.536
While the aforementioned survey series focused on understanding whether or not
there is widespread desire for reconciliation, a 2009 UNDP report reveals the very low
levels of social trust, stating that, “the report finds that BiH’s social fabric is
characterized by fragmentation and segmentation rather than cohesion and solidarity.”537
This report reveals that only about 10% of people feel that most people can be trusted. 538
Of those surveyed 88% believe the most significant level of social tension is between rich
and poor; 86% believe it is between management and workers, and 79% believe it is
between different ethnicities (note that respondents could select more than one
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response).539 This demonstrates that social trust is not only low between ethno-religious
groups, but across multiple levels of social fragmentation.
The lack of trust between ethno-religious groups can be correlated with the lack
of social interaction people of different ethno-religious groups have with one another, as
division has been made materially manifest in multiple ways throughout politics and
society. While large numbers of respondents reported spending time with people of their
own ethnicity nearly everyday (44.6%) or a few times each week (30.5%), only 20.8%
reported spending time with persons of other ethnicities a few times each month, with
more reporting that their interaction is seldom (35.1%) or never (12.6%).540 It is worth
noting that, while people reported low levels of trust in other ethnicities (ranging between
10.2% and 12.3%), they also reported fairly low levels of trust in people of their own
ethnicity (ranging from 20.7% to 22.3%). People reported higher levels of trust when
asked about family and close friends, demonstrating that familial, localized ties are very
strong (pointing to high levels of bonding cohesion).541
While GDP growth has been stable in Bosnia since 2000 and unemployment has
been improving, unemployment remains high and is particularly alarming among youth,
where unemployment is twice as high as for the general population. 542 While this report
did not assess social exclusion, the last National Human Development Report that did, in
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2007, revealed that over 50% of the population reports experiencing some form of
exclusion. 543
Overall, the UNDP report shows widespread frustration and distrust, not limited
to ethnic division, and high levels of bonding cohesion, as homogenous networks
continue to grow. Informal networks have also grown, with “štela” (a term used widely
in Bosnia, referring to gains made through nepotism and clientalism) playing a critical
role in access to jobs and social networks. 544 Taken together, the surveys analyzed here
show a desire for increased social cohesion, but a lack of progress and political will in
that direction.
Beyond these measures of social distrust and fragmentation, there are several
contemporary factors contributing to maintaining, or in some cases increasing, social
discord. At present, one respondent observed, war memories are getting re-hashed and
re-interpreted within the frame of current global events. Islamophobic rhetoric has taken
root and is more widespread, and young Bosnian Muslim identification with the global
ummah has become more common.545
Trust in the state is very low, and there have been several incidents in recent years
that have exacerbated frustration between ethno-religious communities and the state. For
instance, recently, high judicial prosecutors banned everyone wearing religious symbols
from coming into the court building, a move that many saw as being directed explicitly
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toward Muslim women wearing hijab. While the Muslim community publicly opposed
this decision, LGBT and women’s rights activists also mobilized to support the rights of
individuals to wear what they want.546
It is clear that both vertical and horizontal measures of social cohesion are
currently quite low in Bosnia. While bonding cohesion continues to increase, the gaps
between groups have grown wider and have been exacerbated by lack of trust in the state,
which precipitates further bonding (over bridging) behavior, as smaller units of people
feel they must look out for themselves to secure rights and privileges.

Barriers to Impact of Peacebuilding Efforts
Despite the numerous efforts aimed at building peace over the last decade and a
half in Bosnia, social cohesion remains low. There are several barriers that contribute
directly to the lack of broader impact of religious peacebuilding efforts in particular.

1. Embodied Separateness
Bosnia is characterized by both physical and political separation between ethnic
groups. One respondent remarked that, “we established small medieval kingdoms after
the war.”547 This is embodied in geographic segregation, as well as through the education
system.
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Some have pointed to a “soft war” through schools in particular, through the
divided education system. 548 A number of respondents pointed to the “two schools, one
roof” system of education, where in mixed municipalities, children of one ethnic group
will go to school in the morning, then children of the other ethnic group will use the same
building in the afternoon, without the students mixing in classes.549 Additionally, as one
respondent noted, students from Serbian schools take excursions to Belgrade, rather than
to Sarajevo, and go visit monasteries in Serbia, rather than sites within BosniaHerzegovina.550
Furthermore, one respondent noted that in the Republika Srpska, the non-Serbian
Bosnian children are not allowed to call their language Bosnian, but rather must call it
“the language of Bosniaks.” This, they noted, is part of “the continued effort to deny our
children the right of self-identification.”551 It is clear that there are both real and
perceived efforts to maintain distance between ethno-religious communities through the
education system. This is mirrored in the geographical segregation that is rampant
throughout the country as well, demonstrating the ways in which difference manifests
itself materially, embodied and emplaced in Bosnian life.
Additionally, the identification of Bosnia’s social cohesion problem as ethnic or
religious, rather than structural injustices, reinforces this embodied separation and shields
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the state from blame for lack of cohesion, since it is an “ethnic problem,” rather than one
that can be adequately owned and addressed by the state.552

2. Ambivalence of religious leaders
While religious leader have often been involved in peacebuilding and dialogue
efforts, their engagement is ambivalent in a number of ways. First, it is important to note
that there are still a number of religious leaders who do not support peacebuilding efforts,
even on the surface. Some in the Interreligious Council noted that they do not enjoy full
support from the top Bishops in the Catholic and Orthodox communities, and there are a
number of places (i.e., with Catholics in the South and with Orthodox in the Northwest)
where they are not able to do work.553
As one respondent observed, “every religious community is an interest or political
party, basically.”554 Thus, often, religious leaders behave more or less like politicians. 555
While generally, religious leaders aren’t participating directly in politics, there is often
implicit engagement with the political system. For example, last election the top religious
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leaders tried to issue a joint statement, but at the last minute the Islamic Community
withdrew and issued a statement implicitly supporting a party.556
One respondent argued that each religious leader has at least three different
stories- one for the international community (as a peacemaker), one for their community
publicly (painting their own community as the first victims), and a third for own
community behind closed doors. 557 This paints a mixed picture of religious leadership in
Bosnia and how they engage in peacebuilding, as double- (or triple-) speak can make it
very difficult to ascertain true motives and goals. One respondent observed that, while
the religious leaders in the Inter-religious council are outwardly supporting peace, they
are undermining one another and “stabbing each other in the back” all the time. Beyond
the “double speak”, there is also fear among religious leaders to do certain public
appearances for fear of backlash from other leaders or their community.558
Walking a careful political line (between maintaining a commitment to unity and
peace, while looking out for the needs and desires of one’s own religious community)
feeds into an avoidance of difficult issues, which prevents them from making real
progress. For instance, one respondent noted that religious leadership does not want
gender justice to be part of these conversations (a reality that shows up in Lebanon as
well).559 The “avoidance of politics” in this way, while playing into politics in other
ways, as articulated above, limits the reach and efficacy of these efforts.
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Additionally, religious leaders have joined together at times to work against
certain civic efforts. For instance, religious leaders campaigned together against people
declaring themselves “Bosnian-Herzegovinian” for the purpose of the census.560 This
effort would have muddied the divisions between ethno-religious groups, and thus the
religious institutions worked against the effort, despite widespread grassroots interest in
it.
One respondent noted that people expect too much from religious leaders, and
that sometimes this makes it very difficult for them to meet expectations. While many
religious leaders are committed to working for peace, there are some who promote
division as well.561
Perica notes that, “religious authorities carried out…an ambiguous strategy that
involved simultaneous backing of the nationalistic factions while playing the role of
peace mediators before the international observers.”562 Indeed, there are instances of the
institutional religious authorities collectively denouncing other clerics involved in peace
advocacy as “Marxists, communists, and Titoists,”563 demonstrating a desire to control
and contain the ways in which religious peacebuilding was being carried out in the
country. Additionally, a 1999 televised roundtable between the religious leaders featured
them leveraging “charges against secular forces while denying any clerical liability and
[they] saw no connection between religion, ethnic nationalism, and genocide in Yugoslav
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lands.” 564 Later, reports indicated that the Interfaith Council refused a proposal to teach
ecumenical courses on religion in Bosnia’s public schools, opting instead for religious
catechism be taught in separate classes by religious authorities.565

3. Limited reach of efforts
One respondent observed that there are thousands of projects, and each one is
successful (measured through evaluations most often), but none have an impact on the
broader dynamics.566 While this may be an overstatement, it was a common reflection
among peacebuilding actors that their work only reaches about 5% of the population.
They reflected on excellent individual change, but when people return home, they receive
so much pushback that the transformation is reversed, rather than rippling out.567
Another respondent noted that, while there are hundreds of NGOs, very few are
really active toward long-term peace. Additionally, government-stamped NGOs refuse to
criticize the government, and thus are ineffective in much of their work, when the real
transformation would need to come from changes to the system itself.568 These top-down
efforts also fail to effectively engage civil society, and thus never see broad ownership.
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As Roberto Belloni, et. al., argue, there is clearly civilian desire and bottom-up
efforts for institutional change toward greater justice and peace. These desires are
manifested through more hidden networks (including the ones under study in this
dissertation), and make themselves known in more public ways only periodically, with
some positive, though minimal, results.570 However, the ruling elites and the
international community have often pushed back against these bottom-up pushes for
change, preventing them from entering the official political process, and thus preventing
high level, systemic impact.571 Belloni, et. al., posit that the international community has
two particularly problematic priorities when it comes to peacebuilding in Bosnia: the
preference for ethnic security over other concerns and values, and the acceptance and
accommodation of ethnic identities in a way that has prioritized stability over change.572
I argue that this is true for the ways in which religious institutions, and international
efforts focused on religious engagement, have ordered their priorities as well, causing this
same effect from multiple sectors preventing grassroots change efforts from having larger
effects on social cohesion.
Funder constraints also affect the reach and long-term effectiveness of projects,
since they often operate within specific timeframes and limited funding parameters.
Some respondents also felt that the need to cooperate with funders has constrained their
ability to do the deeper, more sustainable work of peacebuilding.573
570

Belloni, et. al., “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Domestic Agency and the Inadequacy of the Liberal Peace.”

571

Belloni, et. al., “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Domestic Agency and the Inadequacy of the Liberal Peace,” 48-9.

572

Belloni, et. al., “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Domestic Agency and the Inadequacy of the Liberal Peace,” 57.

573

Interview with Respondent 2, March 8, 2016.

244

Another factor at work here is the way in which many efforts to engage religion in
peacebuilding treat religion as the source of conflict, even if those involved would argue
that conflict does not stem from religion. For example, the Pro-Future project outlined
above works to bring religious communities into one another’s sacred spaces,
demonstrating a belief that by creating opportunities for religious encounter, conflict
between groups will subside. This type of approach assumes religion itself is causing
conflict, and thus limits the reach of the efforts by isolating it in peacebuilding practice.

4. Enshrining of ethno-religious difference through Dayton
While the Dayton Accords brought peace on one level (in that the active fighting
stopped), it established a stagnant political system. One respondent reflected this in
saying, “we are not post-conflict; this is a frozen conflict.”574 Through the Dayton
process, ethno-religious difference was enshrined in the political and geographic
infrastructure, and thus efforts to build trust and cohesion between groups run into the
very real barrier of a stagnant and divided political system.
Ethnic identity is entrenched in the political structures, as Dino Abazović argues,
The peacebuilding/nation-building efforts cannot be successful because they go
against Bosnia’s very governing structure…Declaring a unified state of BosniaHerzegovina while recognizing two antagonistic entities, proclaiming democracy
while entrenching ethnically based institutional structures and reaffirming
individual rights while legitimizing ethnic majoritarianism, from the outset raised
serious concerns as to which political concept in Bosnia-Herzegovina would
prevail575
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The system itself thus prevents the democratization and affirmation of individual
rights, two key efforts of those looking to further social cohesion and justice in Bosnia,
and also makes real the division between groups in a very material way.
Political parties operate mostly along ethnic lines. The three presidents represent
the three different communities, and this political separation tracks all the way down, for
the most part. Elections are won by appealing to particular ethno-religious groups, rather
than by trying to develop inclusive platforms.576 Ethnicity is indeed enshrined into the
constitution, creating what one respondent called a “checkmate positions”, where you are
required to have agreement at all levels. This does not allow for a citizen-based country,
as everything is divided into three (and leaves no room for Jewish or Roma citizens).577
According to several respondents, the media also perpetuates narratives of
division, and one respondent pointed to the fact that the media is government-controlled.
“The governments don’t want us to reconcile- they say they do, but the way they act does
not match that.”578 Thus, many are skeptical of the commitment of political leaders to
truly seeing peace that accounts for inequalities and injustices in society.
One respondent noted the politicization of religion, premised on an “us vs. them”
way of thinking about religious identity and belonging. She asserted that this religious
division goes against fruitful peacebuilding initiatives and has contributed to the lack of
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political will for peace.579 This respondent went on to say that, “Whatever initiatives you
do, the administrative divisions and complexities prevent you from getting too far.”580
The system is designed for self-preservation.

5. Corruption and clientelism
Several respondents spoke of the extreme corruption and clientelism at work
within the political system and beyond. There is a lack of merit-based appointments, and
one respondent argued that the country would function without the government ministries
the same as it does now- in other words, it is stagnant.581 Another respondent stated that,
“politics would influence so much if it was not so criminalistic.”582 The perception of
political corruption is widespread, and perpetuates the vertical divides as citizens have
very little trust in their government.
These observations from respondents are indeed corroborated by numerous
studies of Bosnian political and social life. Roberto Belloni and Francesco Strazzari have
argued that, while there are strong laws on the books against corruption in Bosnia, state
and international actors have done little to prosecute high-profile corruption cases. They
argue that, “corruption is the cost international actors have been ready to accept in the
name of stability, at least in the first post-conflict phase. Later, with corruption already
engrained in the social fabric, governance reforms have been devised by international
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officials and more or less openly accepted by local ones, but corruption has continued to
prosper under the surface of formal institutions.”583 A strong desire for stability has thus
overridden the focus on combatting corruption, contributing to low levels of social
cohesion over the years in post-conflict Bosnia.

“Change Shouldn’t be Rushed”
The above barriers, among others, help to explain why, despite numerous
peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia over the last two decades and beyond, social cohesion- by
both vertical and horizontal measures- remains low. While efforts to build peace are
plentiful, these barriers impede their potentially positive effects. This reality impacts the
ways in which those involved in peacebuilding- and particularly religious peacebuildingthink about the purpose of their work, and the ways in which they conceptualize the role
of religion therein.
It is, of course, difficult to articulate goals and to measure success in any
peacebuilding efforts, but it is also critical to understand how those engaged in such
efforts see their own goals and theories of change. One respondent observed that, while
the new generation has never been involved in conflict themselves, they have spent their
twenty-odd years of life segregated, as ethno-religious division has been materially
inscribed into life at so many levels. As is the case in Lebanon, their parents have a sense
of pre-war unity, but the younger generation does not, and thus the work is not about
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reconciliation for this generation, but rather establishing inter-group trust in the first
place.584 This, then, is the goal for certain peacebuilding actors- to establish social trust.
Some argued that one should not focus on goals broader than individual
relationship-building. One commented that, “I found myself concluding [after one
particularly revealing workshop incident] that I think even though we tried to jump into
problem solving and trying to basically help deal with issues, if we accomplished
anything at all, it was probably in terms of building or rebuilding relationships between
people. I decided to make that my focus. We did work on some issues, but relationship
building continues to be part of my focus. Unless you establish or maintain relationships
of some kind, I think there’s really little you can do.”585 This was the articulated goal of
a number of efforts across the country.
Others pointed to instances of individual attitude change as evidence of success.
One such example was a Croat coffee shop owner in Mostar, who was in a camp during
the war and reported that he hated all Serbs and Muslims afterwards. His coffee shop
would only serve Croatian coffee (which is one letter different from other types of Balkan
coffee) and he had photos of Croat war heroes lining the walls of his shop. After a
peacebuilding program worked with him on hearing the stories of other war survivors, he
changed his views, started a romantic relationship with a Serbian woman, and is now
retired and working to help others get to know one another across ethno-religious lines.586
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One respondent asserted that the goal should be to strengthen individuals as
believers, to prepare them to do the work of peacebuilding. As one respondent stated,
“personally, I think it’s important for leaders to be promoting peace, but I believe in the
strength of civil society; in the individual believers. We are the ones who are leading our
religious leaders.”587 The goal, then, is to strengthen and empower the individual
believer to engage in peacebuilding work in their personal capacities.
Another respondent noted that their project measures success through post-event
surveys that ask participants to self-report attitude changes and the like, while also
maintaining relationships with participants over the long term in order to monitor and
evaluate longer-term shifts in attitudes and behaviors. This respondent stated that, “This
is something you cannot measure- those human relations, those feelings, but we hear
those stories, when they describe that their local community is relaxed after those board
programs. Also this depends on minority or majority. We have a priest and imam just
walk through the city, and the position of the minority community can be better. So, [we
evaluate our work] through the success stories and through the surveys.”588 Again, this
points to small-scale changes in relationships as the goal and the measure of success.
One respondent who has been involved in peacebuilding work in multiple
capacities since just after the war said he has seen progress in his 20 years of work.
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While Dayton enshrined a certain unhealthy status quo, there has been very gradual
change. But change “shouldn’t be rushed”, according to this respondent.589
While goals and assessment were somewhat varied, there are a plethora of
programs in Bosnia aimed at building better relationships between citizens, with the
general aim of cultivating peace (this was a clear assumption, if not explicitly articulated
by all respondents). Overall, there is a diversity of ways those involved in the religious
peacebuilding space approach the work and think about goals and success, but most are
looking primarily at internal program success, with a hope of a ripple-out effect, rather
than assessing how it is feeding into larger societal change.
The lack of a material approach to understanding and engaging religion in
Bosnian religious peacebuilding stands out starkly in these conversations with interview
respondents. For many, building and maintaining inter-religious relationships is key, and
happens only outside the realm of politics. Religion is thus treated as a primarily internal
matter, to be safely shielded from the socio-political extensions of religious identity. For
some, peacebuilding is a stale issue of sorts, unachievable and tired, and thus, the focus is
on individual relationships, setting aside the goal of institutional, high-level change. For
many who take this view, change will happen eventually, as a new consciousness is
raised among people, one individual or small group at a time.
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Key Findings: What can we say about religious peacebuilding in Bosnia?

1. Religious identities were produced as politically meaningful through the sociopolitical processes preceding the war, and, in turn, shaped the way religion was
employed and understood in the war and post-war periods in Bosnia. Religion itself
became through the lead-up to and course of the war, as the emergence of a Muslim
ethno-political identity particularly illustrates. What it meant to be religious, and
particularly its implications for socio-political life, changed over time through encounter
with one another during increasingly politicized historical moments. This, in turn,
shaped the way religion was employed in and following the war as well.
An additional factor at play here is the important role of outside actors (whether
other governments or religious bodies) played in cultivating, framing, and sometimes
exacerbating conflict. Indeed, this is especially true when they were outside backers, not
just theoretical connections. These connections, along with the outside “gaze” (i.e.,
defining the Bosnian Muslim community as Muslim first) transformed religion for those
living within the boundaries of Bosnia. Thus, even though religion is always lived out
locally, it cannot be extracted from outside influences.

2. The lack of institutional commitment to improving social cohesion is an
irreconcilable barrier that makes it impossible for many of the efforts to have the
desired impact. Institutional entrenchment of ethno-religious identities perpetuates
ethno-religious division, and thus efforts to build better relationships between individuals
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and groups of different ethnic backgrounds will always be limited in the scope of their
effect, since the looming institutional barriers prevent large-scale reconciliation. Ethnoreligious division is thus materially inscribed into Bosnian life, making it impossible to
think about or understand what it means to be religious apart from this embodied reality.
This institutional entrenchment of ethno-religious identity was enshrined in the
political system through Dayton. It continues through the policies of embodied
separation seen in geographic separation and segregated schools to this day. Thus, ethnoreligious division is integrated into the Bosnian state itself, which has no interest in
changing these realities that help to maintain the status quo, benefitting only institutional
elites. The role of religious elites in this is similar to the roles that international
peacebuilding organizations have played more generally, according to Belloni, et. al., as
described above: the prioritization of stability outweighs the commitment to just notions
of peace, and serves in turn to reify ethno-religious difference.

3. Religious institutions and leaders have played important roles in milestone
peacebuilding moments in Bosnia, but subsequently slipped into preservation roles.
For example, the Interreligious Council played an important role in getting to Dayton,
and subsequently in establishing the political infrastructure for initial peace, including
playing a strong role in the development of the religious freedom law. In particular, the
Jewish Community played a critical role as a religious community that was not directly
involved in the war. And yet, now religious institutions and leaders are careful to stay
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“safe” and to maintain unity, but at the expense of playing an active role in furthering
social cohesion more fully.
The Interreligious Council now plays a preservation role, refraining from
challenging the continued structural issues that act as barriers to social cohesion in
Bosnia. The commitment to consensus and to staying out of politics drives the work of
the Council, and thus imagines religion and religious institutions as somehow separate
from political life. Through this approach, the Council thereby, perhaps inadvertently,
helps to preserve political stagnation. This builds on the Interreligious Council and other
entities’ “extraction” of religion from the rest of life, as delineated further above. By
treating religion as an internal matter of belief, rather than seeing its integration with all
aspects of socio-political life in Bosnia, efforts to engage religion to bring peace are
rendered toothless in many ways.

4. As is the case in Lebanon, points 2 & 3 combined bring up a paradox for religious
peacebuilding. Ina Merdjanova makes the case for the “repoliticization” of
Interreligious Dialogue for peacebuilding in Bosnia, stating that, it “has to address more
explicitly political and economic concerns and issues related to poverty and various
forms of inequality and exclusion” in order to be effective in making any progress toward
peace.590 Religious leaders, who have some capacity to influence institutions, display a
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reluctance to address institutional and political concerns, while the grassroots programs
that want to see institutional change are limited in their ability to make impact. Thus, the
status quo maintains, bolstered by political and religious elites who either benefit from its
maintenance, or value unity and consensus over justice concerns.
This demonstrates the way in which religion is imagined and operationalized in
Bosnian religious peacebuilding. Religion is most often treated as an internal matter of
faith, which has been tarnished by its entanglement with politics, and thus, the way to
address the conflict is to “rescue” religion from this entanglement somehow. The focus
here also assumes that religion itself is one of the key conflict drivers, rather than seeing
the ways it is intertwined with, and produced by, socio-political realities. This
internal/extractive approach goes against a material understanding of religion, which
recognized the ways in which religion is inherently integrated into socio-political life,
and cannot therefore be treated as somehow separate from the rest of life.

5. While grassroots religious peacebuilding efforts are unable to break through the
institutional barriers to make broader societal impact, they play an important role
in fostering resilience at the grassroots level.

As I noted in my analysis, Bosnian

peacebuilders are a small but tireless group. The sheer number of programmatic efforts
and ongoing events demonstrates the resilience that is being built and maintained through
these efforts.
I asked some of the grassroots peacebuilding actors if they felt they had seen
progress, and most said not really, so I asked what kept them going and, as one
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respondent said, “what other choice do I have?” Thus, while I argue that, due to
institutional and political barriers, they are not able to produce large-scale social
cohesion, these efforts play a very important role in cultivating resilience and in
materially building an alternative way of living and thinking about socio-political life in
Bosnia. While I do not concur with the idea that cultivating this consciousness among
small groups of individuals will have ripple out effects, as the institutional constraints are
too strong for this mechanism of change to be viable, the peacebuilding efforts are key
for maintaining individual and group resilience in the face of a difficult socio-political
climate.

Conclusion
Religious identity, and the political meaning thereof, was shaped through sociopolitical processes in Bosnia, and particularly by incidents of and sustained episodes of
conflict. This in turn shaped community approaches to social and political life, and to
religion more broadly. Religion thus becomes through these political/social conflict
processes, and acts as a dynamic rather than static force.
In Bosnia, engaging religion in peacebuilding is highly varied, and those pushing
these efforts with the hope of increasing social cohesion face a number of barriers, which
in turn affect the way actors approach the religious peacebuilding work itself. Religious
peacebuilding actors often look to pull religion “to the side” for engagement
uncomplicated by politics, and yet are unable to have a positive socio-political ripple
effect due to this attempted extraction and treatment of religion as a primarily internal
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matter. Institutional approaches in particular become, perhaps inadvertently, guardians of
the status quo, preserving ethno-religious distinction, division, and bonding, while
speaking publicly of the need for bridging work, but failing to take the action on complex
political issues that is needed to see progress on bridging cohesion.
All of this points to the inherently socio-political nature of religion itself.
Religion can serve to uphold or resist the status quo, but it is never entirely apolitical,
particularly considering the way it is always shaped through socio-political processes.
The assumption that we see operating in Bosnia is that extracting religion from the
political is what is needed in order to build better relationships between religious
communities (and thereby contribute to peace). However, the reality is that religion was
made through politics, and thus extracting it now and expecting the change to come from
this remade form of inter-religious understanding ignores the past process by which it
was itself developed/shaped. I argue, then, that religion is inherently political and trying
to “treat” it in a way that isolates it from politics is unproductive (or, at times,
counterproductive indeed).
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Chapter 7: Integrated Findings and Discussion
In the last four chapters, I have provided individual assessments of how (and why)
religious peacebuilding efforts have contributed (or not) to building social cohesion in the
Lebanese and Bosnian contexts. This chapter analyzes those findings in tandem, and in
conversation with the larger theoretical framework of religious peacebuilding laid out in
Chapter Two. By looking at these case studies together, we have a richer understanding
of how a material religion perspective better explains the ups and downs of current and
previous efforts to engage religion in peacebuilding.
Drawing on the findings of my research, I argue for a shift in how we theorize
religion, conflict and peace. While the ambivalence thesis is an important component of
the field of religious peacebuilding, I argue that it is not sufficient in and of itself. We
need an additional dimension of analysis, specifically regarding whether religion works
to uphold or challenge the status quo, in order to conduct deep research about a given
context. This will additionally aid in better designing nuanced programmatic approaches
to engaging religion in peacebuilding work.
This chapter will first look at how several specific theoretical approaches shaped
the case study analyses. I will then examine several key comparative observations drawn
from the Lebanon and Bosnia case studies before laying out several key findings that
emerged from the case study analysis. Finally, I will outline more fully my proposed
theoretical shift in how we approach the analysis of religion, conflict and peacebuilding. I
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will demonstrate how this theoretical shift will have a pragmatic impact on policy
approaches when engaging religion in peacebuilding efforts.

Theoretical Considerations
I began this dissertation by laying out several theoretical approaches that would
anchor my approach and analysis of the country case studies under consideration in this
project. Specifically, I laid out theoretical approaches for how we conceptualize group
identity in conflict situations, how we think about religion, and how we assess the vague
notion of peace. I also examined the current state of religious peacebuilding theory,
which overlaps with the aforementioned theoretical areas, arguing that the current
theoretical approach to religious peacebuilding is useful, but it does not capture the
fullness of the realities on the ground in conflict scenarios with strong religious attributes.
I return to these theoretical approaches here in order to more clearly articulate how the
case study findings interact with the theories, and what these findings tell us about
religious peacebuilding more generally. This section will thus briefly examine the core
theoretical approaches at work in this dissertation, explaining how they helped in the case
study analysis.

Theorizing Group Identity in Conflict
Theorizing “groupness” is a critical component of any conflict analysis, as group
identities (and how they are perceived internally and externally) play heavily into how a
conflict progresses. In Chapter Two, I laid out Ashutosh Varshney’s theoretical approach
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to thinking about group identities in ethnic conflicts in particular. Varshney combines a
constructivist theory of ethnic identity (that group boundaries are constructed through
rhetorical and situational means, rather than being bounded), with an instrumentalist
theory of ethnic identity (that specific political actors utilize and aggravate group
boundaries and tensions in order to achieve particular ends). This hybrid theoretical
approach allows for an understanding of how group boundaries come to be more salient,
and gain a certain stickiness, at particular times. I argued that this extends to religious
group identities as well, which are often (as in the Lebanese and Bosnian cases)
intertwined with ethnic or political identities.
In chapter two, I also laid out Rogers Brubaker’s concept of groupness as an
event, rather than as an ontological reality. Brubaker’s focus on the event of groupness
helps to flesh out Varshney’s hybrid constructivist-instrumentalist theory, showing how
group identities have developed and morphed over time through specific instances of
encounter and socio-political change.
These theoretical approaches to group identities grounded my analysis of religiopolitical identities in both Lebanon and Bosnia. Both cases showed that group identities
and boundaries are porous and shift over time. The salience of religious identities rose
through particular historical events, and became especially critical in these contexts at the
end of the Ottoman Empire, as nationalistic or independence-seeking movements adopted
religious symbols and boundaries to advance their cause. During situations of conflict in
both contexts, there were often shifting alliances, and in Lebanon especially, there were
many moments when religious communal identities took a back seat to geographic or
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other ways of imagining group boundaries. External observers and actors played major
roles in defining or reifying group boundaries as well, as was seen in particular with
external narratives on Muslims in Bosnia and with European narratives on Maronites in
Lebanon, as I will further unpack later in this chapter. Finally, the intra-religious
dynamics that played out during situations of tension in particular show the ways in
which groupness is constantly being defined and re-defined from within and from
without. These findings on how group identities play out on the ground in Lebanon and
Bosnia can be extended to other case studies of religiously-framed conflict, helping
analysts and practitioners alike to approach religious group identities from a more
nuanced and complex perspective.

The Material Lens on Religion, Conflict and Peace
I outlined Manuel Vasquez’s material theory of religion in Chapter Two, arguing
that this theoretical approach to thinking about religion helps us both to better understand
the complex and varied roles religion plays in conflict (and vice-versa), and from there, to
better conceptualize the ways in which we might better think about engaging religion in
peacebuilding efforts. The crux of Vasquez’s theory is captured in the following
selection:
The sort of materialism I would like to advance approaches religion as the openended product of the discursive and nondiscursive practices of embodied
individuals, that is, individuals who exist in particular times and spaces. These
individuals are embedded in nature and culture, and drawing from and
conditioned by their ecological, biological, psychological, and sociocultural
resources, they construct multiple identities and practices, some of which come to
be designated, often through contestation, as religious at particular junctures. In
other words, a materialist approach is interested in the processes behind the
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naming and articulation of religion as relatively stable and patterned reality
recognized by both insiders and outsiders.591
Vasquez’ definition here points to a process approach (through the “discursive
and nondiscursive practices”) to understanding how religion comes to be and to take on
meaning in particular ways for particular contexts. Additionally, his definition points to
an embodied and emplaced approach to thinking about religion, which is shaped and
formed in specific places and times, often through processes of contestation (internally
and externally). This view of religion calls for the analyst to peel back the curtain of
what may appear to be stagnant religious identities and to look at how they came to be
thought of as such. Finally, Vasquez’s material approach to religion, as outlined in the
above quote, calls for a view of religion as multi-directional, shaping and being shaped
by embodied socio-political context. This is a shift from analyses of religion in conflict
that view religion as a source (from which violent or nonviolent interpretations can stem)
and see it instead as a dynamic, multi-directional conflict variable.
My case studies on Lebanon and Bosnia traced moments of groupness and sociopolitical circumstances that led to the formation and increased salience of religious group
boundaries for particular historical circumstances. The case studies also showed how
these boundaries, along with the content of religion, shifted over time (and continue to do
so), in response to socio-political realities on the ground. Additionally, I showed how
religion spanned far beyond the realm of belief in its development in these particular
contexts, and thus argued that religious peacebuilding efforts that focus only or primarily
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on belief will fall short of making social change, a point I will unpack further throughout
this chapter.

Social Cohesion and Peace
As articulated in the introductory sections of this dissertation, peace is a vague
concept in and of itself. While some think of it as the absence of violent conflict, most
would hope for much more than this. The absence of violence is only the beginning of
economic, social and political rebuilding processes. Indeed, Barbara Walter has shown
that, over the past half century, countries that have experienced civil war are more likely
than not to return to civil war after a peace agreement, with over 50% of countries
relapsing into war.592 This demonstrates that the move toward peace is not a smooth or
single-track process, and in some cases, the lack of effective post-conflict rebuilding (and
dealing with the underlying issues) keeps a country in a perpetual state of civil unrest.
We thus need concrete mechanisms in order to conceptualize and measure
sustainable peace in tangible and meaningful ways. For the purpose of this dissertation, I
employed the concept of social cohesion as a tool by which we can assess the state of
peace in Lebanon and Bosnia. I drew particularly on Joseph Chan, et. al., in assessing
social cohesion by looking at both horizontal (across-society) relationships and vertical
(state-society) relationships, combined with consideration of both formal and informal
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measures of these relationships. This approach informed my assessment guide
(Appendix A), which I used in my analysis of both case studies.
By utilizing this tool, I was able to analyze the state of social and political peace
in a more concrete and measurable way. Beyond the importance of having a tangible
assessment tool for thinking about peace, the social cohesion approach compels us to dig
beyond a surface-level view of peace as consensus and relative calm, and into the deeper,
underlying issues of justice and inequalities that are critical to maintaining peace in any
context. This informed how I analyzed the current state of religious engagement in
peacebuilding in both contexts, and it can be used in other contexts to more deeply
analyze how religion and religious actors impact peace by looking at religion in its
interactive and malleable nature within socio-political contexts.

Rethinking Religious Peacebuilding Theory
I argued in the beginning chapters of this dissertation that the current theoretical
approaches to religious peacebuilding are limited and in need of further revision and
development. I draw on Atalia Omer’s critique of how Scott Appleby’s important
ambivalence thesis has been applied, as she argues that,
the preoccupation with theological retrieval and appropriation precludes a
consideration of how historical contexts and interpretations of events from
multiple perspectives might, and perhaps even should, challenge and transform
religious traditions and political ideologies.593
Omer is referring here to the ways in which religious peacebuilding approaches
tend to prioritize and essentialize the internal and ideological aspects of religion. Current
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theoretical approaches to religious peacebuilding often focus on religion as a unidirectional source, rather than something that is shaped by socio-political context.
Additionally, current religious peacebuilding theory hones in on violent and non-violent
teachings and actions, often leaving aside the ways in which justice and inequalities come
into play.
In the last part of this chapter, I will argue for a particular theoretical shift in the
ambivalence thesis that allows for a more holistic view of the way religion interacts with
conflict and peace in various settings- a shift informed by my own case analyses in
Bosnia and Lebanon. Specifically, I will argue that a full analysis of religious
ambivalence must include careful attention to how religious expressions work to uphold
or challenge the status quo. This theoretical shift allows for a more complex analysis of
how religion is interacting with other factors in a conflict scenario, thus identifying more
useful entry points for practitioners seeking to impact how religious actors are
contributing to peace for the long-term.

Lebanon and Bosnia in Perspective
Bosnia and Lebanon are distinct contexts, which is part of what makes them
interesting for comparison. While they share several historical commonalities, outlined
below, they also diverge from one another in important ways, contributing to different
outcomes in the current relationship between religion and social cohesion in each context.
In this section, I will unpack three key comparative areas that emerged from the study:
the shift in both contexts of former neighbors becoming enemies, their experiences under
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Ottoman control, and the state-society relationships when it comes to how religion is
lived out and understood between private and public spheres.

From Neighbors to Enemies
While certainly, as the historical surveys demonstrate, there were numerous
moments of tension, boundary-hardening, and politicization of religious identities, in
both Lebanon and Bosnia, people of different religious backgrounds lived in close
proximity to one another and had generally positive “quotidian” relationships prior to the
recent wars. When the wars began, this quickly shifted, though not in hard-and-fast ways
along religious lines. In Bosnia, for example, recall that one respondent reported his own
former neighbors as his captors in a war camp in his hometown. Conflict “sides” were
consistently shifting in both cases, with different militant groups aligning with one
another in different places. In Lebanon, this constant shifting of “sides” was even more
prevalent, with mixed-sect neighborhoods fighting against other mixed-sect
neighborhoods at various points during the course of the 15-year civil war.
These realities in both contexts challenge a vision of religious wars as somehow
manifesting ancient or inevitable enmities between groups. Group boundaries, and the
socio-political meaning thereof, shifted over time, and it was only at particular historical
junctures that these boundaries hardened and translated into conflictive factions.
Religious identities came to mean something different when entrepreneurs of war
manipulated them, but these “moments of groupness” contributed to a stickiness of these
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boundaries (though still, and always, malleable in important ways), as they became
institutionalized through political and social infrastructures.
The positive quotidian relationships that both Bosnians and Lebanese report from
the pre-war days are now much more difficult to find, as the logic of war has been
mapped onto society and politics in ways that perpetuate distance. Thus, while both
contexts are post-war, it is difficult to call either of them post-conflict.

Ottoman Effects
Both Lebanon and Bosnia were part of the Ottoman Empire, and thus, legacies
from the Ottoman era carried into conflict dynamics, and I would argue, into the present
socio-political dynamics in both contexts. The millet system, as discussed in further
depth in each case study chapter, made religious identities a key form of social
organization under Ottoman rule, and thus contributed to the boundedness and sociopolitical meaning of (primarily Abrahamic) religious communities in each context.
Additionally, this system vested religious authorities and institutions with significant
amounts of control over, and representation of, their people. In both contexts, this laid
important groundwork for the later politicization of ethno-religious identities, as they
already had the experience of being a key unit of socio-political infrastructure.
Lebanon was more geographically central to the Ottoman Empire than was
Bosnia, although Mount Lebanon, like Bosnia, existed as a peripheral region during
much of the Empire’s duration, meaning that Ottoman authorities granted local
governance much autonomy, and there was less oversight over the lives (religious and
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otherwise) of those living in these regions. Bosnia was considered a trade crossroads,
highly important economically for the Ottoman Empire, as well as symbolically, as a
European front. From a European perspective, both Bosnia and Lebanon were seen as
“borderlands” of sorts, as meeting points between Christian Europe and the Muslim
Ottoman Empire. As borderlands, there was much interaction between different peoples
and cultures, and less direct oversight from religious or government authorities, at least at
certain times.
Additionally, under the Ottomans, Christian institutions and elites in particular
benefitted from being vested with certain amounts of control over their constituents,
collecting taxes and speaking on behalf of their “flock.” While lived religion often did
not reflect these divisions or the boundedness by which the institutions were treated, the
administrative treatment of the Christian minorities as bounded communities laid
important groundwork in both contexts for communal identities and institutional religious
representation.
While the Ottoman experiences in Lebanon and Bosnia had a number of
similarities, the post-Ottoman experiences were vastly different in these two contexts.
Ottoman decline came with economic depression and new forms of class-based and
nationalist mobilization. While Lebanon came under the French Mandate, thus
interacting with European powers while pursuing, and eventually achieving,
independence, Bosnia was part of the multiple Yugoslav experiments. The French
Mandate in Lebanon dealt with residents through religious and sectarian identities, while
in Yugoslavia, religious and ethnic identities were played down by the state. The final
268

version of Yugoslavia, Socialist Yugoslavia, in particular shaped the way in which
religion and state interacted, as well as the way religion was lived out in society.

Religion Between Private and Public Spheres
A key difference between how religion in Bosnia and religion in Lebanon
manifested just before and during the recent wars is the public and private ways it was
lived out differently in each context. Under Socialist Yugoslavia, Bosnia had freedom of
religion, but public expressions of religion were strongly discouraged, and religion was
not welcomed into the state infrastructure. This differs from the Lebanese experience,
where religious communities were built squarely into the political and social structures
through the National Pact and the 1923 Constitution.
In present-day Lebanon and Bosnia, there are similarities in the ways that political
appointments are allocated based on religio-ethnic or sectarian group, and the electoral
system reflects that accordingly, but religious belonging is much more integrated into the
social life of Lebanese than it is of Bosnians. The Lebanese personal status legal system,
controlled by religious courts, and the mandate to belong to a recognized sect and have it
reflected on one’s ID card are two key examples of how religion is integrated more fully
into the public life of Lebanese. In both contexts, national identity is reflective of
religious difference, with different ethno-religious groups (in the case of Bosnia) and
sects (in the case of Lebanon) being clearly identified in the founding documents and
peace accords, which is in turn reflected in the political infrastructures as mentioned
above. In each context, then, bonding cohesion (within sects or ethno-religious groups,
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or within particular localities) outweighs bridging cohesion, reflecting the way in which
the state supports in-group cohesion over making strides toward more inclusive national
identities and modes of belonging.
The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) data show that both Lebanon
and Bosnia have fairly low levels of government regulation of religion (4.9/10 and
3.7/10, respectively), although I would argue that the number here for Lebanon fails to
take into account the ways in which government vests religious institutions with more
control and thus does indeed exert control over religion, but not directly since the
institutions act as a filter. Both states determine what can and cannot be considered an
official religion, exerting state control of religious institutions and representation in that
way. In both cases, the social regulation of religion (referring to the ways in which
societal forces restrict and constrain free religious practice) are higher, with Bosnia
coming it at 5.6/10 and Lebanon coming in at a very high 9.3/10, meaning that this
measure shows that Lebanese society places very strong and restrictive constraints on the
freedom of religion.
Overall, Lebanon and Bosnia share some important commonalities in their
histories as mixed religious societies that were under Ottoman control, but they diverge in
important ways, including the private-public treatment of religion in the post-Ottoman
era. The integrated findings from the case studies reflect both these shared and divergent
socio-political and historical realities. The findings from these two cases, while specific
to the particular contexts in certain ways, also point to broader issues that are shared by
other cases of religiously-framed conflict. The malleable, process-theory approach to
270

understanding how and why religious identity becomes politically meaningful in
particular ways at particular times is a finding that is true across a broad spectrum of
cases. Additionally, the ways in which states, as well as social institutions, have asserted
certain types of control over religious identity and expression, both historically and into
the present, clearly factors into the political and social meanings of religious identities- a
finding that crosses geographic boundaries as well, providing a more generalizable frame
of analysis. Overall, the findings from Lebanon and Bosnia have implications well
beyond the borders of these two nations.

Integrated Findings
In this section, I articulate the key findings drawn from examining the Bosnia and
Lebanon case studies in comparative context. Commonalities in the cases lead to some
contingent generalizations that would likely apply in other conflict contexts, while certain
case specificities are also noted.
Both Bosnia and Lebanon illustrate how religion is a multi-dimensional and
multi-directional conflict variable. It interacts with other aspects of social and political
life, and it is indeed shaped by socio-political historical processes and events. It is thus
not a static (if malleable) variable exerting effects on social and political life in a
unidirectional way (with religion as the derivative, for instance, promoting either
violence or peace in society). Instead, what it means to be religious in each of these
contexts changed over time, particularly as religious symbols and institutions were
strategically targeted and employed throughout times of conflict, and then these new
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forms in turn affected the ways that social and political dynamics played out, including in
conflict scenarios. This demonstrates the inherently socio-political nature of religion
itself, as a reality shaped through context rather than existing in a space somehow apart
from the political and social realities in which it is developed. Thus, trying to “extract
religion from politics” or find apolitical sources of religion is a futile exercise. Religion
thus took on new meaning for identity, and itself gained new content, throughout times of
war (and the lead up to conflict) in both contexts. For example, as was seen in the case
study chapters, the politics of institutional reforms at the end of the Ottoman era helped to
shift the meaning of religious identity by prioritizing it within political and social
institutions and structures. Additionally, the emergence of a Muslim ethnic identity in
Bosnia was part of this interactive process, as was the increased salience of Maronite
identity under the French Mandate in Lebanon, and both processes reshaped the meaning
of religious identity in the war and post-war phases.594
Intra-religious dynamics are critical. We see in both cases that tensions within
religious communities often precede and exist simultaneously to tensions between
religious communities. These rivalries are apparent in both Lebanon and Bosnia now and
historically, with numerous examples in both cases. Group elites carefully curate
boundaries and crack down on internal dissent (as was in the case of individual Serbs
resisting extreme Serbian nationalism during the war). This leads to a marginalization of
fringe or border elements of religious identity and practice, prioritizing and curating the
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“mainstream” way of being religious from both inside and outside perspectives. This
also has implications for who is seen as an appropriate or accurate representative of the
religious community- again, often marginalizing voices of dissent or difference within
religious communities themselves. Thus, paying attention to these internal diversities and
conflicts is as critical, if not more so, than examining that of conflict between seemingly
bounded groups.
While religion is always lived and developed in local contexts, it is impossible to
extract local experiences and understandings of religion from the broader global
context. A feature of religion, at least in the contexts of Lebanon and Bosnia, is that it
has global connections and reach. The dominant religious communities in each context,
which primarily include sects of Christianity and Islam, have connections to the more
broad global religious communities (as “world religions”) and also, most have
connections with institutional sectarian structures that span beyond the borders of the
state. For instance, the Sunni community in Lebanon engages with regional Sunni
institutions, while the Serbian Orthodox community in Bosnia answers to institutional
elites in Belgrade. The role that the French in particular played in supporting and
influencing the Maronite community in Lebanon (seen as a “Christian enclave”) prior to
and during the French Mandate had important implications for how this community
understood itself in relation to religious Others in the region. International responses and
rhetoric shaped and reified the religious lenses through which conflict was articulated and
carried out, most notable in the case of how international observers prioritized the
Muslim identity of Bosnians during the war in that context. Christian-Islamic
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civilizational narratives were prevalent in describing conflict during the lead-up to wars
in both Bosnia and Lebanon, and current regional and global narratives of religious
conflict (between Sunni and Shia, between Christians and Muslims, etc.) have very real
impacts on the way local relational dynamics are interpreted and lived out. Thus, all
religion may be local, but it is never only so.
Despite the prevalence of religious and other peacebuilding work, social
cohesion in each context remains dismal. In each context, there is a plethora of
peacebuilding work underway, from top-down and bottom-up approaches, involving
government, non-government and international/bilateral actors, and engaging religious
institutions and identities in a variety of ways. There is no shortage of effort, and yet,
both vertical and horizontal measures of social cohesion are highly negative. Both
Lebanon and Bosnia reveals a lack of social trust (horizontal), as well as widespread lack
of trust in the government (vertical). Successful programs, evaluated on small scales, are
not leading to systemic change. My case study analysis reveals some of the key barriers
and the problematic approaches at work that keep things stagnant, all of which I will not
repeat here, but the key finding that emerged in both cases is that religious institutional
leadership is tied up with the state (more so in Lebanon than in Bosnia, but nevertheless,
a reality in both) and thus have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. In order to
maintain the current national order, bonding cohesion is required, at the expense of
bridging cohesion. This is seen in the way the political and electoral infrastructure relies
upon ethno-religious or sectarian group boundedness and identification.
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Embodied separation, through geography, schooling, and the political system,
works in both Bosnia and Lebanon against attempts to bring people together. This
includes the homogenization and decentralization of Lebanese social geography, a trend
seen in Bosnia as well. Embodied separation goes hand in hand with the presence of
stagnant peace agreements. In both contexts, many have referred to the peace agreements
as “frozen” and unfulfilled. They put in place a status quo that, according to the
agreements themselves, was supposed to change over time, but instead has become
stagnant. Several noted that the Ta’if established “peace” without dealing with the
underlying causes of the war. This has been accompanied by institutionalized and
corporate/communal politics around religious identity, built into the national identity and
into political institutions and structures. In Lebanon in particular, sectarianism is
inscribed into most aspects of life, and access to the state and to numerous services is
filtered through communal belonging, rather than stemming from individual citizenship.
Without addressing these institutional challenges, and without addressing persistent
inequalities and injustices, peacebuilding limited in ability to have impact.
In each context, different peacebuilding actors demonstrated commitments to
different ultimate goals, revealing a diversity of approaches to what peace means and
looks like. Both contexts revealed a plethora of initiatives and approaches to engaging
religion in building peace. While some approaches were complementary, others had
competing goals. The main dividing line in both contexts was that some actors
(particularly those coming from the grassroots) are working to change the system in some
way (and emphasize equality and justice), while others (particularly those with state or
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institutional ties) are working to maintain a sense of unity and consensus, which served to
uphold the status quo. This harkens back to the typology of religion that Bruce Lincoln
offers, outlined in Chapter Two, including religions of resistance, status quo, and
revolution. Religious expression can certainly move between these types of engagement
with the broader societal structures, but religious engagement in peacebuilding in both
contexts demonstrated a divide between those seeking to uphold the status quo and those
looking to dismantle it in some significant way, thus revealing an important fissure in
work.
There is a lack of connection between local and national efforts. While both
top-down, nationally focused efforts and bottom-up, locally centered efforts exist in large
numbers in Bosnia and in Lebanon, there is a large disconnect between them. Locally
centered efforts are often more successful in creating cohesion at the local levels, but
struggle to have any ripple-out effect, while national efforts may have the scale, but lack
the rootedness in local contexts and thus often fail to have the desired effects. Thus, we
see a continuation of bonding cohesion but a lack of bridging cohesion that is widespread
in any way. Additionally, both case studies revealed some differences and tensions
between top-down and bottom up approaches to building peace. Many working on the
grassroots level expressed skepticism about the authenticity and impact of nationallydriven efforts, particularly considering those led by international organizations like the
United Nations. Those involved in national peacebuilding platforms expressed a lack of
confidence in locally-focused efforts, which might have the ability to make real change in
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small localities, but this change will be eroded by national and systemic trends if they are
not addressed.
In Lebanon in particular, but in Bosnia in some instances as well, overt
religious violence serves as a distraction from deeper, root-cause work. Lebanese
NGOs and peacebuilding actors reported that much of their work now focuses on dealing
with the immediate and urgent threat of extremist violence, particularly on the border
with Syria. This tracks with a shift in international funding structures as well, which
prioritize a focus on overt violence over other, less visible kinds (?). While part of this is
about urgency and scale, it reflects a general downfall in religious peacebuilding
approaches, which on the whole tend to pay attention to the more obvious forms of
violence (including extremism in particular), while glossing over some of the structural
violence that lies below the surface. This created a cycle of sorts, as overt violence
continues cropping up, in part because the underlying issues of inequality and injustice
are left untended. This is one of the key reasons I argue for a shift in our theoretical
approach to religion and conflict analysis to include not only analysis of how religion is
promoting violence or peace, but how it is- in various ways- upholding or challenging the
socio-political status quo.
Much of the work to explicitly engage religion in peacebuilding efforts takes a
ideological approach. Through inter-religious dialogues, the production of texts aimed
at promoting peaceful interpretations of religion, and the work on sermons and public
religious messaging, there is a very heavy emphasis in this field on religion in the realm
of beliefs and ideas (ideology and theology). Much of the actual programming of
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religious peacebuilding initiatives involves curating or influencing sermons and religious
texts, dialogues about beliefs between believers at various levels (institutional and
grassroots; clergy and laity), and other similar efforts focused on engaging or influencing
beliefs or ideas. This constrains the impact of these efforts, since they often fail to
consider religion within the broader context of socio-political life. By limiting religion to
ideology, the material ways in which religious identity and meaning in each context was
produced, and thus the way it is now lived out in private and public life, are left to the
side. This is intricately connected to the next point, as a focus on religious beliefs over
other aspects of religious identity can lead to attempts to isolate or extract religion from
the broader conflict arena.
Paired with the ideological emphasis within religious peacebuilding work, there
is also a tendency to try to extract religion from the conflict, treating it as a separate
conflict factor that can be dealt with in isolation. This includes efforts to isolate and
“extract” religion from the broader socio-political context to deal only with religious
concepts and issues in religious peacebuilding settings. Several respondents in both cases
spoke about the need to protect religion from politicians, which for many, led to a desire
to deal with religion outside of the political realm. This extraction of religion from
politics in particular is seen in the efforts of the institutional and clerical leadership in
both contexts. Respondents from both the National Committee for Christian-Muslim
Dialogue in Lebanon and the Interreligious Council in Bosnia spoke of the importance of
staying away from politics in their engagements and work in order to not “rock the boat.”
They noted the importance of staying on consensus issues and sending “messages of
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peace” from their platforms without getting into controversial politics. While certainly
this makes sense if the goal is to maintain unity and consensus between these particular
actors, it makes it very difficult for religious peacebuilding efforts to have any impact on
the broader socio-political dynamics, particularly if we accept that systemic and
institutional changes are needed for social cohesion to improve in both countries. As Ina
Merdjanova argues in her assessment of religious peacebuilding in the Balkans, a
repoliticization of interreligious dialogue for peacebuilding is needed if it is going to
maintain a goal of attaining peace.595
Religious leaders and institutions do indeed play important roles and have clout
in these post-conflict settings. However, we need to unpack and situate what those
roles are- they’re not good at everything, and approaches to engaging religion in
peacebuilding need to take nuance into account here. Institutional religious actors have
been very successful in helping to bring about peace agreements, in building consensus,
and in quelling overt violence. The Interreligious Council in Bosnia, for example, played
a key role in helping to maintain peace initially and working to collaborate with the
government to ensure inclusion of all religious communities in institutional structures.
The high-level interreligious bodies in Lebanon also played and important role in the
Ta’if, as well as continuing to help in quelling outbreaks of violence in the country.
These efforts have been far less successful in these contexts at helping to cultivate social
cohesion more broadly, particularly if they benefit from or have interest in maintaining
the status quo. This is both a reflection of the scope of their influence and impact, but it
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also reflects the very real ways in which religious leaders and institutions in both Bosnia
and Lebanon are benefitting from division between religious communities in a certain
way, and thus prefer to stay in preservation mode. The political posturing of religious
leaders was a common theme in the case studies, and a sense that the religious leaders
and institutions indeed reinforce the logic of ethno-nationalism (in Bosnia) or
sectarianism (in Lebanon). This reveals a key paradox for religious peacebuilding. A
certain level of bonding cohesion is needed to maintain control over these constituencies,
and religious elites in these contexts benefit from moderate levels of boundarymaintenance. In Lebanon in particular, the financial benefits for religious elites are very
real, and in both contexts, maintaining a national vision that gives rights to religious
communities as such is of interest to religious institutional elites.
An area for further study is the impact of peacebuilding efforts on resilience.
There are many ways in which the plethora of peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots
level in particular have more to do with community and individual resilience than they do
with making a direct, measurable impact on social cohesion more broadly. This emerged
as a key finding in both studies, as I spoke with numerous grassroots actors who do not
necessarily believe they are making a broad impact, and some even assert that they are
not trying to, but rather are concerned with helping themselves and those around them
resist the status quo in small ways through their efforts. In Lebanon, there was a
pronounced cynicism among religious peacebuilding actors in particular, but this was
paired with a commitment to continue the work out of necessity- respondents spoke to a
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lack of viable alternatives. Thus, further research might examine the ways in which these
efforts are sources of resilience for an otherwise frustrated and cynical population.

Summary
Religion is multi-dimensional, multi-directional conflict variable that is impacted
by (and exerts impact on) external and internal factors and dynamics. Social cohesion
remains dismal, and this is in part because of continued stagnant peace accords that put in
place what were meant to be temporary structures that have instead become permanent,
crystalizing group belonging and difference into the fabric of state and society. Across
the board, those “engaging religion” in peacebuilding tend to prioritize ideology and treat
religion as something that can and should be extracted from the political. Religious elites
and institutions in particular demonstrate a propensity toward preservation of the status
quo. Some of this is intentional, seen in religious elites jointly opposing certain moves to
make institutional change. Other modes of this are less overt, as elites articulate a desire
to preserve consensus and to do so, must avoid controversial political and social issues,
shielding their work from extensive engagement on injustice and inequalities.
While grassroots work that engages religion in peacebuilding does not often take
this same consensus-oriented approach, reach of this work is limited by the institutional
structures, and there is still a tendency to treat religion in an ideological and extractive
manner. Additionally, extremism and overt violence serve as strong distractions across
the board, consistently pulling funding and attention from root-cause issues. Thus, while
messages of peace from religious elites are helpful in quelling overt violence, underlying
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injustices and inequalities often remain untouched, leading to low levels of social
cohesion and an increased likelihood of violent responses to injustices.

Shifting Religious Peacebuilding Theory
In both Bosnia and Lebanon, as argued in the case studies and reiterated above,
religious institutions and elites are often working to maintain consensus and, in turn, the
socio-political status quo. This is many times in conflict with grassroots peacebuilding
actors, who are working for systemic or institutional change. I am arguing that this
reality on the ground in many places calls for a shift in how scholars and practitioners
theorize religion, conflict and peace.
The religious engagement in these contexts reflects a simplified application of the
ambivalence thesis. While the ambivalence thesis that anchors much religious
peacebuilding theory is right when it comes to malleability of religion and the need to
avoid essentializing (whether it be as violent or peaceful), it doesn’t account for the
multidirectional ways in which religion is also shaped by socio-political context; it is not
only itself a source factors. Additionally, the current ambivalence thesis tends to be seen
as one-dimensional and highly ideologically focused (Diagram 1).

Diagram 1
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The assumption, given this approach, is that moving religious expression along
this spectrum (toward promoting peace) will result in better outcomes. However, even in
contexts like Lebanon and Bosnia where we do indeed see religious leaders and
institutions often speaking up for peace and nonviolence, we still do not see social
cohesion improve. Of course, as asserted in this study, this is due to a multiplicity of
factors. However, I argue that adding another dimension to this theoretical approach can
aid in a more holistic approach to theorizing religion in conflict and peacebuilding. This
added dimension is to consider whether religious actors are upholding or challenging the
socio-political status quo (Diagram 2). They can do this violently or peacefully, but
regardless, it is a critical dimension of how religious actors are situated in various
contexts.

Diagram 2
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Adding this dimension (of upholding vs. challenging the status quo) complexities
how we see religion showing up and exerting influence in conflict situations, and more
fully accounts for how socio-political context is also shaping religious identities and
expression. Additionally, this adds the justice dimension, which helps in assessing if and
how religion can contribute, or is contributing (or not), to improving social cohesion.
This also accounts for religion beyond the ideological, looking at socio-political action
and engagement in a more complete way. Overall, this revised theoretical approach, the
need for which I derive from my case study analysis, will aid in both theory and practice
when it comes to engaging religion in order to advance peace.

Conclusion
Examining the Lebanon and Bosnia cases in comparative context demonstrates
the need to refine religious peacebuilding, in theory and practice, if it is going to make
more progress in advancing social cohesion. This study reveals a key paradox in
religious institutional and elite involvement in peacebuilding efforts, as elites have
developed a stake in preserving the status quo and prioritizing consensus, while often
leaving aside issues of justice and inequality that continue to perpetuate horizontal and
vertical distrust and, at times, lead to more overt violence. A simplified ambivalence
thesis approach to religious peacebuilding would likely miss this paradox, as the focus on
ideology and the promotion of peace messages would lead one to believe that religious
peacebuilding is doing its work effectively in these contexts. However, the added
dimension of whether or not a religious actor is working to uphold or challenge the status
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quo allows for a fuller view of how socio-political contexts shape and are shaped by
religion, and how justice and inequalities play into the context and the work of those
engaging religion in peacebuilding efforts.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: Beyond Kumbaya- Materially Engagement of Religion in
Peacebuilding for a Better Future
This dissertation set out to utilize a material theory of religion in analyzing
practices of engaging religion in peacebuilding efforts in Lebanon and BosniaHerzegovina. By looking at religion, conflict and peacebuilding in these particular
contexts through this lens, we are able to see how religion interacts with conflict in a
dynamic fashion, as it shapes and is shaped by conflict situations. Religion is thus
produced through these processes, as much as- or more than- it exerts influence on the
nature of conflict itself. Religion is also ambivalent in a variety of ways- not only in
terms of peaceful or violent interpretations of traditions, but also in how it seeks to either
uphold or challenge certain status quos. Indeed, as I argued in the last chapter, this second
form of ambivalence is critical to understanding and engaging religious actors in
situations of conflict, if the goal is social cohesion.
Religious engagement, particularly in contexts where religious symbols and
identities were heavily invoked within situations of violence, is critical, and yet, it has not
to date produced the results one would like to see in either Bosnia-Herzegovina or in
Lebanon. This does not mean, however, that religious engagement should therefore be
abandoned. It is both essential to, and can be helpful in, situations of post-conflict
rebuilding, if it is engaged thoughtfully and effectively. Rather than abandoning religious
engagement for lack of desired results, scholars and practitioners alike need to instead
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rethink and refine how religion is imagined and invoked in conflict mitigation and
peacebuilding scenarios.
This shift involves going beyond exclusively internal notions of religion, which
drive highly belief-focused interventions, and also avoiding overstating group identities
and boundaries, which as we have seen are highly malleable and contingent.
The findings specific to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon in this dissertation
have important implications well beyond these contexts. In particular, these findings can
speak into other deeply divided societies in which power-sharing arrangements are
considered in bringing about political peace agreements. This field of research will only
become more relevant, if the Pew numbers on religious conflict hold true and if we
continue to see trends toward intra-state and non-state actors being the primary locus of
conflicts into the middle and latter parts of the 21st century.
In deeply divided societies, which entail societies in which multiple religious,
ethnic, or otherwise identified groups are vying for political and social representation,
any resolutions or peace agreements will be followed by the large task of rebuilding
social cohesion where it has been eroded. In situations where religion is a key factor,
effective post-conflict engagement must pay careful attention to the ways that
institutional structures can aid or inhibit social cohesion. This involves finding ways to
incentivize cooperation and the public expression of multiple forms of identity.
Additionally, it will comprise taking care not to over-prioritize stability at the expense of
long-term cohesion, which entails socio-political justice and equality for both
communities and individuals. Peace treaties, and the role of religious leaders or
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communities therein, must be seen, then, as a first step, rather than expecting them to
bear out long-term solutions on their own. Indeed, we have seen in the case studies at
hand that this approach produces a stale status-quo, further entrenching a lack of social
cohesion.
One might take Syria, for example: a conflict that has gone on for over six years,
and in the course of this time, has produced new forms of religious identity and
community affiliations that were not present or meaningful at the start of the uprisings.
Any post-conflict peace-building efforts in Syria are going to have to take these new
forms of religious identity and meaning into account. However, a narrow focus on
peaceful versus violent understandings of religion will not be fruitful in producing a new
and inclusive society. Simply focusing on the most overt forms of violence, while
ignoring the structural violence that has been present throughout, will only seed future
unrest. Power-sharing arrangements that see stability as the ultimate goal will not be
sustainable long-term, and silencing the voices and grievances of those on the margins of
any of the identity groups at play will only lead to more conflict down the road.
In the Syrian context, any attempts to extract religion from the political and to
build peace by putting different religious groups in dialogue with one another- without
engaging with the larger socio-political context and questions of justice- will produce the
same stagnancy we have seen in Lebanon. Paying attention to the ways in which religious
elites and institutions have been, or will become, tied up in the maintenance of certain
unjust status quo realities, will be especially critical for those hoping to engage religion in
promoting long-term peace.
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While the findings from this dissertation are most applicable in other deeply
divided contexts, such as Syria, there is certainly also specific relevance for other
contexts that do not fit this pattern. Indeed, this study has important implications for how
religion is conceptualized and employed in global Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
policies. Many CVE policies focus nearly completely on Islamic extremism, often
overlooking the other forms of extremism bearing religious credentials, and they tend to
take up a one-dimensional approach to religion and violence, designing programs to
“moderate” religious teachings and beliefs in order to combat the spread of violent
extremism. They most often fail to look at the other dimension of religion & violence that
I argue for in this study, namely, how religion is used to either challenge or uphold the
status quo. CVE programs therefore prioritize the “moderate” elite religious voices, often
ignoring the institutional baggage with which they come. Using the approach laid out in
this dissertation, those engaged in CVE design can more fully situate the rise in violent
extremism in certain contexts, and thus will be better equipped to address it at the root,
rather than simply at the surface.
There are, of course, limitations to a study like this in and of itself, and to its
implications for other contexts. For this study, there were, of course, many other
respondents and programmatic efforts in each context that I was not able to include due
to logistical constraints. This means that there are certainly perspectives and initiatives
that were not taken into account in this research. Rather than being a comprehensive
assessment of each context, this dissertation provides a snapshot, and analyzes this
snapshot accordingly. Additionally, religion in each society develops in very context289

specific ways, making it difficult to assess direct causal connections to certain similar
outcomes in two different contexts. There are always a multiplicity of internal and
external factors at work hindering or enabling social cohesion. Thus, this study is not able
to make social scientific predictions as such, but rather, points to trends and tendencies
within two different contexts with contingent generalizations.
The battle at Maaloula detailed in the opening of this dissertation shows both the
complexity of identifying and pulling out religious threads of a larger situation of sociopolitical unrest, as well as the ways in which the narratives told- internally and
externally- about the role of religion in any conflict has a strong impact on the way that
conflict unfolds. The default assumption of religious or cultural wars or animosities
pervades public opinion as well as global policy, and those engaged in conflict mitigation
and peacebuilding work have an uphill battle to displace these default modes of thinking
and reacting. However, the plethora of religiously-engaged peacebuilding work over the
past decade and beyond has also produced a growing body of knowledge that, if we
approach it thoughtfully and analytically, will aid in the development of more fruitful
engagement into the future, where we are going to need it. Rather than seeing religious
peacebuilding as “supplemental,”596 bracketing religion as belief and extracting it from a
historicized socio-political context, those in the business of religious peacebuilding
should thus expand the scope of how religion can contribute in meaningful ways to the
broader efforts of building peace.
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Appendix: Religion & Social Cohesion Assessment Guide
This assessment framework guide assesses the various dimensions of religious
engagement in national and social conflict dynamics and peacebuilding efforts.
Additionally, the guide assesses factors that span beyond explicitly religious ones
because religious factors necessarily overlap and interact with other socio-political
conflict dynamics. This guide, then, demonstrates these overlaps and interactions,
shedding light on the specific ways in which religion impacts, and is impacted by, other
socio-political dynamics related to conflict and peacebuilding.

1.

Religion in National Identity
n What is the nature of national identity, and how inclusive is it of various
religious identities? Is it a particular ethno-religious identity? What
percentage of the state population fits this identity category?
n Have past leaders instituted direct “nation building”597 policies and reforms?
How far back? And if so, were they successful in generating a more cohesive
national identity, inclusive of religious identity groups?598
n Is there a higher degree of ethnic nationalism or civic nationalism599 (are
rights based on ethnicity or rights based on citizenship)? Or are identities

597

Edward Miguel, “Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania,”
World Politics 56 (April 2004), 327-62.
598
Include an analysis of how I or others are defining success for the particular context.
599
The “Barometers” are useful sources of data related to citizenship and identity. For example, see:
http://www.afrobarometer-online-analysis.com/aj/AJBrowserAB.jsp
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principally ethnic, religious or otherwise, with no real sense of nationalism?
Does the national identity map onto the state’s borders?
n Is political participation inclusive? That is, can all groups of society equally
participate in elections and politics? If not, which groups have restricted
participation, and in what ways?
n What is the official way in which religion is reflected in the national identity
(established religion vs. passive or aggressive secular state identity, etc.)?600
n What are the state’s policies vis-à-vis freedom of religious belief?601
Religious expression in the public square or state-controlled spaces?
n What is the state’s level of state control over religious practice, expression, or
institutions? Does it differ from religion to religion?
n Are there constitutional restrictions on who can vote or run for office, based
on religious identity? 602
n How deeply are religious divisions institutionalized within the state
apparatus?
n To what degree have ethnic or religious identities become interrelated with a
conceptualization of the “nation” and the state?603 Do religious and ethnic

600

Drawing on typologies from Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policy toward Religion: The United
States, France and Turkey, (Cambridge: Columbia University Press, 2009); others.
601
Freedom House indicators; Fox, Jonathan, and Yasemin Akbaba "Restrictions on the Religious Practices
of Religious Minorities: A Global Survey." Political Studies (2014).
602
Conflict dynamic: formal electoral rules shape how much it costs to vote or run in an election, which
might exclude some groups from active participation in the political process.
603
David Little, “Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance,” in Between Terror and Tolerance: Religious
Leaders, Conflict, and Peacemaking, ed. Timothy Sisk (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2011).
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ideals in the country tend to inform more constructive or more destructive
forms of nationalism?
n Are religious groups highly concentrated within particular geographic areas,
or are they dispersed across the state within various areas?
n To what extent, and in what ways, do state institutions shape the actions of
religious or sectarian elites? To what extent do elites shape state institutions’
actions?604 To what extent do formal state institutions constrain or enable
interactions that create exclusion or cohesion?
n Do marginalized ethnic groups have venues605 through which to voice
grievances? If so, to what extent are such grievances actually addressed?
n What is the nature of the current political discourse606 around “social
cohesion” and nationalism in the case? According to leaders and party
rhetoric, who will and will not be part of the developing “nation”?

2. Religion in Social Dynamics
n What can be said about the general nature of social cohesion in the country
under consideration?
n Are there spillover effects from other conflict or fragile environments in the
region? Are there ameliorative effects from other strong environments?

604

Include a mapping of who these elites are.
Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2007).
606
Vanessa Barolsky, “‘A Better Life for All’, Social Cohesion and the Governance of Life in PostApartheid South Africa,” Social Dynamics 38, no. 1 (2012): 134–51.
605
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n How do regional or international expressions of religion, or religious
networks, impact articulation of religious identities or values in the local
context at hand? Are some bigger players in this process than others (i.e., are
certain religions/communities are over- or underrepresented in this process,
and if so, which ones and how)?
n Is there evidence of a recent process through which there has been “invention
of enmity” among competing ethnic or religious groups?607 Or, are there “long
antagonisms” and “ancient hatreds” among ethno-religious groups? Or, are
there new forms of “modern hatreds”608 emerging due to political or economic
change?
n How do the actors define stories of “historical injustice”609 among religious or
ethnic groups? Are there particular historical injustices that groups believe
have never been reconciled? What narratives of the past do various groups
tell: of better or worse intercommunal relations?
n How significant is religious difference in relation to other identity-based
cleavages in this particular context?
n What are the dominant political narratives? Do they involve “hate speech,”610
religious or ethnics stereotyping or propaganda?

607

David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (United States Institute of Peace, 1993). See also, E. J.
Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition, Past and Present Publications (New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
608
Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Cornell Studies in Security
Affairs (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001).
609
David Carment, “The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory,”
Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 2 (May 1, 1993): 137–50.
610
Glaeser, “The Political Economy of Hatred.”
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n To what extent do religious groups active in the conflict or public space fit
into a minimalist or maximalist expression of religious commitment?611
n To what extent do religious groups active in the public space fit into Bruce
Lincoln’s typology of Religions of the Status Quo, Religions of Resistance, or
Religions of Revolution?612
n To what extend do religious demographics overlap with economic disparities
and other measures of inequality? To what extent is there a sense of “relative
deprivation”613 among religious groups across the economic landscape?
n To what extend are faith-based organizations or religious institutions engaged
in providing social services, rather than the state?
n What are the conclusions of social surveys or other attitudinal studies on
measures such as social distance and social trust, particularly along religious
identity lines?
n Is there evidence of strong, voluntary civil society groups that cut across
religious identity lines?614

3. Religious Actors in Conflict Dynamics

611

Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion After September 11, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2006), 59.
612
Lincoln, Holy Terrors, 79-86.
613
Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, 1970). See also, Francesco Caselli and Wilbur
John Coleman, On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict, Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research,
March 2006). Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman, Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection
of Need, Creed, And Greed (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005).
614
Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2002).
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n Do political elites have power over mechanisms that operate to “construct”
religious identities such as the media or using political platforms to promote
metaphors, myths that create “imagined communities,”615 or help shape an
“enemy image”616 of other religious groups? Do they control particular
economic sectors? Are some sectors the ‘province’ of particular groups?
n Do “predatory elites” use extant religious divisions to mobilize political
support, or, “direct public frustration away from their own exploitative
behavior.”617
n Do state leaders have “enemy perceptions”618 of other ethnic groups?
n Do political elites use “religious” conflicts as reference points to mobilize
support for particular purposes?
n Do elites use power and institutions of the state to protect and promote the
interests of their own group over the interests of others?
n Are there religious elite “spoilers”619 in the peace process? (elites who view
peace as preventing them from being able to achieve their primary aims,
interests) Who? Has the state sought to incorporate “spoilers” into the state
apparatus?
615

Anderson, Imagined Communities.
Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,”
International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 108–38. See also, Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,”
Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (1994): 44–76. Ross, Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict. Edward L.
Glaeser, “The Political Economy of Hatred,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, no. 1 (February 1,
2005): 45–86.
617
Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa, 1st ed. (Cambridge
University Press, 2008). See also, Larry Diamond, “Democratic Rollback - The Resurgence of the
Predatory State,” Foreign Affairs 87 (2008): 298.
618
N. Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical
Dimensions of International Relations,” Political Psychology, 1990, 39–82.
619
Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997):
5–53.
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n How does the electoral system map – boundary demarcation and districting –
relate to religious divisions? Is the electoral system likely to promote
“bridging” or “bonding strategies”620 in political parties to gain seats?
n To what extent do incumbent political elites “play the religious card” in order
to maintain power and garner political support from more extremist religious
political groups? To what extent do elites employ religion as a means to
maintain or gain political power?
n What is the organizational structure of dominant religious institutions (e.g.
hierarchical and bureaucratic versus localized)?
n To what degree does clientalism or patronage shape the behavior of religious
elites?

4. Description of Specific Interventions
n What are the different types of initiatives that engage religion in
peacebuilding in this context (elite-level dialogues, committees, or forums;
civil society efforts; foreign entity-driven programs, etc.)?
n How, precisely, do peacebuilding initiatives engage religion in addressing
particular conflict dynamics?
n What are the primary interventions that aim to directly improve social
cohesion at the level of civil society (e.g. dialogue, local peacebuilding, etc.)?
What are the primary interventions that aim to indirectly improve social
620

Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior (Cambridge University Press,
2004).
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cohesion at the level of the state (e.g. governance reforms, aid to marginalized
groups, etc.)?
i. How involved are local religious elites and organizations in these
particular efforts?

5. Conceptual Understandings of Religious Peacebuilding
n How do actors involved in peacebuilding efforts that engage religion articulate
the nature of religion in relation to conflict dynamics?
n Are there differences in the way religious actors vs. “secular” actors articulate
the religious dynamics at play?
n How do civil society actors see the role of religious elites in peacebuilding
efforts? How do religious elites see their own roles in peacebuilding efforts?
n How do peacebuilding and development actors not involved in religious
peacebuilding efforts articulate the nature of religion in relation to conflict
dynamics? The effectiveness of religious peacebuilding efforts?

6. Evidence of Efficacy of Religious Approaches to Peacebuilding
n What lessons have peacebuilding practitioners learned on effective and
ineffective forms of social cohesion programming that explicitly engages
religion or religious groups?
n What are the intervening factors that prohibit or facilitate effectively engaging
religion in peacebuilding efforts?
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